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Following the issuance of the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2009 by the 
Department of Homeland Security, it remains unknown whether homeland security 
programs have been consistently implemented in the nation’s rural areas. Research 
findings have been inconsistent and inconclusive on the degree of implementation. Two 
problems may result from inadequate implementation of these programs: weakened 
national security from the failure to protect critical infrastructure in remote areas and a 
threat to public safety in rural towns. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to 
explore and describe the reasons for possible noncompliance through purposeful 
interviews with 10 law enforcement officials and emergency managers in selected 
Midwestern rural towns. The study’s theoretical foundation was based on Putnam’s 
theory of social capital, which holds that community cohesion develops in direct relation 
to the adaptation of social networks that promote mutual cooperation during times of 
need. The research centered on the question of how rural emergency managers and law 
enforcement officials justified noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines 
of 2009. The interviews and materials were transcribed and analyzed with qualitative 
analytic software using open, axial, and selective coding to identify themes and patterns. 
The study’s key findings disconfirmed conclusions reported in previous studies and 
confirmed compliance with the Guidelines in the studied rural towns. Implications for 
positive social change include informing policymakers, emergency managers, law 
enforcement officials, and researchers. Application of social capital principles in all the 
nation’s remote areas may enhance national security and improve rural public safety.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Background 
 Almost 14 years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and another half 
dozen years following the issuance of the National Preparedness Guidelines (Department 
of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009), the question of whether a homeland security 
program has been consistently implemented on a nationwide basis remains unanswered. 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop all-hazards preparedness guidelines designed to organize and coordinate national 
preparedness strategies, to facilitate a capability and risk-based planning process for use 
by all government levels, and to establish readiness standards to measure progress as well 
as a system to assess the nation’s preparedness capability to respond to major incidents, 
including acts of terrorism (DHS, 2009). Limited available literature on this subject 
indicates that rural communities in previously surveyed Midwest states had not complied 
with those federal guidelines for a variety of reasons. Although the U.S. Constitution 
places primary responsibility on the central government to provide for the safety and 
security of all Americans (Kozak, 2011; U.S. Archives, 2011), in a 2006 lecture at the 
Heritage Foundation, then-DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff made it clear that the essence 
of Homeland Security was recognizing and managing risks. He followed that statement 
with the explanation that the DHS would focus more on risks that were probable and less 
on those that were possible. Secretary Chertoff added that it would be physically and 
financially impractical to guarantee every person and every property protection from all 
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risks, at all times, in all places (Chertoff, 2006).  In his closing remarks, Secretary 
Chertoff stressed that the role of state and local government in disaster preparedness and 
response is one of primacy and common sense, not just a matter of federal responsibility 
as stated in the Constitution. Secretary Chertoff argued that any attempt to execute a 
national plan not built on state and local capabilities is unlikely to succeed (Chertoff, 
2006). 
 The reported reasons for noncompliance varied; they included lack of funding 
(Marion & Cronin, 2009), concerns related to cost effectiveness (Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010), insufficient personnel, inadequate training and equipment (Bryant, 2009), local 
officials not understanding their responsibilities (Oliver, 2007, 2009), and separation or 
remoteness (Stigler, 2010). This variety of rationales for noncompliance reflected 
inconsistent and inconclusive findings by previous studies, all of which called for further 
research on this subject. An identified pattern of noncompliance in other selected rural 
Midwest towns, villages, or hamlets following the completion of this study confirmed a 
condition that poses a threat to U.S. national security and to the public safety of those 
affected communities.  
 The intent of this case study was to confirm or disconfirm the validity of previous 
research findings with the purpose of developing a common rationale for noncompliance 
or compliance, as well as the objective of projecting common generalizations to other 
affected rural communities (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014). Since the nation’s inception in 
1787, a primary responsibility of the central government has been to provide for the 
safety and security of all Americans as stated in Article 4, Section 4 of the U.S. 
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Constitution, which specifies, in part, that the central government will guarantee each 
state of the union a Republican form of government as well as protection against invasion 
and domestic violence (Kozak, 2011, p. 58; U.S. Archives, 2011, p. 7). On the Tuesday 
morning of September 11, 2001, however, the central government failed to fully 
implement the safety and security measures necessary to prevent 19 Islamist terrorists 
from ramming three hijacked U.S. commercial airliners into the Twin Towers in New 
York City and the Pentagon in Alexandria, Virginia, and to cause the crash of a fourth 
airliner into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Passengers on United Airlines Flight 
93 believed that their airliner was intended to be flown into the White House or Capitol 
Building in Washington, DC, and therefore caused it to crash (Ward, Kiernan, & Mabrey, 
2006). 
 On August 16, 2001, some 26 days earlier, Zacarias Moussaoui, who would have 
been the 20th hijacker, was taken into custody by U.S. Immigration agents after he 
attracted the attention of a flight instructor at a Pan Am Flight Academy in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. Moussaoui, a native Moroccan, had expressed an interest in learning how to 
fly an airliner but not in how to take off or land. During questioning, he admitted to being 
an al-Qaeda member and confessed that his role in the attacks was to fly a fifth 
commercial airliner into the White House at some later date. Of the 20 identified 
terrorists who took part in the 9/11 attacks, one was from Lebanon, another was from 
Egypt, and a fourth was from the United Arab Emirates (Ward et al., 2006). The 16 other 
terrorists were all from Saudi Arabia, a country the United States regards as an ally in the 
Arab world (Mahan & Griset, 2008).   
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 The attacks of 9/11 reflected a degree of commitment, involving detailed long-
term planning, funding, training, and collaboration by al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan 
who coordinated the joint operations beyond two continents and an ocean. The attacks 
were executed effectively in spite of a pattern of terrorist activity against U.S. interests 
worldwide that had developed and escalated since the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. On 
9/11, the intended targets were symbols of America’s financial, economic, military, and 
political strength (McEntire, 2009). These previously undetected attacks against the 
homeland served to shatter the prevailing illusion that America was invulnerable to attack 
from external forces. They happened despite previous implementation of what were 
deemed impregnable security measures designed to prevent attacks such as those inflicted 
on the U.S. Navy fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Piddock, 2014). Much as U.S. political 
and military leaders had either ignored or misread the incidents that led up to the Pearl 
Harbor attack, the U.S. intelligence, diplomatic, military, and law enforcement 
communities failed to make critical connections between seemingly separate incidents 
that eventually led to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Although both attacks shook the 
foundation of America’s national security networks, the attackers’ objectives differed. 
After these disasters, blame and responsibility for the attacks were rightly placed on the 
inability of U.S. political leaders and heads of the key intelligence, diplomatic, and 
military organizations to effectively read the threats as they developed at the time. In the 
case of the September 11 attacks, however, independent researchers such as Bergen 
(2011), and members of the 9/11 Commission (2004), found that blame must also be 
shared by the federal law enforcement community, which simply failed to shift its focus 
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from the conduct of primarily criminal investigative work to investigating terrorist 
threats, as well as by the George W. Bush administration, which chose to disregard the 
threats that had developed over the preceding decade (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 
2011).  
 Almost immediately after the attacks, the George W. Bush administration and 
Congress proceeded to direct, enact, and implement a number of security measures 
designed to prevent any such future attacks and to bring the perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks to justice. Among the measures enacted were the USA Patriot Act of 2001; the 
Transportation and Security Act of 2001; and, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which 
established the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. Upon becoming 
operational in March 2003, the new DHS was directed by President Bush to produce and 
distribute the National Preparedness Guidelines for use at all government levels to help 
in developing preparedness strategies and reporting major incidents (DHS, 2009). These 
guidelines included the initial National Response Plan (NRP), which was subsequently 
replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF), and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). The NRP and the NIMS were completed in 2004 and then 
issued nationwide to all levels of government, including Tribal Nations, in 2005 to help 
them in the development and implementation of preparedness programs designed to 
protect residents and critical infrastructure in urban areas, small towns, and rural 
communities. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the Katrina Hurricane disaster in 2005, 
states such as California, Nevada, Texas, Florida, and North Carolina saw the safety and 
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security value of adopting the federally proposed guidelines, along with the revised NRF 
to tailor state preparedness programs suited to their needs (DHS, 2009).  
 Some of those programs, like one implemented by the State of Florida (presented 
in this paper as Appendix D), are regarded as models for other states to copy. Most states 
chose to develop and implement measures designed to protect urban areas having high 
population density and vulnerable infrastructure. Others determined that the 
implementation of emergency preparedness measures in small towns and rural areas was 
not justified by the cost (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009). As a result, some states, including 
New York, decided to apply available homeland security resources primarily in their 
urban areas (Bryant, 2009). This inconsistent implementation of the National 
Preparedness Guidelines appeared to have prevailed in a number of Midwest states, thus 
creating a national security and public safety problem (DHS, 2009). As stated, the intent 
of this case study was to examine the rationales cited by rural leaders in those areas that 
had not adopted the national preparedness guidelines despite the probability that their 
rural communities could be subject to future natural or manmade disasters. The 
previously described condition of noncompliance explained the study’s identified 
problem. The study’s purpose illuminated the reasons for the prevailing national security 
and public safety problems in the studied rural communities. This study’s findings may 
be compared with those of compliant communities to foster improved safety conditions 
that promote positive social change. Positive social change may result from new policies 
that emerge following the identification, exploration, and understanding of the reasons 
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for noncompliance with national preparedness guidelines that affect national security and 
public safety in rural areas (Bryant, 2009; DHS, 2009).  
 As stated above, the identified inconsistency in compliance created two social 
problems related to public safety and security. One weakened national security by failing 
to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and the other threatened public safety in 
Midwest towns and rural communities where local leaders had not established any 
additional safety measures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (DHS, 2009). 
This problem was underscored by an apparent lack of literature addressing 
noncompliance in some rural areas. The available literature was limited to five studies 
concerning this subject published within the past 5 years. Second, the findings in those 
five studies provided different reasons for noncompliance. A study by Bryant (2009) 
generalized the challenges of emergency management in rural communities and small 
towns, underscoring their historical lack of compliance with the national preparedness 
guidelines. Bryant’s study stressed the theoretical relevance of social capital to the 
concept of emergency management in rural areas. Marion and Cronin (2009) found that 
22% of Ohio’s small town and rural police chiefs had not established any new safety and 
security measures since the 9/11 attacks due to lack of funding. In his study, Oliver 
(2009) concluded that the primary reason for noncompliance was likely a lack of 
understanding by local leaders of their roles, duties, and responsibilities in the post-9/11 
era. Chenoweth and Clarke (2009) asserted in their study that federal resources allocated 
to the states were not being distributed evenly by state and urban leaders, who appeared 
predisposed to protecting their own jurisdictions. Stigler (2010), however, determined 
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that noncompliance in small towns and rural communities in Wisconsin might have been 
due in part to a lack of local resources but had just as likely been due to regional 
remoteness. The purpose of this case study was to resolve these disparities by finding 
consensus regarding the reasons following face-to-face interviews, instead of through the 
conduct of surveys (Yin, 2014). 
Problem Statement 
 In spite of the fact that terrorism and natural disasters continue to pose serious 
threats to homeland security and emergency preparedness, some questions have been 
raised as to why the National Preparedness Guidelines of 2009 have not been adopted by 
many small towns or rural communities in some Midwestern states, whereas they have 
been implemented by the vast majority of the nation’s metropolitan and urban centers 
(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009; DHS, 2009; Florida Division of Emergency Management 
[FDEM], 2008-2013). A preliminary review of available literature led to the conclusion 
that the inconsistent condition of compliance created two social problems: (a) weakened 
national security due to failure to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and (b) 
threats to public safety in Midwest towns and rural communities where local leaders had 
not established any new safety and security measures since the 9/11 attacks. The problem 
was also made apparent by the limited literature available on the subject of 
noncompliance with the implementation of emergency preparedness strategies in some 
rural areas. Even more so, the problem was apparent in the lack of consensus among the 
researchers who published those studies on the reasons for noncompliance in their areas 
of inquiry (Bryant, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). A study 
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by Bryant (2009) generalized that challenges of emergency management in rural areas 
were related to resource limitations, separation and remoteness, low population density, 
and a general lack of communication.  
 Marion and Cronin (2009) found that 57 of Ohio’s 260 small town and rural 
police chiefs had not established any new security measures since the 9/11 attacks due to 
a lack of funding. In his study, Oliver (2009) concluded that the primary reason for 
noncompliance was a lack of understanding of local leaders’ specific roles, 
responsibilities, and duties in the post-9/11 era. Chenoweth and Clarke (2009) asserted in 
their study that federal resources allocated to the states were not being distributed evenly 
by state and urban leaders, who appeared predisposed to protecting their own 
jurisdictions, leaving rural areas to manage with available resources. A more recent 
study, Stigler (2010), determined that the status of noncompliance in small towns and 
rural communities in the state of Wisconsin might be due partly to a lack of resources but 
was more likely attributable to regional remoteness. This is generally what was known 
about the problem; what were not known were the common reasons for continued 
noncompliance in rural communities and small towns in some Midwestern states. Absent 
a law or regulation to mandate the implementation of preparedness strategies in rural 
areas, universal compliance becomes an ethical, moral, and commonsense responsibility 
for local leaders. Compliance, then, is based on the need to provide equal safety and 
security for all Americans, whether they live in urban or rural areas. The existing 
literature, although limited, provided the foundation for this study, which focused on 
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exploring the reasons and examining the differing rationales for varying levels of 
noncompliance with national preparedness guidelines (DHS, 2009). 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe the reasons 
that a number of rural communities in the Midwest were not complying with 
implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009).  
By extension, the guidelines applied to all rural and remote communities throughout the 
U.S. and its territories. As developed, the guidelines provide strategies intended to help 
rural communities and small towns develop security plans that prepare them for, respond 
to, and recover from manmade or natural disasters. When viewed in this context, this 
study was unique because it addressed an under-researched area that available literature 
was unable to fully explain (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 
2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), and also because it explored the potential implications 
that noncompliance may have for national security and public safety issues (DHS, 2008b, 
2009). Results of the study findings will be shared with participating communities, as 
well as with other local, county, state, and federal emergency planners, for use as a basis 
for comparison. Other practical contributions likely to be derived from the study’s results 
include enhanced knowledge of the underlying forces that currently resist the concept of 




Qualitative Central  
           How did rural civic leaders (mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, emergency 
managers, and city attorneys) in selected Midwest communities justify noncompliance 
with National Preparedness Guidelines that were issued for implementation in 2009?  
Subquestions 
 RQ1—Qualitative. How had noncompliance with the National Preparedness  
Guidelines in the post-9/11 era reflected in the ability, or inability, of the studied rural 
communities to meet their governing goals and resource needs as they related to local 
public safety and national security matters?  
 RQ2—Qualitative. What role did funding play in the ability or inability of these 
rural communities to fully implement the National Preparedness Guidelines? 
 RQ3---Qualitative. What role did regional remoteness play in decisions made by 
these civic leaders not to implement the National Preparedness Guidelines in their 
communities?  
 RQ4—Qualitative. What understanding did civic leaders have about their 
responsibilities and duties regarding the implementation of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines in rural areas? 
Theoretical Framework for the Study 
 Currently, no established theory exists for homeland security or emergency 
management (Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004). This is due to the multifaceted 
responsibilities of the DHS. The same reason holds true for the discipline of emergency 
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management, the primary function of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) within the DHS, which comprises only one of those facets (DHS, 2008a; Reese, 
2013). McEntire (2004) examined 19 theoretical elements and established theories he 
thought reflected a relationship to the discipline of emergency management. McEntire’s 
final analysis failed to find one theory or combination of elements that encompassed the 
full range of the discipline’s functions. Since then, academics and practitioners from the 
Naval Post Graduate School in Northern California (Bellavita, 2010) and the 
Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC (Reese, 2013) have found and 
adopted a theoretical relation between Putnam’s (2000) social capital theory and its 
positive benefits when applied in rural communities. The origin and source of social 
capital can be traced to the works of Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) as he traveled through 
early America. Among other things, he observed that Americans were prone to meet 
periodically in public squares to discuss issues of mutual concern in furtherance of the 
democratic process. During the 20th century, L. J. Hanifan (1916) made a reference to 
social cohesion and personal investment in the community as goodwill, mutual sympathy, 
and social interaction, which normally result in benefits for individuals as well as for the 
community as a whole (Smith, 2001-2009).  Along with the exploration of rationales for 
noncompliance with emergency preparedness guidelines in the studied rural 
communities, a collateral effort was made to determine the extent that those communities 
had adopted the principles of social capital theory (Putnam, 2000).  
 More currently, the three authorities most commonly associated with social 
capital are Bourdieu (1983) with regard to social theory, Coleman (1988) in discussions 
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of social context in education, and Putnam (2000), who launched social capital as a 
popular focus for research and policy discussions (Smith, 2001-2009). The resurgence of 
interest in social capital as a remedy for today’s social problems draws on the assumption 
that those problems are reflections of a weakened civil society. The argument promoted 
by supporters of social capital theory is that a low level of social capital in a given 
community leads to a rigid and unresponsive political system. Putnam, writing from a 
political perspective, argued that it is better to have more social capital than less as a 
precondition for effective government and economic growth. Putnam explained that 
social capital is about the value of social networks that tend to bond people with similar 
interests and bridge diverse people with norms of trust and reciprocity (Claridge, 2004). 
These are the social values that facilitate collaboration, cooperation, coordination, and 
communication during emergencies, particularly in rural communities (Bryant, 2009).  
Nature of the Study 
 The qualitative approach to this inquiry involved a multisite single-case study that 
aligned with the inquiry’s stated objectives. This approach provided for the formulation 
of interview protocols designed to facilitate the development of answers to the research 
questions, the coding of the data collected, and the analysis and interpretation of the data 
to develop themes that would lead to an understanding of the meaning of the case. The 
selection of this design followed the rationale that the concept drives the research, and 
that the study’s purpose drives the analysis (Patton, 2002). The research questions were 
open ended and formed to elicit specific answers from eight to 12 rural civic leaders in 
four Midwestern states. Those answers provided varying reasons for noncompliance with 
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emergency preparedness guidelines that were developed to enhance the safety and 
security of communities (Creswell, 2013). However, lack of funding was likely to be 
offered as the primary reason for noncompliance with federal preparedness guidelines 
based on an assessment of threat, risk, vulnerability, and population in a given 
community. As such, the levels of threat, risk, vulnerability, and population varied within 
each study site, but regardless of funding, it was still important to determine the particular 
reasons for noncompliance at each of the studied sites. The research findings provided a 
view of the noncompliance problem in the studied sites from a regional perspective.  
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Emergency Management Defined 
 Given the widespread use and misuse of terminology in politics and the media, for 
the purposes of this study, it is important to define the meanings of certain terms that are 
commonly used within the disciplines of homeland security and emergency management, 
such as terrorism, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism, as well as to clarify the roles they 
play in the disciplines of homeland security and emergency management.  
Terrorism has many usable definitions, and its meaning often depends on what 
federal agency is defining the term. Regardless of their individual definitions, they are all 
based on the federal law, which is codified as follows: 
 Title 22, of the U.S. Code, Section 2656 (d) defines terrorism as the premeditated, 
 politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
 national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
 International terrorism involves citizens or the territory of more than one country. 
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 Terrorist groups are groups or sub-groups that practice international terrorism. 
 (White, 2006, p. 6)   
Antiterrorism can be said to emerge from an understanding of, and considered 
responses to, terrorism and therefore includes those measures designed to protect 
populations and infrastructure from terrorist acts. By its nature and design, antiterrorism 
is a defensive measure or series of measures intended to reduce the vulnerability of 
possible targets to such acts. These defensive measures often include limited response 
and containment capability by DHS or FBI officials (DOD, 2007). Conversely, 
counterterrorism can also refer to offensive strategies intended to prevent, deter, preempt, 
and respond to acts of terrorism (White House, 2011). These offensive measures can be 
established strategies designed to deny terrorists opportunities to carry out their tactics 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2007). 
 Curiously, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 does not contain a specific 
definition of homeland security. However, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
of 2002 defined homeland security as “concerted national efforts to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize 
the damage, and recover from attacks that do occur” (Office of Homeland Security 
[OHS], 2002, p. 2). This, however, is not so much a definition as it is a strategy. As 
comprised, the enterprise of homeland security is difficult to define because of its many 
facets, of which emergency management is but one (Bellavita, 2010; Reese, 2013). 
 The discipline of emergency management is simpler to define, due not just to its 
founding in policy statements, but also to the articulated principles that guide the process. 
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Simply defined, emergency management is the discipline in which practitioners identify 
and assess risk and develop strategies to avoid that risk. The federal government plays a 
key role in the process when state and local jurisdictions are unable to deal with a disaster 
because its scope overwhelms available resources. In summary, emergency management 
is the discipline that deals with the identification and analysis of public hazards, assesses 
the public’s mitigation of and preparedness for that risk, and coordinates the resources to 
respond and recover from natural or manmade disasters (Bullock, Haddow, Coppola, & 
Yeletaysi, 2009, p. 2). 
The External Threat Defined 
Al-Qaeda, which is Arabic for “the base,” was established by Osama bin-Laden 
in 1988 for Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, whose troops 
invaded that country to support a faltering procommunist government. Once the jihadists 
succeeded in expelling the Soviet forces, bin-Laden sought other goals through which he 
could use his army of followers. Among his developed goals were to expel all Westerners 
and nonbelievers from Muslim countries, fighting the United States and its allies, and 
overthrowing Muslim governments deemed apostate or nonIslamic (Gunaratna, 2003). 
Al-Qaeda’s ultimate goal, however, remains the establishment of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate 
based on Sharia law that extends from the Iberian Peninsula to the Philippine 
Archipelago. This is the geographical area that comprised the Empire of Islam during its 
peak of conquest between the 7th and 11th centuries (Karsh, 2006; O’Connor, 2009).  
 Psychologists such as Post (2004) and Victoroff (2005) have observed that 
although terrorists tend to form a heterogeneous group, there are some common traits 
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among substate group members. For example, they hold extreme opinions and emotions 
regarding their belief systems. Terrorists are driven by personal stakes such as perceived 
oppression, persecution, or humiliation at the hands of identified governments. In 
addition, they seem to exhibit a low level of cognitive flexibility, which includes low 
tolerance for ambiguity, distaste for complexity, and disregard for multiple layers of 
reality that lead to a mistaken sense of causality and a need to blame others. Finally, 
terrorists harbor a capacity to suppress all moral constraints against harming innocents 
due to acquired, individual, or group influences. Terrorists’ belief system allows them to 
constrain individual morals as long as they believe that they are doing God’s work 
(Mahan & Griset, 2008; O’Connor, 2009). 
The Internal Threat Defined 
 Just as dangerous as the threats posed by foreign nonstate actors, are those posed 
by homegrown terrorists. Americans were first introduced to international terrorism in the 
early 1970s, but it was not until the early 1980s that terrorists began to produce a rising 
number of victims in the United States.  Although the overwhelming number of 
bombings and shootings were single-issue terrorist acts and criminal vendetta shootings, 
those incidents involved criminal low-level activity that still served to capture public 
attention and teach the lesson that terrorism is not just something that happens 
somewhere else. A general typology of domestic terrorist groups operating at the time 
included White leftists, Black militants, and right-wing extremists. In 2002, an FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) arrested six suspects in Buffalo, New York, for supporting 
known jihadists. This incident was labeled as domestic terrorism because it occurred in 
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the US (White, 2006). In contrast, the 9/11 attacks were classified as international 
terrorism because of their origin outside the US. White leftist and Black militant groups 
such as the Weathermen and the Black Panthers were driven by a revolutionary ideology 
and the aim of changing political policy through direct threats against the central 
government. They tended to embrace Marxism, target the economic status quo, select 
symbolic targets of capitalism, and be based in urban areas. By 1989, these groups had 
been eradicated by law enforcement through penetration, conviction, and imprisonment 
(White, 2006). White right-wing extremist groups such as the Aryan Nation, Christian 
Identity, and the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) are antigovernment, anti-Marxist, and very 
religious. Their purpose is to defend the status quo, or return to an earlier period. Their 
common belief is that the Bible will guide their actions, and a gun will defend those 
actions. These groups support the economic system but not the concept of distributing the 
nation’s wealth. They prefer to establish bases in rural areas and focus their attacks on 
symbols of federal and state government authority. Their political beliefs accept only the 
county sheriff as the legal authority, and their social views reflect anti-Semitic, anti-
Black, anti-Catholic, and anti-minority sentiments (White, 2006). Unlike left-wing 
groups of the 1980s, right-wing extremist groups prevail to this day as neo-Nazis, 
Skinheads, Survivalists, Christian Patriots, Posse Comitatus, the New Order, Militias, and 
perpetrators of “Hate” crimes.  Although these groups’ ideologies may differ, they tend to 
employ the same tactics with the use of arson, bombs, and firearms. What is important to 
understand about these internal and external threats is that they are ever present in 
America’s urban and rural areas (Doak et al., 2014; Piddock, 2014).  
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Homeland Security Strategies in the Post-9/11 Era 
 Among the George W. Bush Administration’s immediate domestic reactions to 
the 9/11 attacks were implementation of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which provided 
U.S. intelligence and federal law enforcement agencies with enhanced authority to 
conduct investigations of suspected terrorist activity; and implementation of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, whose provisions created the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Bullock et al., 2009; McEntire, 2009). In international affairs, on 
October 7, 2001, President Bush, with consent from Congress as required by the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973, ordered the invasion of Afghanistan after U.S. intelligence 
advisors determined that the architect of the 9/11 attacks was al-Qaeda leader Osama bin-
Laden, who was being provided a safe haven by the Taliban, a terrorist organization 
controlling the government of that country at the time. The George W. Bush 
Administration promoted the invasion of Afghanistan as a war of necessity. The public 
was informed that the reason for the invasion was to capture bin Laden, dismantle al-
Qaeda, and remove its safe haven by eliminating the Taliban. During the following 2 
years, the Taliban was diminished as a military threat, and although many members of the 
al-Qaeda leadership were killed, bin-Laden and his second in command, Ayman 
Zawahiri, were able to escape into Pakistan due to a change of focus by the Bush 
Administration (Kamien, 2006; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Woerner, 2013).  
 In March 2003, as the DHS was becoming operational, the George W. Bush 
Administration shifted military forces from the war in Afghanistan to be used in the 
invasion of Iraq. The reasons provided to the world for the invasion of Iraq were to keep 
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Saddam Hussein from acquiring or building a nuclear weapon and to prevent Iraq from 
becoming a future base for terrorist attacks against the US and its Western allies. Critics 
of the George W. Bush Administration, however, have pointed out that because no U.S. 
interests were being directly threatened, and no evidence of nuclear production was 
revealed, the invasion of Iraq was one of choice because it did not meet the requirements 
of a just war under international law. In spite of its false premise, the Iraq war did not end 
until December 2011, following the loss of thousands of American and allied lives, at a 
cost of over a trillion dollars in the 8-year period. The legacy of the Iraq war is that 
political issues were not resolved and Iraq is again on the verge of a civil war between 
Sunni and Shiite factions due to divisions underscored by centuries of sectarian violence 
(Crowley, 2014; De Luce, 2014).  
 In a recent statement regarding the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama 
announced that it would end for the US in December 2014. The president signaled that 
with the killing of Osama bin-Laden in May 2011, and the training of that nation’s 
security forces to control a potentially resurgent Taliban, there was no justification for the 
continued presence of U.S. military forces in that country beyond an advisory role, and 
then only if requested by the host country (Borosage, 2014; Crowley, 2014; De Luce, 
2014). However, following an agreement signed in December 2014 between President 
Barack Obama and Afghanistan’s newly elected President, Ashraf Ghani, the US will 
continue to maintain a force of 10,000 troops in that country for another 2 years, with 
these troops serving primarily in support and training roles. To some observers, President 
Obama’s decision to authorize a more active role for the remaining U.S. forces suggested 
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a lingering concern about the Afghan army’s ability to fight. The agreement also 
authorizes the U.S. forces remaining in that country to carry out military operations 
against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets (O’Donnell, 2014).     
Assumptions 
 However scientific or objective it may be, any attempted study is likely to be 
grounded on a particular researcher’s assumptions, which are usually the byproducts of 
ingrained socialization, personal observations, education, and experience, all of which 
serve to form the researcher’s specific set of core beliefs and overall worldview. Whether 
individually accepted as aligned paradigms that are proven, assumptions are difficult to 
leave at the door before commencing research on a scientific research project. A 
researcher benefits from open recognition of these personal philosophies to ensure that 
the study is not influenced in a way that prevents a valid outcome. In this study, my 
personal assumptions were based on my observations, experience, and formal training, 
which led me to the original idea that developed into my study’s premise (Simon, 2011). 
In turn, that original idea helped form the research problem, as well as the research 
questions and how the information was to be sought to answer those questions (Patton, 
2002). One such assumption was that I would employ the logic of inductive reasoning 
while studying the topic in context to generate an outcome. In the end, this process 
allowed me to describe my study findings in detail, just as the research questions drove 
my field experiences (Creswell, 2013). 
 Assumptions are not always within a researcher’s control but should be used to 
guide the study’s purpose when they are recognized (Creswell, 2013). However, simply 
22 
 
recognizing assumptions is not sufficient to justify their probable truth. Appropriate 
action must be taken to address them; otherwise, the study may not progress as originally 
planned (Simon, 2011). For example, an assumption brought to this study was based on 
the concern that rural civic leaders would not answer the interview questions honestly in 
order to avert blame for lack of compliance with implementation of national emergency 
preparedness strategies if a disaster did strike their rural or small town community. 
  Having recognized this assumption, I determined that an expressed promise of 
confidentiality and anonymity would more likely preserve the validity of their responses 
and thus the integrity of the study (Creswell, 2013). Another assumption recognized in 
this study was that some civic leaders in communities without implemented emergency 
preparedness plans might not have been able to develop those safety and security 
strategies for valid reasons. They might have been noncompliant not necessarily because 
they did not care about their residents, but because they actually lacked the necessary 
funding, personnel, equipment, and/or training to implement any preparedness guidelines. 
I also assumed that rural residents should not be treated differently than large city 
dwellers simply because of their choice of habitat. In applied research, it is assumed that 
societal problems can be understood and solved with knowledge. In action research, it is 
assumed that people in certain settings can solve problems by studying themselves. In 
summary, during the literature review, I examined ideas, likely theories, methods, and 
various interpretations as an evaluator. Throughout this study, I questioned the validity, 
reliability, and generalizability of my evaluation, as well as the hidden assumptions that 
surrounded my data collection efforts (Patton, 2002).  
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Scope and Delimitations 
 Delimitations are the characteristics that tend to limit the scope and define the 
boundaries of a study (Simon, 2011). Unlike assumptions, however, where the researcher 
may only have some control, or study limitations, where the researcher has no control, a 
study’s delimitations and scope are in a researcher’s control. This is so because a study’s 
characteristics include the choice of objectives, the research questions, its theoretical 
perspectives, the population selected, and the method of inquiry chosen to examine the 
problem. From the initial abstract idea to the study methodology, findings, and analysis, 
delimitations work to set a boundary on what the research questions will be able to 
determine (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). 
 For this study, I chose to pursue my conceptual idea, which was that disparities 
exist between the nation’s urban and rural areas in how post-9/11 emergency 
preparedness strategies are being implemented. This idea was only partially confirmed by 
limited available literature. In addition, the findings of those few studies were determined 
to be inconclusive and inconsistent. The identified problem was followed by the aligned 
theory of good governance and mutual assistance during times of need (Montoya, 2011; 
Putnam, 2000). To collect the information required by the research questions, I 
determined who the selected participants should be based on the professions and 
positions that they held in their respective rural communities (Creswell, 2013). Finally, I 
decided to delimit my study to a geographical four-state area in the nation’s Midwest 
(Simon, 2011). Even with these imposed delimitations, I remain optimistic that the study 
findings will prove useful in filling the current literature gap and providing potential 
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remedies that may be applicable to rural communities in other states (Patton, 2002; 
Rudestam & Newton, 2007). 
Limitations of the Study 
 Limitations are those variables that will always be out of a researcher’s control 
and are readily evident in all components of the dissertation process. For example, if a 
researcher’s problem requires an investigation of only a single facet of the national 
preparedness guidelines as they apply to rural communities, then the information that is 
collected will only be as good as the questions being asked. In this case, the findings may 
not be applicable to medium-size or larger metropolitan areas, and if the study calls for 
the purposeful sampling of preselected civic officials, then validity of the findings 
becomes dependent on the truthfulness of their responses. In addition, the findings may 
be limited to only those rural towns and communities to which the study’s findings may 
be generalized (Simon, 2011). This study was limited by a specific geographical area 
because it would have been impractical to examine the entire 97.5% of land area the U.S. 
Census Bureau has classified as rural (US Census Bureau, 2010). This land area is home 
for approximately 55 million people, or 18 % of the entire U.S. population (National 
League of Cities [NLC], 2014; US Census Bureau, 2010). An evident limitation of the 
dissertation process is that a study usually reflects only a review of the stated problem 
during the short period of its examination (Simon, 2011).  
Significance of the Study 
 The significance of this qualitative case study resided in the aim of discovering 
and describing the reasons why an undetermined number of rural communities in the 
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Midwest were not complying with implementation of the 2009 National Preparedness 
Guidelines (Bryant, 2009; DHS, 2009; Stigler, 2010). The study’s findings may also 
apply to rural communities in other U.S. states and territories. The issued National 
Preparedness Guidelines provide strategies intended to help rural communities develop 
security plans that will prepare them to respond to, recover from, and mitigate against, 
manmade or natural disasters (DHS, 2009). A prevailing perception in the field of 
homeland security and emergency management is that the nation’s safety net, even 
following the presidential directive of 2003, is still in a state of mixed compliance, with 
most urban jurisdictions complying whereas leaders in rural communities do not seem to 
know what their duties and responsibilities are in regard to the implementation of 
emergency preparedness measures in their jurisdictions (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; 
Oliver, 2007, 2009). This study was designed to collect data from identified civic leaders 
that were analyzed and interpreted to gain an understanding of the factors influencing 
noncompliance in some areas of the nation’s rural regions and not in others (National 
Association of Development Organizations [NADO], 2005). Intended practical 
contributions of the study were to advance knowledge about the subject, to provide 
guidance to homeland security officials and emergency managers in affected states, and 
to offer instructional value to local and rural civic leaders, who may use the study’s 
findings for comparison with their current programs or simply use them to develop new 
and appropriate strategies for their rural communities.  
 Humankind has suffered terrorism in one form or another for thousands of years 
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007), and although militant Islamic terrorism has only been practiced 
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by certain Middle East groups for the past 35 years (Mahan & Griset, 2009; McEntire, 
2009), it is likely to continue until the current generation of terrorists is eliminated, 
educated, or provided some economic, social, or political concessions (Crenshaw, 2005; 
Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism experts Crenshaw and Hoffman have argued that terrorists 
simply want a seat at the policy-making table, while others counter that the current strain 
of terrorists wants access to the table only to blow it up. In either case, it seems unwise 
for concerned rural civic leaders to ignore the continuing threat from terrorism, and too 
dangerous for them to turn their backs on the threat it poses to all the nation communities, 
regardless of size (Giblin, Schafer, & Burruss, 2009).  
Implications for Social Change 
 This study was purposeful not only because it addressed an under researched area 
that the available literature did not fully explain (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), but also because it explored 
the implications that noncompliance with the DHS preparedness guidelines might have 
for national security and public safety issues (DHS, 2009). Results of the study will be 
shared with the participating communities, as well as with other local, county, state, and 
federal emergency planners for use as a basis for comparison. Other contributions likely 
to derive from the study’s results include enhanced knowledge of the underlying forces 
that currently resist the concept of compliance (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000). Several 
other implications for social change may result from addressing a problem that concerns 
national security and the status of rural public safety, in that the study may prompt the 
development of new policies or studies (DHS, 2009). As long as humankind has to deal 
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with earth, wind, fire, and rain, the nation will experience some form of natural disaster 
(Pfeiffer, 2014). And as long as the current strain of terrorist activity remains a threat, 
Americans will continue to see acts of terrorism committed in civilized settings. In a 
more peaceful world, preparedness guidelines would likely not be necessary, but in the 
currently conflicted international environment, they have become a necessity for all of 
the nation’s communities, urban and rural (Giblin, Schafer, & Burruss, 2009).  
Summary 
 The intent of Chapter 1 was to describe the study’s focus; to introduce the 
problem as it developed following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and to 
state the central government’s responsibility to serve and to protect Americans from the 
continuing threat of terrorism. This description was followed by an explanation of the 
strategies developed to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against all 
natural or manmade hazards (DHS, 2009). Through description of the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, the chapter established the need for today’s homeland security strategies to counter 
the continued threat of terrorism (Piddock, 2014). This chapter also defined related 
operational terms, as well as the continuing problem of noncompliance with nationally 
issued preparedness measures in some rural communities (Bryant, 2009; McEntire, 
2009). Definitions were followed by discussion of the study’s purpose, as well as its 
nature, scope, limitations, significance, and implications for social change (Simon, 2011; 
Yin, 2014). In summary, this chapter served as an introduction to the safety and security 
problems that the nation’s emergency managers face today (McEntire, 2009; O’Connor, 
2009). In addition to providing background on the problem and stating its significance to 
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the homeland, this chapter set the foundation for a more in-depth exploration of the 
causal reasons for the prevailing safety and security issues confronting rural America. 
The chapter also described the considerable efforts U.S. counterterrorism experts and 
emergency managers have made to prevent future terrorist attacks on the homeland, as 
well as to prepare for and recover from natural disasters effectively (Bullock et al., 2009; 
Haddow et al., 2011). Although emergency preparedness has become a less urgent matter 
for some observers in the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a report 
by the Heritage Foundation reminds counterterrorism experts as well as the public that 
the threat continues, by recounting 60 terrorist plots that have been thwarted since the 
initial 9/11 attacks (Piddock, 2014; Zuckerman et al., 2013). An objective observer can 
only speculate as to when committed terrorists will abandon their efforts to attack 
hardened targets in urban centers, and instead turn their attention toward unprotected 
rural areas. In Chapter 2, I analyze, synthesize, and assess the available literature on the 
question of homeland security in rural America.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 The 9/11 attacks served to introduce the concept and probable permanence of 
what Americans have now come to understand as homeland security, by exposing the 
vulnerability of a free and open society to foreign and domestic threats (Piddock, 2014). 
Although it can be assumed that the American illusion of invulnerability existed prior to 
September 11, 2001, the thought that a rational foreign government would ever consider 
exploiting it did not seem to occur to this nation’s leaders at the time (Piddock, 2014). 
History has also shown that American political leaders did not give much thought to the 
possibility that a group of irrational nonstate actors would attempt such a bold operation. 
Upon reflection, the 9/11 attacks illuminated the confliction of a national sense of 
security based on illusion, with an act designed to produce insecurity, driven by the 
seemingly delusional goal of reviving a long-lost Islamic empire (Gunaratna, 2003; 
Karsh, 2006; Piddock, 2014). In spite of its organizational reach in 2001, core al-Qaeda 
was unable to achieve that goal. In June 2014, however, a former al-Qaeda affiliate in 
Iraq declared itself to be a worldwide Caliphate and renamed itself the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Although the Obama Administration, the United Nations, and some 
news organizations refer to the same terrorist group as ISIL, which stands for the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant, the group decided to rename itself the Islamic State during 
the same period (Sanchez, 2015).   
 Understanding the threat to the homeland in general and to the nation’s small 
towns and rural communities in particular requires an understanding of the ideological 
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motivations behind terrorism (FEMA, 2004), as well as the groups that pose that threat by 
adopting those ideologies. Implications for the nation’s adaptation toward homeland 
security are primarily derived from public unease regarding the threat of terrorism, which 
was of little concern before the 9/11 attacks but is now one of five major federal law 
enforcement issues facing the country today. The other four are drug trafficking, firearms 
trafficking, financial fraud, and human trafficking (Department of Justice [DOJ], 2011). 
Americans now agree that the central government should address these problems with all 
the resources at its disposal (PEW, 2013; TIME, CNN/ORC Poll, 2013). 
 Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, homeland security assumed a new 
meaning following the actions of the George W. Bush Administration and Congress. The 
rush to assess and control damage was not the product of forethought, but a reaction to 
the fear of a follow-up attack. In the wake of the initial attacks, Congress and the Bush 
Administration were propelled to act quickly in efforts to develop strategies that were 
specifically designed to prevent any follow-up attack. They acted without the benefit of 
knowing when or where such an attack might occur, but they did direct federal 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to initiate investigations with the purpose of 
identifying perpetrators of the attacks and bringing them to justice. The government’s 
reaction was conducted in tandem with the invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s home 
base (Hashim, 2006).  
 The Afghanistan war continued even after the killing of Osama bin-Laden, the 
chief architect of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Similarly, on the domestic 
front, the concept of homeland security remains an evolving process. Much has been 
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written about the causes and reasons for the 9/11 attacks, along with underlying questions 
of how U.S. joint internal security systems allowed them to happen. As in most passing 
events of this nature, the view always seems to be clearer in retrospect. In this study, I 
was peripherally concerned with the consequences of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars; and 
more in the legacy of militant Islamic ideology adopted by Islamic groups such as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
which have been spawned by the now diminished al-Qaeda central organization that is 
still operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Crowley, M. 2014; Crowley, P. J. 2013; 
O’Donnell, 2014). This study’s intent was to examine the levels of implementation of the 
National Preparedness Guidelines in some of the nation’s rural communities and small 
towns following the review of available literature that specifically addressed the subject 
of preparedness for natural and manmade disasters in those remote areas (Bryant, 2009; 
Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). 
 In spite of the threats that natural and manmade disasters continue to pose to the 
nation’s communities, the question of homeland security for all rural communities and 
small towns remains unanswered. In light of this unanswered question, I sought to 
determine what valid rationales prevailed to explain why a majority of the nation’s 
communities had adopted the National Preparedness Guidelines issued in 2005 and 2009 
(DHS, 2009) whereas many rural areas in the Midwest had not (Bryant, 2009; Caruson & 
MacManus, 2005). The prevailing condition of inconsistent compliance has created two 
related social problems. First, it has affected national security by creating a gap in the 
nation’s antiterrorism network by failing to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas. 
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Additionally, it has threatened public safety in Midwestern communities where local 
leaders decided not to implement any new safety and security measures following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The problem was identified in five previous 
studies, which resulted in five different findings concerning rationales for noncompliance 
(Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; 
Stigler, 2010). 
 The purpose of this case study was to further explore and describe the rationales 
offered by rural civic leaders for noncompliance in previous studies, as well as to 
compare their dependability and confirmability with those provided by participants in the 
Midwestern rural areas that were studied. The National Preparedness Guidelines, which 
were first issued in 2005, then revised and reissued in 2009, outline strategies intended to 
help rural communities develop and implement programs that will prepare them for 
effective response to and recovery from manmade or natural disasters (DHS, 2009). This 
study addressed an under-researched social problem and, by extension, explored the 
social implications that continued noncompliance may have for national security and 
public safety. The available literature served to establish the relevance of the identified 
problem. For example, studies by Bryant (2009) and Caruson and MacManus (2005) 
listed the many challenges of implementing emergency management strategies in small 
towns and rural communities, emphasizing their historical lack of compliance with other 
national programs and implying a degree of separation from rural and national center 
direction. Bryant’s study addressed the practice of separation in rural communities, which 
the U.S. Census Bureau (2010) describes as the physical distance between households, 
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and drew a relationship between the theory of social capital as defined by Putnam (2000) 
and the concept of emergency management as practiced in rural communities. This 
relationship also served to illustrate what is known about the problem in rural areas, but 
left unknown the common reasons for noncompliance in the rural communities that were 
previously studied. What I intended to do in this study, then, was to explore that question 
further in order to arrive at a common understanding of those reasons. 
 The underlying consequences of the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
are that although one provided Americans with a sense of justice following the death of 
Osama bin-Laden, both seem to have created a proliferation of terrorist off-shoots that 
embrace the al-Qaeda ideology. That ideology is driven by the desire of ISIL to establish 
an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East based on Sharia Islamic law (Kamien, 2006; 
Karsh, 2006; Sanchez, 2015). This was Osama bin-Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s initial and 
continuing goal in other areas of operation within the Middle East and Africa (Gunaratna, 
2003). After the expulsion of Soviet forces from Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1989, al-
Qaeda and its off-shoots considered the US the main obstacle to achieving their stated 
goal. In addition to their primary goal, militant Islamists have demanded that all U.S. 
troops be removed from what they consider sacred Muslim land, that apostate leaders of 
Muslim countries be eliminated, and that the Jewish state of Israel be expelled from 
Palestinian lands (Kamien, 2006). Because none of those goals have been realized, 
Islamic jihad is likely to continue for the foreseeable future unless and until the current 
generation of militants is captured, killed, or pacified through education or economic 
assistance (O’Connor, 2009; Woerner, 2013).  
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 The events of September 11, 2001 were a manifestation of al-Qaeda’s held intent. 
This prompted the central government to develop and implement strategies designed to 
deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the homeland (Bullock et al., 2009). Just 
as the foregoing background information has served to provide a chronology of the 
events that led to the necessity for homeland security, it is just as important to understand 
the evolution of emergency management in America as it relates to external and internal 
threats. Thus, it should be understood that homeland security is the direct result of 
terrorist threat recognition and its applicability to domestic manmade or natural disasters 
(Doak et al., 2014; McEntire, 2009).  Since 1997, the U.S. Department of State has 
identified and listed 62 groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Most of those 
terrorist groups have claimed to be Islamic based (Department of State [DOS], 2013a). 
However, only a small number of those groups are considered direct threats to the 
homeland or to U.S. interests abroad (DOS, 2013a; Piddock, 2015). The groups that do 
pose a direct threat to U.S. interests are Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
(AQ), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which broke away from core al-Qaeda in 2014 and 
renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A related group operating in 
Syria is the al-Nusrah Front, which has merged with ISIS (DOS, 2013b; Sanchez, 2015). 
Recently, al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group that operates in Sudan and 
Somalia, has urged Muslims throughout the world to attack shopping malls in the US, 
Canada, Great Britain, and other Western countries just as that group did in Nairobi, 
Kenya in 2013 (DOS, 2013c; Meldrum, 2015).    
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Literature Search Strategy 
 Much effort was expended on the search for pertinent studies on the status of 
homeland security and emergency management in rural America following the issuance 
of the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2005 and 2008 (DHS, 2009). Among the 
Walden University Library sites searched were Academic Search Premier, American 
Constitution Society for Law and Policy, American Journal of Political Science, Criminal 
Justice Policy Review, Journal of Criminal Justice and Behavior, National Interest 
Online, Political Research Quarterly, Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, and the ProQuest Dissertation and Thesis Database. The Walden 
Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) database provided only one source that 
originated from a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School of Homeland Defense and 
Security (HLDS). This source was one of the five studies I was able to locate during the 
literature search that supported my initial hypothesis that noncompliance in rural America 
was likely due not only to a lack of resources, but also to remoteness and perceptions of 
separation (Stigler, 2010). Those studies helped me to gain an understanding of the 
rationales for that noncompliance and provided a basis for comparison of those rationales 
with those developed in this study. As a result of finding few general sources and no 
dissertations on the topic of inquiry in the Walden Library databases, it was necessary to 
use other sites such Google Scholar and rely heavily on textbooks, academic articles, and 
government documents to support my initial concept. These combined sources helped me 
understand the probable reasons for the problem of noncompliance and provided a sense 
of direction on how to address the problem. Among the government sources relied upon 
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for pertinent information regarding threats to the homeland, along with reactive and 
proactive strategies to confront those threats, were the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (HLDS), and the Homeland Security Digital 
Library (HSDL).  
 Key search terms used to locate pertinent literature regarding the topic of inquiry 
included terrorism, antiterrorism, counterterrorism, homeland defense, homeland 
security, emergency management, and related theories. These terms were also used in 
combination with rural areas or communities and interchangeably in Walden’s Library, 
as well as in the Internet databases queried. I considered it fortunate that each of the five 
studies located provided a basis for a developed research question. Despite the paucity of 
pertinent literature regarding the subject of inquiry, I was able to structure the study to 
describe the problem, explain its contradiction to compliant rural areas, and welcome the 
opportunity to generalize findings in noncompliant communities to other regional rural 
areas, which may serve to enhance national security and rural public safety.     
Literature Related to Theoretical Foundation 
 Theory frames how individuals view their social world, whether they do so 
inductively or deductively. Because a theory’s primary purpose is to explain, my study 
was to focus on a theoretical explanation for noncompliance or compliance with the 
implementation of emergency preparedness measures in rural communities, which would 
inform me about the reason why either process is occurring. The theoretical foundation 
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that aligned with my study was social capital as advanced by Putnam (2000). Social 
capital theory is based on the concept that community cohesion and stability rest on a 
firmer foundation when residents establish networks of exchange that promote mutual 
trust through cooperation, collaboration, and communication. The more common 
community exchanges and networks become, the healthier a community becomes, both 
politically and socially. The underlying assumption, then, is that a community that 
cultivates and nurtures the “civic virtues” of social capital will be healthier in all ways, as 
opposed to one that does not (Putnam, 2000, p. 7).  
 For much of the past decade, experts in the fields of homeland security and 
emergency management have made efforts to develop theories to guide these disciplines 
without success (Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004; Reese, 2013).  The consensus among 
experts is that homeland security is a multifaceted enterprise involving many disciplines, 
of which emergency management is one (Reese, 2013).  Even when considered 
separately from homeland security, emergency management incorporates multiple 
principles and disciplines involving players from first responders to political leaders, 
which have been difficult to isolate into one common theory (McEntire, 2004). Experts at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, North Texas University, Eastern Kentucky University, 
and the U.S. Congressional Research Service have found that the theory of social capital 
provides a related and workable theoretical base that is applicable to all communities, but 
particularly to rural areas (Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004; Reese, 2013). The concept of 
community governance has been present since early Americans began living in small 
communities for the necessary reason of survival that is made possible by mutual aid 
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under various conditions (Putnam, 2000). Historically, this mutual aid was formed on the 
basis of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust. Although other contemporary theorists such 
as Bourdieu (1983-1989), Coleman (1986-1990), and Fukuyama (1995) have measured 
success in education, social class inequalities, and economics through the application of 
social capital, it was Putnam (1995-2004) who, writing from a political perspective, drew 
a relationship between social capital and community cohesion (Smith, 2001-2009).  
 The selection of this theory was made on the basis of its applicability to the study 
and the absence of any other theory that was specifically developed for this topic of 
inquiry. In addition, social capital theory made sense in terms of its history, its simple 
application, and practice. Social capital theory relates to the present investigation of the 
question of compliance with nationally directed emergency preparedness measures in 
rural communities. The value of social capital becomes more meaningful when a local 
leader considers the challenges of applying such emergency measures in remote and 
separated rural communities where cohesion based on cooperation, reciprocity, and trust 
is essential to a community’s general welfare and development (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 
2000). Rural emergency managers, when designated as such, must therefore rely on 
volunteerism, limited funding, limited training, and often inadequate equipment to meet 
the challenges posed by seasonal natural disasters or potential manmade incidents. 
Among other objectives, this study determined the extent to which the practice of social 
capital in a rural community affected the overall welfare of that studied community. To 
that end, the research questions were structured to elicit responses from participants that 
reflected the general health of the community they represented.  
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 The previously cited sources representing topical peer reviewed literature were 
journal articles published by Marion and Cronin (2009) who found that 57 of Ohio’s 260 
small town and rural police chiefs had not established any new security measures since 
the 9/11 attacks due to a lack of funding. That same year Oliver (2009) contended in his 
study that the primary reasons for noncompliance in many of the nation’s rural towns and 
communities were due to local civic leaders’ lack of understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities in the post-9/11 era. Oliver’s contention seemed to be based on the 
rationales offered by that study’s participants that although added responsibility had been 
assigned to them, it came with no sense of direction or added resources. Contemporary 
researchers Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) argued that the primary reason for a general 
lack of compliance with emergency preparedness guidelines in rural areas was the result 
of a governance decision made by state and urban leaders more interested in protecting 
their densely populated metropolitan centers than adjoining less populated rural areas. 
Chenoweth and Clarke argued that federal resources allocated to the states were not being 
distributed evenly by state and urban leaders apparently predisposed to protecting their 
particular jurisdictions. A more recent study by Stigler (2010) concluded that a lack of 
resources might not be the primary reason for noncompliance with implementation of the 
national guidelines in Wisconsin’s small towns and rural communities. Following field 
work that allowed him contact with civic leaders in the state’s rural areas, Stigler’s study 
added that noncompliance in those remote areas may not be due to a lack of resources, 
but more likely to regional remoteness and separation. Although limited, the existing 
literature provided the essence of the research questions by articulating what is known 
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about the problem. What this literature did not provide were consistent reasons for 
noncompliance, thus setting the foundation for this study, which focused on exploring the 
reasons and rationales for noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines 
(DHS, 2009).   
 Bryant’s (2009) in-depth study in Missouri identified the challenges of emergency 
management in rural areas as resource limitations, regional separation and remoteness, a 
low population density, and a general lack of communication. Those findings lent 
credence to the reasons cited in her colleagues’ studies, but as a group they failed to 
explain why some states had successfully implemented emergency preparedness 
strategies in their rural communities and others had not (FDEM, 2008-2013). Bryant 
explained that resource limitations included a lack of available human, financial, cultural, 
political, and social capital. Human capital, she argued, is limited in rural areas due 
historically to urbanization and decades-long declines in population as a result of young 
educated people moving to urban areas seeking better job opportunities. Bryant added 
that financial capital was usually concentrated in aging rural populations, and lost when 
urban heirs inherited and moved those assets. She concluded that these declines in human 
and financial capital tend to limit the preservation of rural culture, as well as the general 
development of political and social capital. Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) further argued 
that the lack of political will in a small rural town was evident in instances of unequal 
access to the basic resources necessary to maintain a vibrant community. The principles 
of social capital theory thus become essential to the social cohesion and political health of 
rural communities when it is necessary to meet the challenges of emergency 
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management. Similar findings were reported earlier by Caruson and MacManus (2005) in 
their study of Florida’s homeland security preparedness issues prior to that state’s 
adoption and implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2009; 
FDEM, 2008-2013).  
 The National League of Cities (NLC, 2013) defined rurality by the distance 
between residents, or separation and remoteness. During disasters, this remoteness results 
in longer response times, less favorable outcomes for residents in need of emergency 
attention, and longer periods of recovery due to the cost ratio of allocating resources to 
residents served. Based on this economic equation, urban centers are served first. Federal 
and state funding programs take into consideration population density when allocating 
funds; as a result, densely populated areas receive more funds for recovery and mitigation 
purposes. The consequence for rural areas is that recovery following disasters is usually 
addressed reactively instead of proactively. In those instances, limited local financial 
capital will be spent on an unanticipated disaster response, thus requiring the marshaling 
of local social capital to facilitate recovery after an event; with little human or financial 
capital left to spend on mitigation. Preparedness activities are also difficult to fund when 
populations are small and spread out, thus making it difficult to alert and educate remote 
households about an impending incident. Rural communities must therefore rely on radio, 
television, or telephone messaging to receive such impending disaster information timely 
(Caruson & MacManus, 2005; Giblin, Schaefer, & Burruss, 2009). 
 In efforts to improve their emergency preparedness standards, some small town 
and rural communities have sent their emergency services volunteers to free federal or 
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state training programs, only to find that the training materials and lessons reflected the 
meeting of urban needs which were based on urban resources. This was discovered after 
volunteers had attended training sessions at their own expense. While at the training site, 
they became part of training scenarios that did not test rural incidents, that also assumed 
equipment and personnel capabilities that were unrealistic in rural areas, and involved 
mass casualties, or acts of terrorism not common in their small towns. The assumption by 
trainers appears to be that rural emergency managers are smaller versions of their urban 
counterparts. The reality is that rural emergency managers are faced with challenges that 
are unfamiliar to their urban counterparts (Giblin et al., 2009). For those reasons, rural 
communities must rely on trust and social capital (Putnam, 2000). They need support 
from their volunteers, as well as training and equipment that is tailored to their needs. 
Yet, federal government guidelines require training and preparation for hazards that may 
never occur in rural areas. This condition supports the argument that local hazards and 
needs should dictate local resource allocation. To resolve this issue there will have to be a 
better understanding by federal and state agencies of the realities facing rural emergency 
managers (Bryant, 2009; Caruson & MacManus, 2005; FDEM, 2008-2013).  
 However accurate the foregoing findings were in generalizing the challenges of 
establishing emergency preparedness measures in rural communities, they did not answer 
the question of why some states had included rural communities in their emergency 
preparedness plans, and others had not. Those previous studies did, however, provide an 
introduction to the relationship between social capital principles and their value to rural 
communities in meeting their emergency management challenges (Bryant, 2009; Caruson 
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& MacManus, 2005; Giblin et al., 2009). In describing social capital theory, Putnam 
presented that society’s bonds tend to break down when people stop supporting one 
another through participation in common social and political activities. Putnam’s social 
capital theory focused on the various aspects of social relations, which include local 
norms, values, networks, and the roles they play in community cohesion. To Putnam, 
community is central to his theory of social capital, which he related to civic virtue, or a 
network of reciprocal social relations that included political participation and being active 
in local associations. These social relations, he argued, tend to form community ties, as 
well as develop tolerance and the trust of others. Putnam went on to explain how social 
capital has a positive effect on educational performance, public health, crime rates, race 
relations, economic productivity, community development, and even human happiness. 
Putnam offered that these are some of the virtues that benefit communities when they 
connect with friends, neighbors, and co-workers.  
 Throughout his work, Putnam (2000) argued that a civic community is usually 
characterized by the degree of civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, 
tolerance, and the associational life it practices. To summarize the validity of his theory, 
academics, scholars, and government analysts throughout the nation are in consensus that 
interaction enables people to build communities, to commit themselves to each other, and 
to knit a strong social fabric (Reese, 2013). Absent any existing theories on homeland 
security or emergency management, some institutions have found a relational link 
between Putnam’s social capital theory and emergency management. They base the link 
on the science of social institutions and relationships that develop structure and stimulate 
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interaction of collective behavior within a community for the common good, which 
includes safety and security (Bellavita, 2012; McEntire, 2004). In qualitative studies, the 
link between the research literature, the research questions, and a theoretical relationship 
is not always self-evident. As a way of confirming this link, my field research determined 
that noncompliance or compliance with emergency preparedness measures within rural 
communities was due, in large part, to the degree of adopting and exercising of social 
capital principles (Putnam, 2000).  
Literature Review Related to Key Concepts 
 The few studies found that related to key concepts of this study were quantitative 
in nature, except for two which were qualitative case studies (Marion & Cronin, 2009; 
Stigler, 2010). The quantitative studies sought to confirm the hypotheses of preparedness 
noncompliance in rural communities within the states of Florida, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, 
and other unnamed Midwestern states through the use of survey instruments. Each of the 
quantitative studies (Caruson & MacManus, 2005; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Giblin, 
Schafer, & Burrus 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009) reported a different finding as a causal 
reason for noncompliance, which ranged from a lack of funding, training, personnel, and 
equipment, to a misunderstanding of roles in the post 9/11 era. Short of repeating those 
studies at the same sites, there was little evidence to confirm the validity of those 
findings. A mixed-methods study conducted by Pelfry (2009) applied that methodology 
to identify and assess areas of strengths and weaknesses regarding the application of 
emergency preparedness guidelines in local communities. Pelfrey used interviews, as 
well as surveys, to collect research data from local agency representatives in an unnamed 
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Midwestern state. The two qualitative case studies conducted by Marion and Cronin 
(2009) and Stigler (2010), reflected the most reliable findings. That was due to the 
researchers’ fieldwork, which involved interviews and observations of participants and 
peers who were rural chiefs of police in the states of Ohio and Wisconsin. Those studies 
revealed the additional rationale of geographical separation and remoteness as a likely 
cause for noncompliance. The strengths derived from those studies were the basis for this 
study’s research questions, which recognized a previous problem related to the issue of 
noncompliance in the studied communities. That recognized strengths, along with the 
stated willingness of local officials to adopt applicable preparedness guidelines in their 
rural communities, provided the basis for this study’s research and interview questions. 
What those previous studies also articulated in common was a need for further study of 
this particular subject. Those same strengths, however, also revealed the weaknesses of 
those previous studies as reflected in their inconclusive and inconsistent findings, which 
served to justify the need for this study. What is known about those previous studies 
(Caruson & MacManus, 2005; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Giblin, Schafer, & Burrus, 
2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Pelfrey, 2009; Stigler, 2010) is that the 
rationales for noncompliance varied from a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel, to 
remoteness, and local leadership not understanding their roles and responsibilities in the 
post 9/11 era. The previously reported conditions were critical to my determination of the 
type of approach for this inquiry, and why I believed that a qualitative case study would 
provide the most meaningful results (Yin, 2014).   
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A Brief History of U. S. Civil Defense and Homeland Security 
Homeland Security Described and Defined 
 The phrase “National Homeland Security Agency” first appeared in a January 
2001 report submitted by the 14-member Hart-Rudman Commission formed during the 
Bill Clinton Administration in 1998 (Bullock et al., 2009; Reese, 2013). The phrase 
homeland security not only serves to describe a nation’s civilian security concept, but 
also its common purpose. Homeland defense refers to the military aspects of national 
security, and although assigned different missions the two functions normally work 
together in efforts to keep the nation safe and secure. Absent a statutory or regulatory 
definition, the meaning of the phrase must be derived from a variety of scholarly and 
legal sources. Foremost among the sources reviewed is the meaning stated by President 
George W. Bush in 2002 as contained in the National Strategies for Homeland Security, 
which define homeland security as a concerted national effort to prevent any terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize 
damage, and help recover from attacks that may occur (Caudle & Yim, 2006; DHS, 
2008b; Reese, 2013). The initial understanding of risk assurance between the central 
government and the states, which required local governments to assume a primary role in 
domestic security with the federal government assuming a secondary role, begin with the 
birth of the nation and continued throughout the 20th century. During that time, however, 
much confusion affected Civil Defense and emergency preparedness due to the lack of a 
single national operating plan. This organizational condition resulted in uncoordinated 
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responses from agencies with differing policies, leadership, and operating agendas (DHS, 
2006). 
Homeland Security 2001-Present 
 The civil defense philosophy continued throughout the Cold War, through the first 
World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and after other attacks against US interests in East 
Africa and the Middle East (Ward et al., 2006). Immediately following the September 11, 
2001 attacks, a significant change in the concept of homeland security took place as the 
phrase Civil Defense was displaced by the phrase Homeland Security (Haddow et al., 
2011). Congressional legislation and executive orders enacted and issued after the 9/11 
attacks led to implementation of strategies designed to protect the homeland with a more 
proactive concept. That new concept incorporated all aspects of national power, which 
included diplomatic, intelligence, federal, state, local, and tribal organizations, as well as 
the private sector which owns 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure (Bullock et al., 
2009). In 2002 the U.S. military also assumed an expanded role in national security. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established under the direction of the 
Department of Defense (DOD) with the mission of homeland security, homeland defense, 
and civil support. NORTHCOM’s primary mission is to defend the land, sea, and air 
approaches to the US from Alaska to Central America and surrounding water 500 
nautical miles beyond those land areas (Haddow et al., 2011). NORTHCOM’s duties are 
to deter, prevent and defeat threats, as well as and any type of aggression aimed at the 
US, its territories, and interests. For that purpose NORTHCOM has established and 
maintains quick reaction forces of highly trained Army and Marine Corps personnel 
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ready to respond to a range of potential threats.  NORTHCOM’S authority is specified in 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which states in part that “the Congress shall 
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States…and to call 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions” (Kozak, 2011, p. 47; U.S. Archives, 2011, p. 9). Except under certain 
conditions, and with limitations, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits any U.S. 
military branches from becoming directly involved in law enforcement operations other 
than in logistical support. The Posse Comitatus Act excludes the U.S. Coast Guard, 
which serves as a subagency in the DHS, and the National Guard, which serves under a 
state governor’s authority, unless mobilized by the president to maintain order during a 
national incident (Bullock et al., 2009; Haddow et al., 2011; Schertizing, 2009).  
 After the 9/11 attacks, the concept of homeland security no longer assumed a 
reactive response to natural or manmade disasters. Those attacks made homeland security 
a proactive concept to be carried out by first responders from different organizations, 
whose interests were national security, antiterrorism, counterterrorism, emergency 
preparedness and management, crime prevention and investigation, intelligence, strategic 
and tactical coordination, as well as threat mitigation and risk assessment (Kamien, 2006; 
Ward et al., 2006). This concept included the principle of balancing domestic safety and 
security with civil liberties, and public safety with freedom, an operational challenge that 
continues to this day (ACLU, 2009; DOJ, 2009). Liberal critics have complained that the 
current balance weighs more to safety and security than to civil liberties and freedom 
(ACLU, 2009).   
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Emergency Preparedness in the Post-9/11 Era 
 The most significant laws enacted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, were the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001; the USA Patriot Act of 2001; the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002; the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002; the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness, and Response Act of 2002 (Bullock et 
al., 2009; Haddow et al., 2011). Of these laws the most controversial have been the USA 
Patriot Act, the establishment of the TSA and support of state-run, but DHS funded 
Fusion Centers (ACLU, 2011; Andino, 2008). In addition to granting new discretionary 
powers to the federal executive to immobilize any future attacks, the Patriot Act made 
specific changes to existing federal statutes. Those changes broadened the definition of 
terrorism, increased the penalties for terrorists, and expanded the government’s authority 
to use electronic monitoring devices when terrorism was suspected. The Act facilitated 
the practice of information sharing among and between intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, and also granted police surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).  Objections to the Act have centered on the expanded authority 
granted to law enforcement, which critics argue restrict the civil rights of citizens and 
non-citizens alike (Kamien, 2006; Ozdogan, 2007; White, 2006).  
 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 is codified into 10 titles, each containing descriptive 
sections of the law. The most controversial sections of the law reside in Title II, which 
was designed to improve surveillance by granting federal agents authority to intercept 
communications between suspected terrorists (DOJ, 2009). Title II also facilitates the 
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application of roving wiretaps, allows criminal justice agencies to share information, and 
expands intelligence gathering. The Act’s authority allows agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) to seize materials and records from private businesses and public 
institutions are of particular concern to civil rights groups. For the past 14 years, Title II 
of the Patriot Act has been at the center of a controversy where critics see it as a symbol 
of government expansion, particularly within the executive branch (ACLU, 2011; CATO, 
2011b). Critics not only viewed the expansion of authority as a threat to civil liberties, 
but tend to equate the potential for abuse with actual abuse of that power. This view is 
formed on the concept of a limited government that fears any expansion of executive 
authority is likely to lead to abuses of power, which will outweigh any potential benefits. 
Coupled with this view is the idea that the access to expanded information sources 
increases executive power, and what follows with that increase in efficiency is more 
effective use of that power (Kamien, 2006). Critics argued that the Act’s provisions go 
too far in threatening civil liberties while expanding police powers. They also expressed 
concerns regarding the government’s ability to collect and share noncriminal or 
nonterrorist information with other agencies during the conduct of investigations. Their 
most pressing concern, however, has been the enhanced authority of the government to 
monitor the activities of its own citizens (ACLU, 2011; CATO, 2011a; White, 2006).  
 Supporters of the Patriot Act, in contrast, have asserted that counterterrorism is 
strengthened by combining intelligence and law enforcement to form a more effective 
national defense system (Kamien, 2006). Proponents of the Act further argued that the 
law provides critical tools to law enforcement in their efforts to counter the threat of 
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terrorism. They also advance the argument that this merger creates an intelligence 
conduit among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to eliminate the 
information gap that existed prior to the 9/11 attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004). 
Supporters of this view point out that those critics fail to draw a distinction between a 
potential for abuse, and the actual abuse of power. They add that the few abuses of 
federal powers that have been reported and identified since enactment of the law have 
been corrected (Kamien, 2006). Proponents of the law caution that proposing a 
prohibition against such expansion of executive authority would be a mistake in the face 
of the terrorist threat still confronting the nation, and that a more appropriate response to 
this conflict of interests is continued vigilance and oversight (Rosenzweig, 2006). 
Supporters of the Patriot Act cap their argument with documentation showing that 61 
terrorist plots have been thwarted since September 11, 2001 through application of the 
law’s provisions (DOJ, 2013; Heritage Foundation, 2011; Zuckerman, Bucci, & 
Carafano, 2013).  
 Although the Patriot Act made significant amendments to more than 15 federal 
statutes, it was passed in the House and Senate without hearings or debate, and was not 
accompanied by any committee reports (ACLU, 2011; Ozdogan, 2007). Specific changes 
to the existing federal statutes included: a broadened definition of terrorism; increased 
penalties for terrorist acts; expanded government authority to use pen registers and 
wiretapping devices; increased scope for search warrants and subpoenas by lowering 
standards for probable cause; facilitated sharing of information between law enforcement 
agencies; expanded police surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence 
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Surveillance Act (FISA); and, restricted some civil rights of citizens and noncitizens alike 
(CATO, 2011a; CATO, 2011b; Ozdogan, 2007). There is little argument that the attacks 
created a post-9/11 era that required examination and reevaluation of the implications the 
attacks had on the American psyche. While Americans examined their commitment to 
democratic principles, the central government was working in haste to protect them from 
further attacks. Those government efforts, however, required Americans to accept some 
restrictions on their freedoms of speech and movement. The most notable of these 
restrictions have been increased surveillance of personal communications, more searches 
of homes and personal belongings, the potential detention without the benefit of habeas 
corpus, and the facing of possible proceedings before a military tribunal without the 
standard protections of due process as guaranteed by civil courts (DOJ, 2009; Ward et al., 
2006). Under these conditions, the tradeoff between civil rights and personal security 
seems to rest on the notion that although the nation’s openness may have added to the 
planning and execution of the terrorist attacks, Americans’ desires to live in a peaceful 
and orderly society should favor greater acceptance of limitations on personal freedom of 
movement, freedom of association, freedom from unlawful searches and seizures, and 
freedom of speech. Three years after the 9/11 attacks, Davis and Silver (2004) asked the 
question of how many rights Americans were willing to sacrifice in exchange for 
perceived safety and security from the threat of terrorism. That study’s findings indicated 
that the greater the perceived threat by participants, the lower became their support for 
civil liberties. Those findings, however, tended to be offset when study participants 
indicated their trust in government was low, and the lower that trust was, the less willing 
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they were to give up their civil liberties, regardless of the threat level faced (Davis & 
Silver, 2004). 
 In the initial aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the American public was more 
receptive to the government’s new security measures than it was about civil liberties. As 
time passed, however, the older attachments to privacy and individual liberty steadily 
regained their rightful position in public opinion polls. Although recent polls indicate that 
security still trumps civil liberties, this gradual shift in public opinion reflects the nation’s 
long-term commitment to their civil rights and liberties. A poll by TIME/CNN/ORC in 
May 2013, confirmed this trend. To the question of whether participants were willing to 
give up some civil liberties if they were necessary to curb acts of terrorism, 57% of all 
respondents in 1995 answered yes, but in 2013 that percentage was down to 40%. In 
response to the question regarding government monitoring of personal communications, 
the response in 2001 was 54% in favor, but down to 38% in 2013 (PEW, 2013). Finally, 
to the question of what concerned participants more, the enactment of new and stronger 
antiterrorism policies, with the potential for more excessive restrictions of civil liberties. 
Of the respondents, 61% indicated they were opposed to enactment of new excessive 
policies, and 31% hoped the government would not enact any new antiterrorism laws or 
policies that affected their civil liberties (TIME/CNN/ORC Poll, 2013).  
 To guard against abuse and excessive use of these executive powers, provisions of 
the Patriot Act included 4-year sunset dates for purposes of legislative and executive 
review. Debates regarding the law’s provisions, therefore, were the most vociferous 
during the sunset years of 2005 and 2009 (ACLU, 2009; DOJ, 2009). Arguments for the 
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law’s continued implementation were led by a majority of Congress, the president, 
members of the intelligence and law enforcement communities, noted legal and social 
scholars and conservative think tank members, who have argued that since its date of 
enactment the law has helped prevent over sixty terrorist attempts against the homeland 
(DOJ, 2013; Heritage Foundation, 2011; Zuckerman, Bucci, & Carafano, 2013). 
Arguments from those opposed to all or some of the law’s provisions and prefer to have 
them repealed or revised include ethicists, a smaller number of Congressmen, and 
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the CATO 
Institute. They present that government agents have consistently abused the additional 
powers granted to the executive branch by the law. In an effort to moderate these 
opposing arguments law professor Paul Rosenzweig (2006) at George Mason University, 
reviewed the Patriot Act’s provisions, along with other related government programs 
regarding civil liberties. Rosenzweig concluded that instead of posing a threat to civil 
liberties, the laws and programs he reviewed promised a significant benefit in the current 
terrorist environment. And rather than focusing on the possibility of executive abuse, 
Americans should instead make efforts to construct suitable oversight and response 
mechanisms that will serve to empower executive action and effectively check abusive 
practices. In the long-run, that effort will be more “likely to enhance Americans’ security 
and liberty” (Rosenzweig, 2006. p. 1027).  
 Although that advice was offered in an attempt to moderate opposing positions, it 
does not appear likely that either argument will be quieted soon. For practical purposes, 
al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, has been decimated and most 
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of its top leadership has been killed. In addition, al-Qaeda central no longer has the 
organizational and logistical reach it had in 2001 (Baker, 2014; Borosage, 2014; Zakaria, 
2013). However, its legacy is an ideology that has spawned a new generation of terrorists 
now operating in the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and much of Africa, with a 
revisionist worldview driven by a radical delusion of reestablishing a lost Islamic empire 
(Karsh, 2006). As long as they view the US as their primary obstacle to that goal, the 
Patriot Act will continue to be implemented with the accepted justification that it keeps 
America secure. In a terrorist free environment, Americans would choose civil liberties 
over security, but in the currently conflicted world, public sentiment indicates that they 
prefer enhanced security now, with minimal government intrusions into their civil 
liberties (PEW, 2013; TIME/CNN/ORC Poll, 2013).  
 Public complaints lodged against the DHS are focused primarily on its funding of 
state-operated Fusion Centers (ACLU, 2007; ACLU, 2008; Andino, 2008). As defined 
by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, Fusion Centers are effective and 
efficient mechanisms designed to exchange critical law enforcement and intelligence 
information, maximize all participant resources, streamline operations, and to improve 
the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources (CRS, 
2007; DOJ, 2006). In this definition, fusion emerges as the fundamental process by which 
the sharing of homeland security related information and intelligence can be facilitated 
(9/11 Commission, 2004). The idea is to manage and disseminate the information to the 
responsible agencies for appropriate action. The short-term goal of Fusion Centers is to 
provide a colocated mechanism where intelligence, law enforcement, public safety, and 
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all private sector partners can come together for the common purpose of safeguarding the 
homeland and preventing major criminal activity (FBI, 2009a; FBI, 2009b). A regional 
policeman, fireman, agricultural inspector, or financial sector representative should not 
have to search his agency’s database or other sources for information when it is likely 
that the intelligence has already been collected by a Fusion Center in his jurisdiction 
(Masse & Rollins, 2007). Following a specific recommendation by the 9/11 Commission, 
Fusion Centers have been established in every state of the union (DHS, 2008b). Some 
large states have established four or more centers to comply with information sharing 
mandates after the 9/11 attacks. They are state owned and operated (DHS, 2008b), but are 
primarily funded by DHS grants, and thus the basis for complaints from liberal groups 
that contend these centers collect information on people who may not be involved in 
criminal or terrorist activities (Carter & Carter, 2009; Rollins & Connors, 2007). 
 Unlike Fusion Centers, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) normally do not 
generate public complaints, although they too are ancillary products of the 9/11 attacks. 
Essentially, a JTTF is a law enforcement unit that uses an interagency approach to 
counter domestic terrorism. These units are led and funded by the FBI (DOJ, 2013) and 
are comprised of representatives from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 
The Department of Justice defines a JTTF as a cell of highly trained, locally based, and 
committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT members, and other experts from 
dozens of domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Their primary purpose is 
to investigate leads from all sources, including area Fusion Centers, and to insure the 
timely collection and sharing of intelligence critical to antiterrorism and major crime 
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prevention. JTTF members may also provide security at major events, work undercover, 
and conduct surveillance of suspected terrorist or criminal activity. Certain types of 
illegal activity such as money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking, gun 
trafficking, extortion, smuggling, and corruption of public officials often involve 
coordination with other offices over a large geographical area. This type of cooperation is 
also necessary during the conduct of counterintelligence to detect espionage, sabotage, or 
assassinations planned by a foreign government or nonstate actor. During the conduct of 
these types of investigations, the exchange of information on a vertical and horizontal 
plane is critical to the operation’s success (Doak et al., 2014). 
 Today there are over 100 JTTFs throughout the country permanently staffed on a 
full-time basis by members of the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service 
(USSS), the U.S. Marshal’s Service (USMS), the intelligence branches of the Army, Air 
Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as by members of regionally assigned state and local 
law enforcement agencies (Ward et al., 2006). At last count, total nationwide JTTF 
membership was estimated at 4,000 participants with over half of those being federal 
agents (DOJ, 2013). Prior to joining, all participants must sign a memorandum of 
understanding accepting the JTTf’s joint mission of reacting to terrorist-related activity 
and proactively investigating domestic and foreign terrorist groups or individuals who 
may be targeting people or infrastructure in the particular JTTF’s operating area. All 
nonfederal agents are subjected to background investigations to gain top secret clearance 
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before they can participate in a task force. JTTFs work under the FBI’s definition of 
terrorism, which the agency defines as an unlawful act, a threat of force or violence, that 
is committed by a group of individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce 
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives (Doak et al., 2014; DOJ, 2013). 
 The difference between a Joint Terrorism Task Force and a Fusion Center is that a 
JTTF is sponsored, led, and funded by the FBI. A JTTF is both regionally and nationally 
focused and deals exclusively with terrorism matters (DOJ, 2013). A Fusion Center, is 
sponsored, led, and funded by the host state with grant support from the DHS (DOJ, 
2006). Fusion Centers are state and local-centric, but deal with terrorism, criminal, as 
well as public safety matters. And most importantly, Fusion Centers produce intelligence 
for dissemination to appropriate agencies, including JTTFs, for determined action, but 
they do not conduct investigations. Some Fusion Centers are colocated with JTTFs or 
FBI Field Intelligence Groups throughout the country, but more commonly situated 
regionally within a state (DOJ, 2013). The foregoing descriptions of laws and strategies 
were designed to deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist activity in the immediate aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks. The most visible of these strategies were enacted and implemented by 
the George W. Bush Administration and continue in the post 9/11 era with only minor 
changes. Some have proven to be effective, others have created internal debate, and the 
DHS, which comprises the largest component of this antiterrorism effort, is still a work in 
progress (Carter & Carter, 2009; DHS, 2006; Kopp, 2012). 
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Emergency Management As Prescribed by the DHS 
 The preceding pages have presented the threats that terrorism, as well as natural 
disasters, continue to pose to the homeland. Also described above are some of the most 
high-profile strategies that the U.S. has developed and implemented to counter those 
threats. Further description of these strategies, along with explanations regarding their 
intent and anticipated effect, is provided in the following pages. These then, are the 
emergency management methods and procedures that the DHS has prescribed with the 
objective of securing the homeland (DHS, 2008b; DOJ, 2013). Constitutional scholars 
point out, however, that although the central government may prescribe the national 
implementation of such strategies and procedures, the 10th amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution makes that process a states’ rights prerogative (Kozak, 2011; U.S. Archives, 
2011). Essentially, the DHS has little leverage, other than funding, to force states to adopt 
and implement strategies and procedures deemed effective to secure their urban and rural 
areas (Bullock et al., 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009). To withhold homeland security funds 
from noncompliant states would defeat the purpose of filling the gap in the nation’s 
security network. This policy would then shape the question of whether homeland 
security is intended only for high population urban centers, and not for low-density rural 
areas, such as those in some Midwestern states (Bryant, 2009; Ward, et al., 2006).  
 Although some of the laws and policies that were enacted and implemented in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks did provide the intelligence and law enforcement communities 
more effective tools to track and apprehend terrorists, those laws and policies did not 
resolve the organizational problems dealing with homeland security and emergency 
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management. To rectify this condition, in December 2003, President George W. Bush 
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD), which directed the DHS 
Secretary to take a leading role in the development of a National Preparedness Goal to 
define preparedness as a coordinated national effort involving all levels of government, 
the private sector, nongovernment organizations, individual citizens, and called for the 
strengthening of capabilities that would address the full range of homeland security 
missions, including preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Bullock et al., 
2009). The National Preparedness Goal was first released in March 2005, along with a 
revised version of the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). The NRP was an all-hazards plan designed to establish a 
single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents (DHS, 
2009). The plan addressed the prevention of terrorist attacks and the reduction of 
vulnerability to all natural and manmade disasters. In addition, the NRP provided 
guidelines for minimizing the damage and seeking assistance in recovering from an 
incident. NIMS was created in tandem with the NRP to provide a systematic and 
consistent nationwide procedure for use by all federal, state, and local government 
representatives during the conduct and reporting of incidents that would also work 
effectively and efficiently when preparing for, responding to, and recovering from 
domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity (GAO, 2014; Haddow et al., 
2011; TISP, 2006).   
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The National Preparedness Guidelines 
 Since their initial issuance date of 2005, the National Preparedness Guidelines 
have been stated as a process to organize and synchronize federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial efforts to strengthen national preparedness against all-hazards (DHS, 2009). 
Critical elements of the guidelines are the establishment of readiness metrics to measure 
progress for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness capability to respond to all 
incidents, especially those involving acts of terrorism. Two other important elements of 
the guidelines are the Target Capabilities List, which defines 37 specific capabilities that 
all communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should possess in order 
to respond effectively to disasters, whether natural or manmade (DHS, 2009). And the 
other is the Universal Task List which provides a menu of some 1,600 tasks that can 
facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the major events 
represented by the National Planning Scenarios provided by FEMA (DHS, 2009). Of 
course no single community is expected to perform every task. In summary, the National 
Preparedness Guidelines adopt an all-hazards approach to preparedness, and are risk-
based, but primarily they are a unified and systematized call to action at all levels of 
government, with the mission to plan, organize, equip, train, and evaluate effectiveness 
(Bullock et al., 2009; Haddow et al., 2011).  
The National Response Framework and National Incident Management System 
 The National Response Framework (NRF), a revision of the National Response 
Plan, was developed to provide basic emergency management strategies at all levels of 
government as a common structure (DHS, 2009; White House, 2003). The NRF’s basic 
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purpose is to ensure that all levels of government, the private sector, and nongovernment 
organizations, work together and operate under a common set of emergency principles 
(DHS, 2009). In addition, the NRF provides guidelines for first responders, decision 
makers, and supporting entities on how to conduct a unified response to an incident 
(Bullock et al., 2009). The NRF was partly written for appointed political leaders, 
governors, mayors, county and city officials, and those who have a responsibility to 
provide effective disaster preparedness and response capability to a community (Bullock 
et al., 2009). While the NRF provides the structure and operating mechanisms for a 
national-level policy that concerns incident management, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) provides a systematic and proactive approach that guides 
departments and agencies at all levels of government and the private sector to work in a 
collaborative effort to prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, protect against, and 
mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, with 
the objective of reducing loss of life or injury, damage to property, and damage to the 
environment (DHS, 2009). Due to its importance in NIMS and emergency management, 
the Incident Command System (ICS) was designed as a flexible management system that 
enables effective and efficient control of an incident by integrating the combination of 
personnel, facilities, equipment, procedures, and communication at a given site (DHS, 
2009).  
 Most incidents are handled adequately by local first responders and emergency 
managers, but the system becomes more applicable during disasters that may traverse 
multistates and jurisdictions, in which cases command and control becomes an issue. A 
63 
 
major earthquake in California, a great flood or extensive tornado damage in the Midwest 
(NOAA, 2014a), a Category 4 Hurricane that churns in the Gulf of Mexico, or travels up 
the East Coast (NOAA, 2014b), requires emergency management leadership at the same 
or different sites to ensure coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and communication 
of all response units at affected locales. The ICS provides structure to facilitate activities 
in the five major functional response areas that include operations, command, planning, 
logistics, and finance administration (DHS, 2009; Moteff, 2014).  
Emergency Management in Rural Areas of the Midwest 
 Some experts, such as Oliver (2007, 2009), contended that although state and 
local officials now play a critical role in the post-9/11 era of homeland security, they 
remained unsure of their specific responsibilities and duties in the current threat 
environment. Marion and Cronin (2009) argued that if rural leaders’ new role is to 
become law enforcement and intelligence officers, they lacked the necessary funding, 
training, expertise, and equipment to do the job right. Yet Oliver, Marion, and Cronin did 
not explain how it is that states such as Florida have been able to develop a 
comprehensive plan with the same formulaic allotment of homeland security funds as 
other states, and implement the National Preparedness Guidelines as they were originally 
issued in 2008 (FDEM, 2008-2013). These arguments prompted the study question: Why 
the National Preparedness Guidelines that were first issued in 2005, and which were 
revised and reissued in 2008, have not been consistently implemented in all of the 
nation’s municipalities, including small towns and rural communities? Finding the 
answer to this question drove the premise of this inquiry. The proper place to begin the 
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search for that answer was a review of the available literature that addressed the topic, 
along with federal and state documents that clearly present preparedness guidelines for all 
communities. Following a review of that pertinent literature, an objective researcher will 
conclude that the guidelines are understandable, that state and local responsibilities are 
clear regarding their application, and that funding is allocated nationally to states, based 
on assessed threat, risk, vulnerability, and population (DHS, 2009). The same researcher 
could also review an example of their effective adaptation and implementation of the 
guidelines in model states such as Florida (FDEM, 2008-2013). 
 The issued guidelines provide strategies intended to help rural communities and 
small towns develop security plans that deter, detect, respond to, and recover from 
manmade or natural disasters (DHS, 2009). Their intent, purpose, and function have been 
described in the foregoing sections and supported by the government and academic 
sources referenced, but when compared to findings of the various studies, the results of 
those studies do not provide entirely valid responses to the question of noncompliance. 
For example, as described in the foregoing sections, the guidelines are specific in how to 
prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against disasters. They also provide 
guidance on the structure and set-up of incident command, along with descriptions of 
responder duties and responsibilities in all hazards regardless of size and scope. 
Essentially, the National Preparedness Guidelines were developed to provide any size 
community the flexibility to adopt, borrow, and establish broad or limited emergency 
preparedness measures in direct relation to its security needs (Bullock et al., 2009; DHS, 
2009). Yet Bryant (2009) pointed out in her findings the many challenges of establishing 
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emergency preparedness measures in rural communities, at the same time underscoring 
rural communities’ historical lack of compliance with nationally issued guidelines (NLC, 
2013; NADO, 2005).  
 The challenges of emergency management that Bryant (2009) presented in terms 
of differences between rural communities and urban centers can be categorized into four 
major themes of challenge: a limitation of resources; separation and remoteness; low 
population density, and a lack of communication with neighboring communities. These 
are some of the basic themes that underscored the research questions and drove this 
study. Bryant’s conclusions, however, did not explain how states such as Florida and 
Maryland (FDEM, 2008-2013; Kamien, 2006), have been able to adopt, develop, and 
also implement variations of the National Preparedness Guidelines on a statewide basis 
that utilized funding allocations based on threat, risk, vulnerability, and population; a 
formula applicable to all communities nation-wide, whether large, small, or rural. 
Although Congress has recognized that small towns and rural communities do not receive 
the same attention as urban centers do, no changes have been made regarding the way 
homeland security funds are allocated (Bryant, 2009; DHS, 2008b; FDEM, 2008-2013). 
In their article, Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) argued that the primary reason for the 
general lack of compliance with national preparedness measures in rural areas was a 
governance decision made by state and urban leaders more interested in protecting their 
jurisdictions. To sustain their argument they presented data showing that from 1993 to 
2000, 94 % of injuries and 61% of deaths resulting from a terrorist attack occurred in 
urbanized areas throughout the world (Chenoweth & Clarke). Their argument is premised 
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on the idea that if terror strikes, it will occur in an urban setting high in population with 
more available infrastructure targets. What they failed to understand is that terrorists 
continue to adjust their target selection from hard to soft. As urban area targets are 
hardened and the threat is reduced, the risk to rural or softer targets increases in 
proportion. The 9/11 attacks and the Boston Marathon bombings in urban areas lend 
credence to the argument presented by Chenoweth and Clarke. However, that argument 
ignored the physical and moral need to protect residents and infrastructure in a given 
state’s rural communities.  
 The major themes surfaced by these studies were that noncompliance with the 
National Preparedness Guidelines prevailed in some rural Midwestern communities, but 
the rationales for noncompliance differed with participants and geographical regions. 
What is known about the problem is that it has created national security and public safety 
issues. What are not known about the problem are the common rationales for existing 
noncompliance. Each study presented findings that varied from a lack of funding, 
personnel, training, equipment, to separation and remoteness. This study’s findings have 
done much to fill this knowledge gap following purposeful contact with those participants 
responsible for the implementation of such security and safety measures in the rural sites.   
 The above cited sources and related literature review were used to determine the 
saturation point regarding the question of homeland security in the nation’s rural areas. 
Their reported themes underscored the questions that drove this study. Their conclusions, 
however, failed to explain how some states have been able to adopt variations of the 
National Preparedness Guidelines on a state-wide basis without the type of concerns 
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voiced by the respondents in the reviewed studies. Compliant states have done so by 
utilizing funding allocations based on the formula that was established by Congress in 
2006 (Kopp, 2012; Moteff, 2014), that is based on assessed threat, risk, vulnerability, and 
population. The formula is applicable to all communities nationwide, whether they are 
large, small, or rural. The literature search strategy involved the use of all Walden 
University databases, the Internet, as well as articles and books that focused on the topic 
under investigation. Academic sources provided the bulk of references used in this study, 
followed by government publications and textbooks previously read during coursework. 
Walden University databases provided many of the sources cited in this study.    
Summary 
 The preceding pages restated the problem and purpose of this case study, along 
with a background and brief history of homeland security, its definition, and why it is 
necessary in today’s conflicted world (DHS, 2009). Following those presentations were a 
brief description of the threat that external and internal terrorism continues to pose to the 
security of the homeland, and how the US is responding to those threats (DOJ. 2009). 
This chapter’s introduction cited the central government’s constitutional responsibility to 
protect the homeland from invasion and domestic violence (Kozak, 2011; U.S. Archives, 
2011), then explained some of the cited reasons for militant Islamists’ avowed hostility 
toward the US following its involvement in Central Asia and the Middle East. The 
involvement exposed the nation to external and internal terrorism, which prompted the 
development of domestic countermeasures following the 9/11 attacks, including the USA 
Patriot Act, and establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2008a; 
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DOJ, 2009). These countermeasures have thwarted 60 terrorist attempts against the 
homeland since the 9/11 attacks (DOJ, 2013; Zuckerman et al., 2013). In exchange for 
the enhanced security these countermeasures have provided, Americans have had to limit 
some of their civil liberties (DOJ, 2009; TIME, CNN/ORC Poll, 2013). That explanation 
was followed by a short history on the evolution of US civil defense and homeland 
security (DHS, 2008a; Schertzing, 2009). Following an overview of the external and 
internal threats that confront the nation today (DOJ, 2011), the discussion then provided a 
description of the emergency management disciplines as prescribed by the DHS (DHS, 
2009). That discussion also provided an explanation of the operational principles most 
states have adopted from the National Preparedness Guidelines, as well as what has not 
been implemented in noncompliant states and rural communities. The degree of 
noncompliance, as noted by previous studies, was compared to successful adaptations of 
the National Response Framework by states such as Florida and Maryland (FDEM, 2008-
2013; Kamien, 2006). Inconsistencies that resulted from that comparison informed the 
research questions that drove this study to determine the reasons for those inconsistencies 
(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). 
In summary, this chapter discussed the social problems of noncompliance that were 
revealed by the limited available literature, which addressed them (Bryant, 2009). 
Chapter 3, which follows, describes the methodology that was employed in an effort to 
arrive at a more definitive answer to the question of homeland security in America’s 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 Following a review of available literature and evidence of what appears to be a 
pattern of inconsistent implementation of emergency preparedness strategies in some 
rural communities throughout the Midwest (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; 
Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), I sought to identify the key factors 
that have precluded full compliance in the selected study areas, with the objective of 
developing common reasons that can be generalized to other rural regions to improve 
implementation. The attacks of 9/11 served to shatter the prevailing illusion that America 
was invulnerable to attack from external forces. They happened despite the previous 
implementation of what were deemed impregnable security measures designed to prevent 
such attacks (Piddock, 2014). An immediate response from the George W. Bush 
Administration and Congress resulted in the enactment and implementation of security 
measures designed to prevent future attacks and to bring the perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks to justice. Among those measures was enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, which established the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In March 
2003, President George W. Bush directed the newly formed DHS to develop and 
distribute National Preparedness Guidelines for use by all government levels in 
implementing protective strategies and reporting major incidents (DHS, 2009). These 
guidelines included the initial National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, most states, such as 
California, Texas, Illinois, Florida, and New York, accepted the value of adopting the 
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federally proposed guidelines to tailor preparedness programs suited to their needs 
(FDEM, 2008-2013). Other states such as Ohio, Wisconsin, and Missouri chose to 
develop measures designed primarily to protect urban areas having high population 
density and vulnerable infrastructure (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion 
& Cronin, 2009; Stigler, 2010). Yet others determined that implementation of emergency 
preparedness measures in small towns and rural areas were not justified by the cost 
(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010). This inconsistency of implementation created two social 
problems in affected areas: one concerns national security in general and the other relates 
to public safety in rural communities in particular (DHS, 2009).  
 Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, responsibility for protecting the nation from 
external threats fell within the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD). During this 
same pre-9/11 period, responsibility for the response to, and recovery from, internal 
disasters was assigned to a number of federal agencies, each with varying agendas, which 
responded reactively to natural and manmade disasters with minimal cooperation, 
collaboration, coordination, or communication (DHS, 2008a). Soon after the 9/11 attacks, 
however, homeland security became a proactive endeavor conducted by professionals 
from many fields in the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 
DHS also inherited the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the 
primary federal agency responsible for the establishment and conduct of emergency 
management protocols designed to deal with all hazards that may affect the nation’s 
communities (DHS, 2008b). This case study focused directly on the question of 
emergency preparedness in rural communities, and collaterally on the causative 
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relationship between the central government and its responses to the continuing terrorist 
threat. Establishment of the DHS and subsequent enhancement of FEMA’s emergency 
response and management responsibilities are evidence of this causative relationship 
(DHS, 2009; FEMA, 2011; Yin, 2014).  
 A qualitative case study approach was chosen as the most effective method to 
explore and describe the reasons why some rural communities in the Midwest (Bryant, 
2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010) 
were not complying with implementation of the national preparedness guidelines, first 
issued in 2005, then revised and reissued in 2008 (DHS, 2009). Since their first issuance, 
the national guidelines have provided strategies intended to help rural communities and 
small towns develop security plans that prepare them for and allow them to respond to as 
well as recover from manmade or natural disasters. These strategies were recommended 
for national adoption in accordance with a community’s particular needs in relation to 
assessed risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and available resources. When viewed in this 
context, this case study addressed an under researched topic that available literature had 
not fully explained (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; 
Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010) and also explored the implications that noncompliance might 
have for national security and public safety issues (DHS, 2008b, 2009). When the study 
is complete, the findings will be shared with participating communities, as well as with 
other local, state, and federal emergency planners for use as a basis for comparison. Other 
practical contributions likely to be derived from this study’s results include enhanced 
knowledge of the underlying forces that previously resisted the concept of compliance, 
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along with findings that may lead to the adoption of generalized practices by other 
currently noncompliant communities (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014).  
 In spite of the fact that acts of terrorism and natural disasters continue to pose 
serious threats to homeland security and emergency preparedness, questions have been 
raised by the above cited experts (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Stigler, 
2010) as to why the National Preparedness Guidelines of 2008 have not been adopted by 
small towns and rural communities in some Midwestern states while they have been 
implemented by the vast majority of the nation’s metropolitan and urban centers, as well 
as most rural areas (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; FDEM, 2008-2013). This inconsistent 
condition of compliance creates two social problems. One weakens national security by 
failing to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and the other threatens public safety 
in Midwestern towns and rural communities where civic leaders did not establish any 
new safety measures following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Marion & 
Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009). This problem was highlighted first by an apparent gap in the 
literature specifically addressing the subject of noncompliance in some rural areas, and 
second by a lack of consensus among the cited researchers on the reasons for that 
noncompliance (Bryant, 2009; Stigler, 2010).  
 As is common in qualitative research, in my role as the researcher I functioned as 
the primary tool for purposes of data collection and analysis. An interview protocol was 
developed posing a set of open-ended questions based on the reasons for noncompliance 
previously reported in the five cited studies that made up the core literature for this study 
(Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; 
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Stigler, 2010). The interview questions were posed to rural civic leaders selected by 
purposeful sampling methods responsible for implementation of emergency preparedness 
measures. To assist in the analysis process, the qualitative data analysis software named 
Atlas.ti was used. Constant vigilance was employed throughout the study to ensure and 
maintain the ethicality and trustworthiness of the research process. Particular attention 
was also devoted to ensuring the internal and external validity of the study. Selected 
study participants were asked to execute an informed consent form that stated their rights 
and guarantee of confidentiality. Because I did not intend to target vulnerable or 
protected populations, it was not anticipated that any challenges with ethics, 
confidentiality, or human subject issues would be of concern.   
Research Design and Rationale 
 This qualitative research was based on a holistic single case study design that 
aligned well with the inquiry’s stated objectives of developing an in-depth description 
and analysis of an identified problem by examining the operational processes at selected 
sites of suspected noncompliance (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014). This approach provided 
for: the formulation of interview protocols designed to answer the research questions; 
coding of the data collected; and, analysis and interpretation of the data to develop 
themes that led to an understanding of the study’s findings. The selection of this design 
followed the rationale that the concept drives the research and the study purpose drives 
the analysis. The interview questions were open-ended and formed to elicit specific 
answers from eight to 12 civic leaders in four states who provided reasons for 
noncompliance with emergency preparedness guidelines that were developed to enhance 
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the security and safety of their rural communities (Patton, 2002; Rudestam & Newton, 
2007; Yin, 2014).  
 Since 2001, Pew Research Center surveys have reflected the concerns of 
Americans when over 53% of respondents have indicated that they believe it is necessary 
to give up some civil liberties in order to curb terrorism. Another 81% have favored the 
use of undercover activities to penetrate suspected terrorist groups, and over 67% have 
favored closer monitoring of banking, credit, and funding sources as well as Internet chat 
rooms to reveal any indications of terrorist activity (PEW, 2013). With this indicated 
public support, it seems that preventing terrorism, mitigating its impact on the nation’s 
communities, and responding effectively to any attack that occurs should be a high 
priority for federal, state, and local leaders (PEW, 2013). Yet the question remained: 
Why did civic leaders in some rural communities choose not to provide proper security to 
their residents? This reported condition prompted the bases for the research questions. 
 The Central Question that drove this study was as follows: How do rural civic 
leaders in the selected Midwestern communities, which include mayors, police chiefs, 
fire chiefs, emergency managers, and city attorneys, justify noncompliance with the 
National Preparedness Guidelines that were issued for implementation in 2009? In my 
personal experience, I have found that some sheriffs in Midwestern states do not have 
significant emergency preparedness responsibilities. In other instances, the sheriff is the 
chief law enforcement officer in the county and carries out those duties. As such, sheriffs’ 
law enforcement training is usually determined by the status they hold in the county, as is 
NIMS and other emergency preparedness training in the post-9/11 era. More often than 
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not, counties rely on state troopers or large police departments to provide any mutual-aid 
during major incidents. Law enforcement jurisdiction and response was a question I 
asked of rural leaders during the interview process to determine what they had done since 
the 9/11 attacks to make their communities safer. Responses reflected the variable 
perspective of each respondent, but it was anticipated that their justifications would 
center on issues of funding, training, personnel, remoteness, or lack of understanding of 
their respective roles in the post-9/11 era. However, it was also anticipated that valid 
justifications for exposing their communities to public safety threats would not be 
forthcoming. In addition, their responses were not expected to explain how other rural 
communities in other states have implemented appropriate emergency preparedness 
strategies with similar limitations. To seek the proper answers, I based the subquestions 
on findings developed by the core studies cited in the literature review. Each subquestion 
reflected a particular finding from each of the studies as a reason for noncompliance.  
 For example, Subquestion 1 was stated as follows: How was noncompliance with 
the National Preparedness Guidelines in the post-9/11 era reflected in the ability or 
inability of those rural communities to meet their governing goals and resource needs as 
they related to local public safety and national security issues?  
Subquestion 2 was posed as follows: What role had funding, or lack thereof, 
played in the ability or inability of those rural communities to fully implement the 
National Preparedness Guidelines? 
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Subquestion 3 was stated as follows: What role had regional remoteness played in 
decisions made by local rural leaders not to implement the national preparedness 
guidelines in their communities? 
Finally, Subquestion 4 was posed as follows: What understanding did rural civic 
leaders have about their duties and responsibilities regarding implementation of the 
National Preparedness Guidelines in their communities?   
The intent of these subquestions was to further specify the purpose of the central 
question by refining its intent. The subquestions were considered a means of asking the 
central question in a piecemeal fashion to further analyze the issue of noncompliance as it 
related to the research process (Creswell, 2013).  
 Much of the literature reviewed that addressed the question of noncompliance 
with the National Preparedness Guidelines in some of the nation’s rural communities 
was published by academics who based their conclusions on survey-based studies and 
government documents. Those peer-reviewed articles were explored in the preceding 
chapter. The reviewed government publications that addressed the benefits of compliance 
with the National Preparedness Guidelines included those produced by the DHS (2008-
2013) and FEMA (2011). These documents provided the legal history for establishing the 
DHS in 2002, along with the subsequent issuance of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines in 2005, which were revised and reissued in 2008. Their initial ineffectiveness 
was made public during the disorganized response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The 
DHS (2009) described the provisions of the National Preparedness Guidelines, along 
with outlines for the development of strategies specifically applicable to state and local 
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governments. A good example of how the guidelines can be adopted, tailored, and 
implemented effectively by states that are confronted with seasonal disasters are the 
guidelines developed by the Florida Department of Emergency Management (2008-
2013). The FDEM guidelines describe the state’s plan following implementation of its 
version of the National Preparedness Guidelines. This example shows what a model state 
can do with the national guidelines to create statewide interoperable response plans for its 
urban and rural areas.  
Role of the Researcher 
 The credibility of a qualitative research study hinges on the skill and competence 
of the researcher conducting the fieldwork and ongoing analysis of the information being 
developed.  Among the qualities I possess as an effective researcher are a grounded 
understanding of the subject and the setting under investigation. Following a long career 
as a federal agent, I also developed good investigative and interview skills that proved 
useful with individuals from various social levels and different professional settings. 
Through these skills, I honed my ability to draw people out with a sense of empathetic 
engagement while maintaining a balance of nonjudgmental and objective awareness 
regarding interviewees. I collected data by examining documents and interviewing the 
participants. As the primary data-collecting instrument, I used a self-designed interview 
protocol to answer my research questions, with the objective of developing a holistic 
account of the subject I was investigating. I accepted that a well-conducted case study 
would place demands on my intellect and personal biases due to the interaction between 
theoretical issues and the data being collected. As a case study researcher, I exercised my 
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ability to ask purposeful questions, be a good listener, remain reflexive and adaptive, 
have a good understanding of the topical issues, and avoid biases by being aware of them, 
all in an effort to ensure that the conduct of the research remained ethical.  
 The conceptual origin of this study was evidence that some rural civic leaders had 
not implemented recommended safety and security measures in their communities to 
protect local residents. This study was designed with the objective of confirming or 
disconfirming that original concept. This research, however, can also be considered a 
valid premise for a study seeking social change. By triangulating multiple data sources, 
observations, collection methods, and relational theories, I was able to overcome the 
question of bias that can surface from the single-theory, single-research-method, single-
perspective, and single-analysis interpretations that are usually associated with these 
types of studies. In addition, I anticipated that any personal research bias would be 
checked by the exercise and maintenance of high research ethics that complied with 
Walden University’s IRB standards. These standards include honesty and responsibility 
for original scholarship to ensure study validity and reliability. Controlling my personal 
biases involved an in-depth understanding of the research problem and purpose, as well 
as respect for participants in their normal sites. Checking my research biases required 
constant awareness of their presence throughout the research process, as well as 
immediately addressing their potentially negative consequences for the study if and when 
they surfaced. During the development of the study proposal I had no contact with 
anticipated participants who were to be purposefully interviewed as a result of the 
positions they held in the selected communities. A review of the research proposal 
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revealed no ethical operational issues or any challenges to the field interview process. 
The participant interviews were voluntary, and the documents reviewed were sources 
open to the public. I projected that the study findings would justify the study premise and 
also produce sufficient data to answer the research questions. Primary biases that drove 
my role as the researcher derived from 23 years of experience as a federal agent and a 
familiarity with antiterrorism. Another was a related belief in the value of national 
security. This belief encompassed the moral conviction that the safety and security of 
rural residents are every bit as important as those of urban dwellers. 
Methodology 
 This case study focused primarily on the question of noncompliance with 
federally issued preparedness guidelines. The theoretical framework that aligned with this 
study was Putnam’s (2000) theory of social capital, which refers to connections among 
individuals within a community who develop social networks with norms of reciprocity, 
and the trustworthiness that arises from them (Yin, 2014). Putnam articulated a series of 
“civic virtues” (p. 7) that emanate from this type social exchange. Among those virtues 
are political and civic engagement, informal social ties, tolerance and trust, social justice, 
mutual aid, and communal coherence (p. 19). Putnam added that social capital becomes 
especially relevant in meeting various emergency management challenges in small towns 
and rural communities, and that these civic virtues are stronger when they are embedded 
in a community’s network of reciprocal social relations. Putnam cautioned, however, that 
a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital 
(p. 19).  The theoretical premise of this approach is that the reason why civic leaders in 
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some Midwestern rural communities had not taken steps to adopt National Preparedness 
Guidelines is that levels of engagement and social ties are stronger in a local setting and 
can cause resistance to federal and state directives (Caruson & MacManus, 2004; DHS, 
2009; Putnam, 2000). After considering this theoretical premise, the reasons for 
noncompliance with implementation of safety and security measures in some small towns 
and rural communities remained unclear, but the theory of social capital shed some light 
on the resistance to change (Putnam, 2000). The intent and purpose of this study, 
therefore, was to develop the necessary information that would explain the reasons for 
noncompliance in the identified small towns and rural communities. This theoretical 
framework holds that lives and infrastructure in rural communities are just as vital as 
those in urban centers, and offered insight into the reasons for the reported 
noncompliance.  
Sample Selection Strategy 
  I used purposeful sampling to identify and recruit participants. As is common in 
this type of qualitative research, small samples of uncertain population representation 
were taken with the objective of saturating the concept, and to explore its relationship to 
other concepts so that it became theoretically meaningful (Reynolds, 2007; Rudestam & 
Newton, 2007). The framing of research questions specific to participants was found to 
be beneficial to the research process. This strategy limited inappropriate generalization 
and helped me to recognize the diversity among participants. Finally, it also helped me 
focus on the specific actions, events, and processes in the actual context that they were 
researched and studied (Maxwell, 2013).  
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 Participants in this study were unknown to me, and were selected on the basis of 
the positions they held in the rural communities selected for this study. These participants 
were mayors, city attorneys, emergency managers, fire chiefs, or police chiefs. They were 
identified by the positions they occupied and the authority they held to develop and 
implement emergency preparedness programs in their communities. The number of 
interviews was limited to 12 or no more than two representatives from each of four sites 
in the Midwestern states of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas. The recruitment of 
participants began with their identification from state and local records, followed by 
telephone calls to confirm names, addresses, and their willingness to participate in the 
study. That process was followed with presentation of a formal letter extending 
individual invitations to each representative of the communities selected for study, who 
expressed an interest in participating. An acknowledgement of acceptance was secured 
with a signed consent letter, which informed them that participation was voluntary. This 
was followed with a conversation confirming the place, date, and time for the interview 
(Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). The literature review revealed no indication that these 
prospective participants were ever used as subjects in past studies. I anticipated that the 
samples chosen for this study would suffice to provide saturation of the data sought. To 
summarize, the study participants were contacted by telephone, then presented with a 
consent letter if they decided to participate in the study. Three prospective participants 





 The data collection process was preceded by a review of emergency management 
documents, which pertained to the particular state and rural communities selected for the 
study. That review identified the prevailing policies for the adoption and implementation 
of emergency preparedness measures statewide, and whether they were inclusive of rural 
communities. Applicable federal documents detailing National Preparedness Guidelines 
were also reviewed and are clear as they apply to all municipalities nationwide. For the 
most part, however, the reviewed documents imply that states that adopted the national 
guidelines also implemented strategies inclusive of small towns and rural communities. 
Although federal homeland security funds are allocated to states based on threat, risk, 
vulnerability, and population density, the federal government cannot force states to 
ensure that rural areas are protected from natural or manmade disasters (DHS, 2009; 
Kozak, 2011; Reese, 2009). These documents, along with the studies described in the 
literature review, were instrumental in the formulation of this study’s research and 
interview questions. The interview protocol guided the data collected from participants 
and established the extent of compliance with emergency preparedness measures in the 
selected research sites. The interview protocol is referenced in Appendices A and B.  
 I conducted all participant interviews professionally and in accordance with ethics 
best practices. The interview protocol was formulated with open-ended questions that 
followed a careful assessment of the available literature and the various federal policies 
currently in effect, to determine what local policies were in place. I was confident that 
interviews conducted with rural civic leaders would develop the necessary information to 
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answer the research questions. My written notes of the interview process supplemented 
the recorded interviews, which varied in duration from 30 to 45 minutes. The interviews 
were conducted in participants’ choice of setting. Following their analysis, the data 
collected from the interviews produced a better understanding of the reasons why some 
rural communities had not complied with implementation of National Preparedness 
Guidelines. Findings of this study will be provided to participant communities for their 
comparative and adaptive use. At the time the study was initiated, it was not anticipated 
that follow-up contacts would be necessary after completion of the initial interviews and 
data analysis except to offer the study’s findings (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002).         
Data Analysis Plan 
 My data analysis plan aligned the research problem, the research method, and the 
study’s results. The plan included the issues of identifying and soliciting participants, of 
preparing research protocols and other data collecting tools, as well as the formulation of 
procedures pertaining to the study as recommended by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 
(2014). The research analysis began with the first piece of information collected and 
continued until the subject was saturated (Patton, 2002). Although I could not guarantee 
that I would be able to completely saturate the subject, I anticipated collecting sufficient 
information to answer the research questions. In this case study, I analyzed information 
related to programs and processes conducted by individuals in the Midwest region. This 
data analysis plan specified a method of collecting, organizing, and analyzing data, which 
was aligned with my case study approach. Although some of the sources reviewed held 
that there is no fixed formula for the conduct of analysis (Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2002; 
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Yin, 2014), my intent was to conduct data collection and analysis concurrently, as 
suggested by Miles et al. (2014).  
 This case study employed the basic strategies of first reading all pertinent notes, 
memoranda, documents, and interview transcripts. These readings were followed by 
open, axial, and selective coding, which helped describe, classify, and interpret data 
collected (Creswell, 2013). The final step in this study’s analysis plan involved the 
development of patterns and themes from the data collected in order to formulate a valid 
narrative of the interpreted information. To facilitate this process, qualitative computer 
software was used to help with the coding, analysis, and interpretation of the collected 
data. However, it was understood that I would be responsible for the actual coding and 
the analysis of that data (Patton, 2002). Miles et al. (2014), noted that coding drives 
ongoing data collection as a form of continuing analysis, which I adopted as a strategy.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
 The purpose of trustworthiness is to support the argument that my research 
findings are valid. By accepting this premise I believe that the trustworthiness of this 
study design is the standard by which my research results will be judged. For this reason, 
trustworthiness in this case study was an ongoing process requiring constant bracketing 
of my biases and assumptions, along with the corroboration and confirmation of collected 
data. By extension, validation of the research provided judgment of the study’s overall 
trustworthiness, which added value of substance and ethical standards to the process. The 
validation strategies I employed in this qualitative study stressed quality, credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. To summarize, the trustworthiness of 
85 
 
this study was founded on the credibility and validity of my research, which required me 
to be especially mindful of validity issues during the data collection and analysis 
processes. The issues of external and internal validity, reliability, and construct validity 
required my awareness during the entire research process, but they did not consume too 
much of my concern because I ensured the study’s integrity by practicing truth and 
honesty in all that I did. That way I assured future readers that nothing in my study would 
be false or invalid.    
 The exploratory process of this case study took place in a specific region of the 
country to determine the extent of compliance with National Preparedness Guidelines in 
rural communities. This exploratory research examined emerging patterns that formed 
themes, reviewed document explanations, and addressed rival explanations, in efforts to 
test the study’s internal validity. The research design ensured the study’s construct 
validity and reliability. Indications are that this study’s results may be transferable, and 
its operational process reliable to the extent of providing similar results in other regions, 
such as the four state areas of Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, and Idaho (Yin, 2014). 
Transferability may also be applicable to the four-state region encompassing Colorado, 
Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona. Both of these regions have similar patterns of densely 
populated urban centers and dispersed populations in rural areas, which may indicate 
similar noncompliance issues. These are the demographic conditions that prompted the 
research questions that drove this study. To ensure proper documentation of this study’s 
dependability and repeatability, pertinent data will be maintained in research logs, tapes, 
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and computer external drives. Digital records reflecting the analysis that was conducted 
will be maintained in a selected computer software program (Miles et al., 2014). 
Ethics Procedures 
 Prior to and during the research process, I addressed ethical concerns with the 
simple commitment to do no harm. Another effective practice I adopted following years 
of experience as a federal agent, is to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. Abiding by these professional codes guided me to be true to this study, thereby 
preventing it from becoming false. By adding respect and consideration, along with an 
assurance of confidentiality, to participants, validation of the study was also assured. 
Before arriving at that point, however, the start of formal research required the review 
and approval of the study proposal and related protocols by the Walden University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), which granted approval on June 25, 2015, with the 
assigned number of 06-25-15-0275903. Because the study involved the conduct of 
interviews with selected participants, the execution of an Informed Consent agreement 
with the study participants was necessary. This consent agreement is required by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and is intended for the protection of 
all study participants from abuse and liability. Potential risks for study participants may 
include unintended discomfort, as well as physical, emotional, or psychological stress. 
From the researcher’s perspective, the consent agreement also serves to shift some 
responsibility to participants who may experience negative results from their 
participation. A copy of the consent agreement has been made part of Appendix A that is 
attached to this study (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014).   
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 In efforts to prevent ethical issues, this study did not involve vulnerable members 
of the population, nor was data collected from my own workplace. This study’s selected 
interviewees were public employees serving in elected or appointed positions in the 
selected rural communities. The information sought from them was open-source, and thus 
available to the general public. At no time were questions asked of participants about 
their work that might have led to the disclosure of behavior or views, which may have 
affected their employment status. All participant identities remained confidential during 
the research process and will throughout the storage period at conclusion of the study. 
This confidentiality will be extended to include the locations and names of the 
communities they represented. Interviewees and site locations will be identified and 
cataloged by code words and numbers known only to me.  
 During and after completion of this study, that information will be stored 
separately from other study documents and the data that was collected for analysis. The 
recordings and transcriptions of participant interviewees will be similarly stored in digital 
format, with copies saved on external drives. Encryption will preserve the data and also 
ensure privacy for the required 5-year period following completion of the study. This 
study was conducted in the region that encompasses the four-state region of Nebraska, 
Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. All participants were interviewed in their own settings, and 
remained unknown to me until the scheduled interview date (Yin, 2014).  
Summary 
 In the initial paragraphs of this chapter, I reintroduced the threat that terrorism 
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still poses to the nation. I also stressed that the threat justifies the need for heightened 
vigilance by all Americans, but particularly by counterterrorism experts and emergency 
managers. Vigilance involves the need for implementation of preparedness strategies to 
counter that threat, as well as those threats posed by natural causes. The introduction was 
followed by a description of the research methodology employed to explore the reasons 
for noncompliance with implementation of National Preparedness Guidelines in rural 
communities within the selected Midwestern states. The study’s research design and 
rationale reflects a strategy that aligned well with the investigation’s objectives of 
developing an in-depth understanding of the reasons for noncompliance with safety and 
security emergency management measures as implemented by a majority of the nation’s 
communities. The decision for selecting this study design followed the rationale that the 
initial concept drives the research, and the study’s purpose drives the analysis. With an 
enhanced understanding of the reasons for noncompliance in some rural communities, it 
became possible to develop a consensus of rationales that influenced their compliance or 
noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2009; Yin, 2014).   
 This study involved a review of all pertinent government documents, laws, and 
policies, as well as findings in available literature identified in Chapter 2, all of which 
provided the basis for the open-ended research questions. The Midwest region was ideal 
for this type of research due to literature confirmation that no similar research studies had 
been previously conducted in the states of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, or Kansas. This 
environment provided sites that reflected responsiveness to a holistic, single case study 
that assessed levels of compliance in rural areas, and offered opportunities for the 
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application of emergency management strategies designed to meet the various needs of 
the affected communities (Yin, 2014). The assessment also gauged the level of social 
capital involvement in those communities to measure the level of preparedness and the 
response capability to manmade or natural disasters (Putnam, 2000). As the primary 
research tool, I was responsible for maintaining the validity and trustworthiness of the 
study. This was ensured by personal integrity and through the application of various 
triangulation techniques, as well as compliance with required IRB guidelines (Patton, 
2002; Yin, 2014). Those measures were employed despite personal assurances that the 
study would be free of validity concerns. Chapter 4, which follows, provides an accurate 
description of the data collected, its analysis, and interpretation of the information which 
revealed the reasons for noncompliance with emergency management strategies in rural 











Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
 The general intent of this study was to seek an answer to the question of whether 
the National Preparedness Guidelines had been consistently implemented in selected  
rural communities within the Midwestern states of Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri and Kansas 
since the last issuance of the policy in 2008 (DHS, 2009). More specifically, the purpose 
of this case study was to explore and examine the various rationales rural civic leaders 
offered in response to the five studies previously conducted in other Midwestern states 
regarding the question of compliance with the national guidelines (Bryant, 2009; 
Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). 
For example, Bryant (2009) reported that the challenges of rural emergency management 
were based primarily on resource limitations, low population density, and aged or absent 
communications warning systems, coupled with separation and remoteness. Chenoweth 
and Clarke (2010) advanced an argument for cost effectiveness, noting that decisions had 
been made by urban leaders to apply homeland security allocations to metropolitan areas 
where denser populations and more critical infrastructure are situated. Marion and Cronin 
(2009) simply reported that noncompliance in their region of study was attributed to a 
lack of funding. In his studies, Oliver (2007, 2009) contended that the primary reason for 
noncompliance with national guidelines in the nation’s small communities was a lack of 
understanding by local leaders of their duties and responsibilities in the post-9/11 era. 
And in his study, Stigler (2010) found that although the rationale for a lack of resources  
had validity, geographical remoteness and separation also played an important role in 
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how rural communities viewed and accepted nationally issued guidelines.  
 The related intent of this case study was to confirm or disconfirm the validity of 
the findings reported in the previous studies, and to establish a common rationale for 
noncompliance or compliance at the end of this study. One objective was to develop 
generalizations that would be applicable to other national regions having similar 
demographics. The above studies reported variances in the rationales for noncompliance 
that reflected inconsistent and inconclusive findings. What those studies shared in 
common, however, was a recommendation for further study on this subject. The overall 
purpose of this study, then, was to identify a pattern of noncompliance in the selected 
rural hamlets, villages, and towns within the four-state region of Iowa, Nebraska, 
Missouri, and Kansas, to confirm or disconfirm the common conditions that may pose a 
threat to national security and the public safety of the affected communities. If the 
findings of the previously reviewed studies were valid, then the prevailing inconsistencies 
in compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines had created two social 
problems related to security and public safety. One problem weakened the nation’s 
security by failing to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and the other threatened 
public safety in those same communities.  
 During the field research, I expected confirmation of general public perceptions of 
backwardness and poverty in rural communities. Among the perceived phenomena were 
lacks of good health care and treatment facilities, low-paying agricultural, manufacturing, 
or retail jobs, and limited educational and employment options, coupled with an exodus 
of younger residents seeking better educational and employment opportunities in urban 
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areas (Bryant, 2009). These conditions reportedly contribute to the designation of “last 
served” when a state allocates funds for emergency preparedness and recovery in case of 
a disaster. Even if these conditions are generally true, I was prompted to ask whether the 
general welfare and safety of rural residents are less important than those of people who 
live in urban areas (Bryant, 2009).  Field research confirmed some of these perceptions 
but also disconfirmed others. The field research involved gaining an understanding of the 
nation’s small towns, hamlets, villages, and townships following a review of literature 
provided by the National League of Cities (2014) and the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). 
These agencies estimated that 97.5% of the nation’s land area is regarded as rural and is 
home to about 55 million people, or about 18% of the U.S. population.  
 My field research included a complete review of federal and state documents 
related to homeland security and emergency management (DHS, 2009; State of Iowa, 
2015; State of Kansas, 2014; State of Missouri, 2015; State of Nebraska, 2014-2016). 
The document reviews were followed by interviews with emergency managers as well as 
law enforcement officials and fire chiefs at the local level in the selected communities. 
The document reviews revealed that the state emergency plans were mirror reproductions 
of the federal guidelines, as they outlined the National Response Framework (NRF) and 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). Emergency managers at state regional or 
district levels were directed to comply with NIMS requirements to ensure annual funding 
for homeland security, and qualify for special needs grants. The specific object of the 
interviews was to determine the levels of emergency preparedness in selected small rural 
communities along Tornado Alley. Tornado Alley is a wide corridor that runs north from 
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Texas and Oklahoma through Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa that also affects Missouri. 
This particular part of the Heartland was chosen for the study due to its continuing cycle 
of extreme weather patterns, which include tornadoes, severe storms, lighting strikes, 
flooding, fires, heat, cold, and drought, as well as the presence of antigovernment groups 
such as the Sovereign Citizens who do not recognize federal law, only the authority of the 
county sheriff. Communities selected for this study were situated along this corridor and 
were limited to those with small populations that numbered between 2,500 and 10,500 
residents. See Figure 1 below for a rendering of wind currents that form tornado alley.  
 
Figure 1. Illustration showing how Tornado Alley develops. From Tornado Alley 
diagram, by D. Craggs, 2009, retrieved from 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tornado_Alley_Diagram.svg  
 
 The interview questions were designed to elicit information that revealed how the 
selected communities coped with the seasonal series of natural weather extremes 
commonly caused by the confluence of high cold air streams flowing down from the 
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Northwest, meeting with low warm air masses coming up from the southeastern part of 
the United States (NOAA, NWS, 2015).  Although I intended to interview at least two 
participants from each state, by the end of 1 week I had interviewed four in Missouri, five 
in Kansas, and one in Iowa. The interviews revealed comments from participants that 
were rich with descriptions of the civic “virtues” of cohesion, cooperation, collaboration, 
and exchange prompted by a sense of reciprocity that is firmly based on common need 
(Putnam, 2000). For example, while I was interviewing an emergency manager in a rural 
Kansas community, he recounted how a week prior to my visit, a tornado had touched 
down on a neighbor’s farm, destroying a large two-wing barn and uprooting a livestock 
fence, causing cattle to scatter. According to the emergency manager’s account, soon 
after the tornado passed, neighbors appeared with the necessary machines to rebuild the 
fence, corral the livestock, and build a temporary shelter for the roofless farming 
vehicles. The temporary repairs would secure the tornado victim’s property until his 
homeowner’s insurance compensated him for permanent fixtures. This was the type of 
reciprocity and trust that appeared to bind residents of the studied communities. This 
finding alone could serve as a positive generalization to other regions with similar 
demographics in the U.S. and its territories. 
 The general research objective sought by this study centered on the unresolved 
question of compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines in rural America that 
were issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009). Initially, these guidelines were designed and issued in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to protect all communities from 
manmade and natural disasters. They were then revised following the response to the 
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Hurricane Katrina disaster in August 2005 (DHS, 2009). In particular, this study was 
driven by the Central Question of how civic leaders in rural communities justified 
noncompliance with the issued guidelines. That research question was influenced by the 
previously reviewed literature, and although presumptive in nature, it was intended to 
address only those communities that were actually found to be noncompliant. This study, 
however, found that all of the studied communities were compliant with the National 
Preparedness Guidelines. No evidence of noncompliance was found in any of the 
communities visited during the study period. This central question was answered by 
participant responses to interview questions that described the nature of disasters that had 
occurred in the community (Interview Question1), the threats they posed to local 
infrastructure (Interview Question 2), the protocols in place to respond to those threats 
(Interview Question 7), and acceptance of federal guidelines and assistance (Interview 
Question 15). Those responses indicated that the studied communities had already 
implemented the National Preparedness Guidelines and had been compliant with the 
guidelines’ provisions since their initial issuance. A number of the emergency managers 
interviewed in Kansas and Missouri stated that they had been involved in the disciplines 
of homeland security and emergency management for the past decade.    
 Research Question 1 addressed how noncompliance with national guidelines 
reflected the ability or inability of rural leaders to meet their governing goals as they 
related to public safety and national security. In their responses to Interview Questions 3, 
4, 5, 6, and 8, all of the participants described the natural conditions and types of groups 
that threatened their communities. They explained how they jointly conducted their threat 
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assessments in line with national and state guidelines, established mutual-aid agreements, 
and identified the county, state, and federal agencies available for assistance. Members 
attending threat assessment meetings usually involved the Mid-America Council, which 
is composed of representatives from the four-state region, FEMA, state regional 
emergency coordinators, local emergency managers, law enforcement officials, and 
members of area National Guard units. At those meetings, attending members share their 
concerns concerning particular emergency incident needs.  
 As an example, a community in southwest Missouri experienced a particularly 
heavy snowfall last year that immobilized the town. The deep snow prevented the town’s 
emergency vehicles, business owners, and residents from traveling safely over the roads. 
The town’s emergency manager called the National Guard unit in the next county and 
asked the Guard to bring the necessary equipment to clear the town’s roads, which it did. 
The question that was discussed at the following regional assessment meeting was 
whether it would be practical for FEMA to purchase a large snowplow for that town and 
house it in the local fire station, or enter into an agreement with the National Guard unit 
to make its equipment available when needed. The decision was made to submit a grant 
to FEMA requesting a snowplow to be used as needed and housed in a centrally located 
firehouse. The reasoning was that if the roads were impassable during a heavy snowfall, 
National Guardsmen who operated the unit’s equipment would also have difficulty 
getting to the Armory and make the equipment operational.     
 Research Question 2 concerned the role that funding played in the ability or 
inability of rural leaders to implement the national guidelines. Participant responses to 
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Interview Questions 9 and 11 indicated that funding and lack of resources were always 
issues but that those shortcomings were usually overcome by local volunteerism, mutual- 
aid, and federal grants. The emergency managers interviewed in Iowa, Kansas, and 
Missouri offered the same response to these interview questions. Accepting that they had 
no control over the question of funding, they had long ago committed to carry out their 
duties as best as they could with the resources the state made available to them. Those 
resources, coupled with eligibility for FEMA grant applications to acquire special needs 
equipment, met all their funding needs. For example, interviewees M3-EM and K3-EM 
stated almost verbatim during their interviews that “additional funds were always 
welcome to fill vacancies and acquire more current equipment, but their limitation was 
not having a negative impact on their ability to perform effectively.”  To the specific 
question of whether direct funding from the federal government would improve their 
operational effectiveness, all of the participants responded that direct funding would have 
a negative effect on their operational flexibility due to administrative accounting 
requirements they deemed time consuming and nonoperational. This consensus was best 
explained by interviewee M2-LE/EM, who stated that “assuming responsibility for the 
receipt of direct funding from either the federal or state government would have a 
negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency operations due to the 
preoccupation of field coordinators with the maintenance of additional records for the 
expenditures of those funds.”  He added that “the two functions were incompatible 
because both were full-time jobs.”    
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 The intent of Research Question 3 was to elicit information about the role that 
regional remoteness played in rural leaders’ decisions not to implement the National 
Preparedness Guidelines in their communities. Participant responses to Interview 
Questions 10 and 12 described a long history of cooperation with other local and regional 
emergency response agencies and indicated that a remote lifestyle was a matter of choice. 
As a result, rural residents found it easy to work with other like-minded people during 
times of need, thus expressing an active form of social capital to complement their 
chosen status of remoteness and separation (Putnam, 2000). In response to Interview 
Question 12, M4-EM, M5-EM, and K3-EM stated that they had no communication 
limitations with their regional coordinators or state capitals in case of an emergency. In 
fact, they proudly exhibited their state-of-the-art telecommunications systems, which they 
stated were satellite driven. Those emergency managers followed their presentations with 
the statement that, due in part to this capability, their overall effectiveness in response 
and recovery efforts regarding emergencies that occur in their communities had been 
significantly enhanced. Informal conversations that I had with local residents while 
waiting for a scheduled participant interview reflected confidence in the ability of their 
local leaders to provide for their safety and security prior to, during, and following an 
incident. A curious finding in response to this question was that none of the participants, 
whether emergency managers or law enforcement officials, considered themselves 
separated from urban centers or disconnected from social contacts in those areas due to 
their relative remoteness. Participants M5-EM, K1-EM/LE, and K3-EM stated that they 
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often travelled to regional urban centers to remain socially connected, or to participate in 
refresher training in their respective disciplines. 
 Finally, Research Question 4, which addressed the issue of whether rural 
community leaders understood their duties, roles, and responsibilities in the post 9/11 era, 
was fully explained by participant responses to Interview Questions 13 and 14. In their 
responses, none of the participants expressed concerns about limitations due to 
remoteness, having learned to be self-reliant following years of being confronted with 
natural disasters, regardless whether their population numbers ranged from 2,500 to 
10,500. In their responses to Interview Question 13, participants stated that their personal 
roles in local emergency matters were those of on-site directors of operations. All 
participants expressed a clear understanding of their public safety and security roles in 
the post-9/11 era. 
Table 1 
Relationship of Study’s Research Questions to Participant Interview Questions 
      Research questions                                            Interview questions 
           Central research question       Interview Questions 1, 2, 7, & 15  
  
 Research Subquestion 1    Interview Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, & 8 
 Research Subquestion 2    Interview Questions 9 & 11 
 Research Subquestion 3   Interview Questions 10 & 12 
 Research Subquestion 4   Interview Questions 13 & 14 




 This chapter will next review the setting where the field research was conducted, 
along with the demographics particular to this study. These general explanations will be 
followed by a specific description of the data collection and analysis phases of the study, 
and then a discussion about developed evidence of the study’s trustworthiness. That 
discussion will be complemented with a description of the analyzed data’s results. The 
final section will provide a summary of this chapter’s contents, and offer a transitional 
introduction to Chapter 5.  
Setting 
 Following the June 2015 approval by the University’s IRB to conduct this study, I 
contacted potential gatekeepers in the selected states of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and 
Nebraska. After making travel arrangements, I began the field research phase of this 
study in July 2015. The geographical setting for this study was the corridor that extends 
from Texas and Oklahoma through Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Iowa. This corridor 
is commonly referred to as “Tornado Alley.” The physical locations for the conduct of 
face-to-face interviews were the public offices of regional law enforcement officials and 
emergency managers who were situated in small rural communities along that corridor. 
In one instance the interview was conducted by telephone with M4-EM who was in route 
to his office from a regional conference. The field research revealed no organizational or 
personal conditions at the time of the study that may have influenced interpretation of this 
study’s results. When presented to preidentified participants, the letter of consent proved 
effective not only as my introduction, but also in outlining the purpose and scope of the 
study. As a result, participants expressed an interest in participating in the study, all of 
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whom consented to a recorded interview, except for three, although all signed a consent 
form and agreed to answer the interview questions. A fire chief who also served as an 
emergency manager was interviewed outside his fire station as he prepared to answer a 
call.  
 During the field research phase I conducted 10 formal interviews and participated 
in several informal conversations with local residents regarding the state of emergency 
preparedness in their rural communities. Prior to initiating contact with participants, I 
took the time to study the pertinent federal, state, and regional documents concerning 
emergency preparedness policies, operational practices, and organizational structures in 
effect within each state. That preparation proved helpful during the interview process, 
especially in those instances when participants accepted my knowledge base. Due to a 
developed rapport with participants along with my understanding of the study issues, no 
conditions were noted that would have influenced the final interpretation of this study’s 
results.  
 A remarkable finding during my informal conversations with local residents was 
the expressed faith and confidence in the ability of their local leaders to provide for the 
general safety and security of their respective communities. These informal conversations 
were held with state, county, and city employees, as well as local residents in the states of 
Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. As a group, their comments reflected an understanding of 
the threats they faced seasonally and accepted the likelihood that at one future time or 
another they would be part of the volunteer group that responds to an incident. Contrary 
to previously reported findings by Oliver (2007, 2009) the field research confirmed that 
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local rural leaders did understand their roles and responsibilities prior to, during, and after 
a disaster, whether the cause was natural or manmade. At those times, local residents tend 
express a bonding with affected neighbors, often bridging social diversity to assist in the 
response, recovery, and mitigating processes. According to participants and residents of 
the communities studied, assistance during times of need is never an issue. As explained 
by K3-EM, what does create a series of logistical problems during an incident is an influx 
of uninvited volunteers from adjoining regional areas. Those problems are related to the 
provisions of sleeping and hygiene facilities, food, water, fuel, as well as with traffic 
congestion, coordination, communication, and conflicts in leadership. These types of 
problems became evident in 2011 after a deadly tornado devastated the western part of 
Joplin, Missouri, a town of 50,000 people situated in the Tornado Alley corridor. To 
prevent such future recurrences of uninvited volunteers, local and regional emergency 
managers from Kansas and Missouri were invited by the emergency manager in Joplin, 
Missouri to participate in a Mid-America Council meeting shortly after the tornado 
passed. At that meeting, operational guidelines for all contiguous states, adjoining 
communities, and regions, were established which directed outside emergency services 
not to respond to an incident site unless they are invited, and to bring only the personnel 
and equipment that is requested.  
Demographics 
 The statistical characteristics of the populations studied included white, middle-
aged, emergency managers, fire, and law enforcement officials who choose to live in the 
Heartland’s rural communities selected for this study. The communities studied ranged 
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from 2,500 to 10,500 residents, most of who have lived in the same homes where they 
were born. This observation included the majority of the study participants. Newer 
residents were retirees or transfers from urban centers who sought a more pastoral setting 
in which to live. An example of such a resident was a participant who retired as a U.S. 
Marine Colonel and decided to buy a farm in rural Kansas along the Tornado Alley 
corridor. By circumstance he was elected county sheriff and also became the area’s joint 
emergency manager. All of the formal interviews involved local professional emergency 
managers or law enforcement officials responsible for the implementation and execution 
of safety and security measures in their respective rural communities. All the participants 
interviewed were active, full-time professionals serving as emergency managers, fire 
chiefs, or law enforcement officers. Other local leaders such as mayors and city attorneys 
were not available for interviews, and those who were contacted indicated they had little 
to do with emergency management or preparedness programs in their communities.  
Data Collection 
 As the primary tool for data collection, I conducted face-to-face interviews with 
ten rural civic officials responsible for the implementation and execution of emergency 
preparedness measures in their communities within the Midwestern states of Nebraska, 
Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. From federal Internet sites I collected and reviewed those 
public documents related to emergency preparedness for use by all of the nation’s 
communities. From state sites I collected and reviewed those documents dedicated to a 
particular state’s adaptation of the National Preparedness Guidelines. In all instances, the 
state documents were mirror versions of the federal publications. Although each of the 
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studied states had developed its own organizational structure in response to incidents, as 
well as a messaging system to alert citizens of impending threats, their operational 
manuals, such as the NRF and NIMS, were printed in language identical to that of the 
federal documents. At the state district or regional levels, which are comprised of 12 or 
more counties, the operational policies under which they currently operate strictly follow 
the state’s guidelines. As an example, the State of Missouri lists nine appointed regional 
coordinators assigned to administer and ensure compliance with the state’s guidelines in 
114 counties. That level of compliance is necessary in order for the state to qualify for 
federal homeland security funding and to maintain eligibility for FEMA grant approval 
(State of Iowa, 2015; State of Kansas, 2014; State of Missouri, 2015; State of Nebraska, 
2014-2016). 
 Prior to initiating the field interviews, I purchased a binder with eight pockets in 
which I inserted maps of the selected study states, and copies of each state’s emergency 
preparedness plans, along with 10 sets of consent forms and interview questions that were 
assigned identification codes. The locations for conducting interviews were participants’ 
offices in Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas. Most of the interviews lasted between 
25 to 45 minutes, depending on the participant’s schedule. The interview data was 
recorded and stored in an Olympus digital voice recorder, model number WS-821. A 
variation to the initial interview protocol occurred when a Nebraska participant referred 
to me by a gatekeeper declined to participate. This happened one other time in Kansas. 
Responses to the interview questions reached the level of redundancy by the tenth 
interview, so I determined it unnecessary to continue the process. The only unusual 
105 
 
circumstances encountered during the data collection phase were the refusal by a law 
enforcement official to allow me a telephone interview after he previously agreed to a  
face-to-face interview.  Another was the failure of a rural emergency manager who 
granted me a telephone interview, but never returned the consent form. Other than those 
two variations, the field research was deemed successful after ten participants produced 
the data to answer the research questions sufficiently. 
Data Analysis 
 The inductive nature of qualitative research analysis led this study from specific 
pieces of data to larger patterns of similar information, which helped form themes that 
facilitated the interpretation of that data. A review of the Stanford University (2010-
2012) publication on the use of Atlas.ti for qualitative data analysis proved useful in the 
coding, analysis, and interpretation of the data collected. Following the user-friendly 
booklet, I was able to code types of threats to the studied rural communities, how to 
manage those codes, and align them by type, frequency, severity, and region. Patterns of 
codes included the extreme degrees of cold and heat, duration of droughts, the frequency 
of electrical storms and fires, storms that cause flooding, and extremist groups of the 
political right. According to local law enforcement officials and emergency managers, a 
militant group known as Sovereign Citizens, which is active in the Midwest, has created 
problems through acts of civil disobedience in local communities by refusing to obey first 
responder directives during emergencies. Sovereign Citizens do not recognize civil law 
because they consider themselves independent of government authority except for that of 
the county sheriff. In regard to the natural threats that the studied communities experience 
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seasonally, participants M2-EM and K3-EM conceded that although Nature’s threats 
cannot be prevented, they have learned to prepare against and recover from their effects 
through the application of best emergency management practices. 
 An example can be drawn from National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
(NASA) ability to track massive storms, bearing 80 to 100 mile fronts, across Kansas in a 
converted DC-8 that sends messages to regional ground stations.  Those messages alert 
local emergency managers before the storm hits their area. A curious finding regarding 
this storm-chasing effort was that these storm fronts form in the late afternoon, at which 
time the plane circles and begins tracking them to report their direction. These high wind 
fronts may travel from Kansas to Iowa where they may drop six inches of rain in a short 
period of time, accompanied by multiple lightning strikes and flooding by morning. I had 
a chance to witness this type of overnight flooding while conducting field research in 
Iowa. When I asked local residents if the flooding qualified for regional or federal aid, 
they responded that it did not, that they were used to it and knew how to deal with the 
problem. Historically, the geographical area between Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas 
City, Missouri averages 50 days of such torrential storms each year (Bavley, 2015; 
Montgomery, 2015). The stated objective of the NASA experiment is to collect sufficient 
data to more accurately pinpoint where and when the next downpour will occur, thereby 
allowing emergency managers on the ground more time to prepare for the likely flooding 
that will follow, and to move people to safer areas (Bavley, 2015).  
 Due to the Midwest region’s lack of mountains, hills, wooded areas, or large 
bodies of water, and the presence of other climatologically determined conditions as 
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illustrated in Figure 1, nature uses the void of those natural elements to provide dramatic 
scenes that reflect those conditions. Figure 2 below presents an illustration of a storm cell 
hovering over the Kansas plains. This is the type of storm cell that NASA tracks by 
aircraft throughout the Midwest during the stormy season.  Figure 3 that follows, is a 
photo illustration of a lightning storm over Kansas City, Kansas as referred to by the 
above cited sources.  
 
Figure 2. Photo image of super storm cell over Kansas plain. Open source print retrieved 
from Sean Heavey, Barcraft Media. Article 1334672-OC511. 
 
 Figure 3 that follows illustrates a photo image of an evening electrical storm over 
Kansas City, Kansas as it is viewed from Kansas City, Missouri (Antle, Lauria, Mirriam-
Goldberg, & Locke, 2015). These storms can appear with little notice and bring with 
them massive fronts that drop great amounts of water after they introduce themselves 
with such electrical activity. The point being made is that rural and urban residents of the 
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Midwest must not only contend with these threats, but also with the flooding they bring 
and the tornadoes they create. M3-EM/LE stated that the main concern for emergency 
managers during the winter months is snow removal and an occasional accidental fire 
caused by an unattended appliance.  He added, however, that if snowfall is heavy, then 
the spring thaw is prone to flood communities near rivers and lakes.  
 
Figure 3. Storm cell preceded by lightning activity over Kansas City, Kansas, viewed 
from Kansas City, Missouri. Retrieved from the Kansas City Star, (November 5, 2015,  
p. 3C).  
 
 The only discrepant qualities that may require mention were the noted differences 
between participant statements and findings in the previously cited studies, which will be 
more fully contrasted in the Results section of this paper. The major themes that emerged 
from data analysis were the identification of the emergency management and law 
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enforcement personnel who serve the rural communities that seasonally experience 
extreme heat, cold, drought, lightning storms, fires, flooding, tornadoes, and extremist 
groups of the political right. The services provided by local law enforcement are the 
protection of life and property. Emergency managers help rural policy makers plan for 
response and recovery operations following an incident. Firefighters and emergency 
medical technicians complete the quartet of first responders in these rural areas where 
immediate response is critical. Atlas.ti was used to collect, organize, review, and interpret 
the data. This guidance simplified the coding process, which I eventually reduced from 
172 to 10 major codes. One code identified and aligned the purposes and functions of the 
first responders in the local Homeland Security effort. Eight other codes defined the 
threats particular to each of the studied sites, and the tenth code described the actual 
services provided to each rural community. 
 The purposeful application of axial and selective coding allowed me to utilize 
categorical aggregation to facilitate the interpretation of the collected data with specific, 
issue related meaning (Creswell, 2013). Because this case study involved multisites, I 
was able to apply a variance of cross case synthesis of the collected data from different 
sites as an analytical technique (Yin, 2014).  Although I have provided an explanation of 
the data collection process as a separate function from data analysis, I found the two 
processes closely related in purpose, due partly to the constant development of patterns 
and themes as the data were being collected (Patton, 2002). This iterative process is 
reflected in the analysis process I utilized during the study. My familiarity with the 
studied region, coupled with my subject knowledge base, proved instrumental in 
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facilitating the analysis and interpretation of the data collected. These advantages helped 
me focus on the issues being addressed through the interview questions. This avoided 
being led into local issues not pertinent or relevant to the subject under investigation. The 
interview questions served to develop the codes, patterns, and themes, which ultimately 
led to an interpretation of the data that was responsive to the study’s research questions. 
The resulting interpretation allowed me to begin shaping the study’s story. Participant 
responses to the interview questions were transcribed, after which the transcripts were 
processed and analyzed on my computer’s hard drive. The data will be stored securely for 
the required five years in a file safe located in my home office.   
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
 As stated in Chapter 3 of this paper, the primary purpose of trustworthiness is to 
support the argument that a study’s findings are valid. The validation strategies applied in 
this study stressed quality, credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
By extension, validation of the study research provided judgment of the study’s overall 
trustworthiness. In this study I viewed the implementation of credibility as assurance that 
the study was believable and trustworthy from the participants’ perspective. Participants’ 
openness and confidence in the accuracy of their responses to the interview questions did 
much to assure that they had provided honest answers to the inquiries. A review of each 
state’s guidelines prior to conducting interviews was helpful in confirming the accuracy 
of participant responses. Although credibility represented only one criterion for judging 
the quality of this study by establishing trustworthiness from each of the participants’ 
perspectives, it proved the transferability of the study’s findings, and established the 
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extent to which the results could be generalized to other settings. The study’s exploratory 
process took place in the four states of Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas, a region 
with urban centers and rural areas that are afflicted by extreme weather patterns and 
extremist groups. Indications from this study’s results are that the findings are reliable 
and transferable to other regions situated in various parts of the US and its possessions. 
 My review of the four state’s documents, and subsequent conduct of participant 
interviews, served to ensure this study’s construct validity and reliability by using 
multiple sources of data, establishing a chain of evidence, and using key interviewees to 
review each participant’s emergency management practices (Yin, 2009, 2014). In regard 
to confirmability, reviewers should be able to corroborate this study’s findings through 
the use of triangulation, not only to reduce assumptions and biases, but also to recognize 
methodological limitations through the use of audit trails. In summary, no adjustments 
were necessary to the implemented strategies that provided evidence of this study’s 
trustworthiness. This explanation conforms to the study’s standards of validity and 
trustworthiness as initially presented in Chapter 3.  
Results 
 This final section addressed each research question and its relation to each of the 
interview questions. In addition, each of the field interview questions was supported by 
the collected data, which included transcriptions and government documents. Also 
provided in this section are discussions of discrepant data found to be disconfirming of 
previously held assumptions. This discussion includes appropriate tables and figures 
designed to facilitate understanding of the relationships between research and interview 
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questions. The following narrative discusses the themes first introduced during the data 
analysis phase of the study, and how each of the field interview questions served to elicit 
information necessary to answer the research questions. Because all of the participants 
interviewed were professional first responders directly involved in executing state policy 
and directing operations, their statements gave credibility to the interview question 
responses. Upon arrival at the setting, I assigned codes to each of the states, sites, and 
participants. For example, M1-EM/F is code for participant one in the state of Missouri, 
whose primary position was emergency manager, with a background in fire fighting. 
Participant number five in Kansas, who was a certified emergency manager, as well as a 
captain of detectives, was coded as K5-EM/LE. Other participants were coded in 
accordance with their primary training and background. As an example, M3-EM was the 
third interviewee in Missouri experienced and trained solely in emergency management.  
 The Central Question that drove this study concerned how rural civic leaders 
justified their noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines. This question 
was influenced by the five previous studies, which found varying degrees of 
noncompliance in each of the other studied Midwestern states (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth 
& Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). Seemingly 
presumptive in nature, the question was found to be invalid in this studied region. This 
research question was disconfirmed by all participants in their responses to Interview 
Questions 1, 2, 7, and 15.  Those interview questions addressed the issues of disaster 
occurrences in their respective communities since the 9/11 attacks, their responses to 
those incidents, the assessed risk to and vulnerability of their infrastructure, the type of 
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regional assistance available, and general acceptance of federal guidelines. In their 
responses to Interview Question 1, interviewees M1, M2, M3, M4, I1, and K1 through K5 
stated that the threats their communities faced seasonally were primarily natural and 
involved preparation and recovery from tornadoes, flooding, droughts, deep snow falls, 
wild fires, and wind storms. Emergency managers in Nebraska did not return my consent 
forms or telephone calls, so their comments will not be included in these findings. 
Another threat reported by M1 was the phenomenon of micro bursts, a form of linear 
wind shear that tears whatever is in its path when it touches the ground.  Participants K1, 
K2, K3, and M1 reported that law enforcement occasionally encountered various forms 
of civil disobedience from members of the Sovereign Citizen militant group.  
 In response to Interview Question 2, all participants, except I1 and N1, reported 
that their critical infrastructure included local government buildings, electric grids, waste-
water plants, area lakes and dams, as well as bridges, schools, school buses, and water 
supplies. Also critical to their rural status were clear ingress and egress roadways to their 
communities for emergency and supply vehicles. Participants’ responses to Interview 
Question 7 confirmed the implementation of mutual-aid agreements and letters of 
understanding with contiguous counties and states during a major disaster. Participant K4 
added that Kansas state law required that in-state agencies should be contacted first 
during such major emergencies. To Interview Question 15, all participants, except I1 and 
N1, responded that they welcomed the issuance of federal homeland security funding and 
the National Preparedness Guidelines. As a whole, all participants stated that direct state 
or federal funding to their communities would not be practical due to the cumbersome 
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requirements to account for program funds. They added that the National Preparedness 
Guidelines provided them standardization for the preparation, response, recovery, and 
mitigation phases before, during, and following an incident. Participants acknowledged 
that the same guidelines provided protocols for setting up universal command centers and 
common reporting standards so that all responders become familiar with field operations 
when assigned to an incident.  
 Research Question1 concerned how noncompliance with the national guidelines 
affected local rural leaders’ ability to meet their governing goals and resource needs as 
they related to national security and public safety. Participant responses to Interview 
Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 provided sufficient information to conclude that local leaders’ 
ability to govern was not compromised in spite of having to develop threat assessments, 
execute mutual aid agreements, and also deal with area militant groups. In their responses 
to Interview Question 3, participants M1, M2, K2, and K4 stated that members of the 
Sovereign Citizens group had a history of challenging local laws by disobeying them. To 
Interview Question 4, participant M1 responded that the Mid-America Council conducted 
his area’s threat assessments. Participants M2, M3, and M4, stated that they personally 
conducted the threat assessments for their areas of responsibility, as did I1, K1, K3, K4, 
and K5. Interview Question 5 was posed to determine what federal, state, or county 
agencies had been contacted to help with threat assessments. All of the participants 
responded that their assessments followed the guidelines provided by FEMA. As a follow 
up to the previous question, Interview Question 6 was written to elicit information about 
the federal, state, or county agencies that offered assistance during actual disasters or 
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threats. Participant M1 responded that he relied on the National Weather Service and the 
State Fire Marshal’s Office. The other Kansas and Missouri participants from M2 to M4, 
and K1, K3 to K5 stated they relied on mutual-aid agreements and volunteers. Participant 
K1 added that in the past he had called for specialized expertise from federal agencies in 
Kansas City, Missouri.  
 Research Question 2 concerned participants about the role that funding, and a 
lack of resources, played in local leaders’ ability to implement emergency measures in 
their rural communities. Interview Question 9 addressed how funding and remoteness 
affected their community’s implementation of emergency preparedness measures. 
Interview Question 11 pertained to what mutual-aid agreements communities had with 
regional agencies. In response to Interview Question 9, participants M1, M4, and K1 
stated they relied on FEMA grants for any funding above what the state allows them for 
homeland security purposes. Participants I1, M2, K3, K4, and K5 stated that funding had 
always been an issue, and with additional funding they would be able to update their 
communications systems and provide their first responders with additional training. They 
added that more funding would also allow for the placement of more law enforcement 
officers to deal with area militant groups. Despite funding shortages, they stated that 
current operational funding was adequate and felt secure in the knowledge that FEMA 
grants were available when specific equipment was justified. Mutual-aid provided 
additional assistance when it was needed. In his response to Interview Question 11, 
participant I1 stated that he was part of the Homeland Security Council, and a six-county 
mutual-aid response unit with shared communication radio frequencies. Participants M1, 
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M2, M3, and M4 stated they were part of the regional Fire Chiefs Association, the Mid-
America Council, and state-wide mutual-aid groups. Kansas participants K1, K3, K4, and 
K5, stated they were part of regional and state-wide mutual-aid groups that responded to 
meetings when called. 
 Research Question 3 was worded to ask what role remoteness played in rural 
leaders’ ability to implement emergency preparedness measures in their communities 
since the attacks of 9/11. Interview Question 10 was phrased to elicit information about a 
rural community’s ability to respond to and recover from major incidents. Interview 
Question 12 addressed the issue of limitations that rural communities experienced with 
communications due to their remoteness. In their responses to Interview Question 10, 
participants M1 through M4 stated they were part of local task forces comprised of fire, 
police, emergency medical technicians, and emergency managers. In addition, they stated 
that they were also part of disaster preparedness committees led by the Missouri Office of 
Emergency Management (MOEM) and FEMA. Kansas participants K1, K3, K4, and K5, 
stated they were part of local task forces comprised of first responders, as well as regional 
groups committed to developing emergency preparedness strategies. Iowa participant I1 
stated that he relied on support from local volunteers, first responders, as well as regional 
mutual-aid members.  
 In response to Interview Question 12, participants K1 and K3 stated that rurality 
and remoteness limited their ability to hire a hazardous materials expert because they 
could not justify his expertise on an annual basis. As a consequence, they normally 
secured a contaminated area until such an expert was provided by an urban center. 
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Kansas participants K4 and K5 pointed out that because they served primary emergency 
managers for their communities, their greatest concern was to become ill or disabled and 
not be able to conduct their duties in case of an incident. Their other concern was that as 
local emergency managers, they were responsible for their own deployment and local 
coordination efforts when responding to an incident. Missouri participants M1 through 
M4 expressed their concerns with remoteness in terms of hours before mutual-aid could 
arrive to supplement their local resources. They pointed out that the nearest regional 
center was hours away and perhaps even longer if the incident affected highways and 
local ingress roads to their communities. Curiously, although their communities were 
often situated long distances from the nearest urban centers, not one participant 
considered himself as separate or remote from people in those regional centers. As a 
group, participants held the common belief that responses to emergency incidents should 
be a local matter unless the incident overwhelmed their capability, at which time they 
would rely on area volunteers and mutual-aid from the nearest urban center.  
 Finally, Research Question 4 related to what understanding local leaders had 
about their duties and responsibilities in the post 9/11 era regarding the implementation 
of emergency preparedness measures in their communities. This study’s results found 
that rural civic leaders had a complete understanding of their roles and responsibilities 
regarding the protection of life and property in their communities. Their responses to 
Interview Questions 13 and 14 attest to that understanding. Interview Question 13 was 
worded to determine what role each of the participants played in case of a manmade or 
natural disaster. Interview Question 14 related to the size of the population their offices 
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served. All the participants responded to Interview Questions 13 and 14 with the 
statement that they were solely responsible for the overall coordination of disaster 
preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation plans in their respective communities, 
which numbered between 2,500 and 10,500 residents. A concern expressed by participant 
M1 was that too often other responding agencies tended to overstep their authority and 
allow parochial interests to limit cooperation. Participant K2 offered that a command 
center established in accordance with NIMS guidelines overcomes incident leadership 
issues. In all, participants expressed few limitations to the conduct of their public safety 
roles and responsibility to those they serve. 
 Table 2 below, shows how the interview questions served to disconfirm or to 
confirm the research questions.  
Table 2 
Analysis Showing How Interview Questions Disconfirmed or Confirmed the Research 
Questions 
       Research questions                                           Interview questions 
 
          Central research question     Disconfirmed by IQs 1, 2, 7, & 15 
                Research Question 1    Disconfirmed by IQs 3, 4, 5, 6, & 8 
     Research Question 2     Confirmed by IQs 9 & 11 
     Research Question 3    Disconfirmed by IQs 10 & 12 
     Research Question 4   Disconfirmed by IQs 13 & 14 
Note. From Dissertation Chapter 4, pp. 112-118. 
 
 What these findings revealed were that the conclusions reported in the previous 
studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; 
Stigler, 2010), were not generalizable. They were not transferable from the other 
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Midwestern states because the identified problems and findings must have been exclusive 
to those regions. In any case, this study proved that compliance with the National 
Preparedness Guidelines was ongoing and systematically implemented at the state, 
regional, district, and local levels of government in these four states. This study also 
proved that emergency management and disaster response is a career held by college 
educated and experienced personnel in these fields. At this point in the discussion, it was 
important to draw a contrast between discrepant cases and disconfirming information that 
was presented in the previously reviewed studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), and the resulting findings of 
this study. 
 Although acknowledged that the study problem, purpose, research method, and 
interview questions developed for this study were influenced by the findings of previous 
studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; 
Stigler, 2010), this study revealed some discrepancies and illuminated disconfirming data 
that contradicted the findings of those previous studies. By accepting this study’s analysis 
and interpretation of the data collected as trustworthy, these findings indicated that the 
conclusions reached by authors of the previous studies may have been relevant only to 
the sites being investigated at the time. Except for the role that funding has played in 
local leaders’ ability or inability to implement viable emergency measures in their rural 
communities, as stated in Research Question 2, neither of the previous study findings 
proved dependable or reliable. For example, in this study’s Research Question 1, rural 
leaders did not have to explain how they justified noncompliance with national security 
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and safety measures because it was found that they were already in full compliance. 
Local leaders’ ability to meet their governing goals, as they related to public safety and 
national security, appear not to have been compromised as implied in that research 
question. Research Question 3 was phrased to determine what role regional remoteness 
played in decisions made by rural leaders not to implement the National Preparedness 
Guidelines in their communities (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; 
Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). This study found that regional remoteness or separation had 
little or no bearing on rural leaders’ willingness or ability to implement adaptations of the 
National Preparedness Guidelines as directed and supported by their state-designated 
regional or district emergency managers. 
 Research Question 4 was concerned with the understanding local leaders had in 
regard to their duties and responsibilities to provide safety and security measures for 
residents of their rural communities (Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 
2010). The results revealed that local leaders have had a very good understanding of their 
responsibilities to provide for the safety and security of their rural communities. The 
initial intent of these research and interview questions was to gain new information 
regarding the issue of noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines, and to 
confirm levels of compliance in the region’s rural study sites. Participant responses to the 
interview questions disconfirmed the Central Research Question as well as Research 
Questions 1, 3, and 4. Only Research Question 2, regarding the issue of funding, was 
confirmed.   
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 Contrary to the findings reported by the previous and mostly quantitative studies, 
this qualitative case study found that the studied rural communities in the four-state 
regions of Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri had adopted applicable versions of the 
National Preparedness Guidelines issued in 2009 to achieve compliance with guideline 
provisions. The study also found that funding limitations had not restricted the ability of 
rural leaders to govern in relation to public safety and concern for national security. 
Another finding established that remoteness was a matter of choice, and that rural 
communities customarily relied on one another for mutual-aid during times of need with 
expressions of social capital (Putnam, 2000). An important finding in this study was that 
rural civic leaders had a good understanding of their roles and responsibilities in the post 
9/11 era.  
 Initially, I had some concern that study participants may regard a few of the 
interview questions as affronts to their sense of professional competence and civic 
responsibility. As the professionals they represented themselves to be, the questions were 
accepted as candid academic critiques of their established operational standards. The 
participants interviewed were college trained and experienced emergency managers or 
law enforcement officials. Their normal responses to the interview questions reflected an 
in-depth knowledge of their respective duties, noting that a few had received training and 
earned experience in both disciplines. As the sole data collector for this study, I could not 
avoid making a mental note of the pride participants exhibited about their professions, 
and the openness with which they shared their understanding of the principles related to 
homeland security and emergency management. Those observations were reinforced by 
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the constant analysis of the data they provided, which seemed redundant after the 10th 
interview. At that point, I determined that the data being collected had reached the 
saturation point (Patton, 2002). The findings provided convincing evidence that despite 
being interviewed at different sites, and often in different states, the study participants 
expressed a clear understanding of their joint and individual roles in providing competent 
and effective emergency response capability to all the residents of their respective rural 
communities.  
Summary 
 The introduction to this chapter provided a brief review of this study’s purpose 
and the developed research questions. This review was followed with a preview of the 
chapter’s structure and organization. The next major section described the study’s setting 
in Tornado Alley along the Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska, Iowa borders. The study’s 
purpose was to conduct field research along that corridor to determine how residents of 
rural communities, with populations between 2,500 and 10,500 coped with the threats 
posed by a seasonal cycle of disasters that include extreme cold, heat, rain, fire, drought, 
lightning strikes, tornadoes, and extremist groups of the political right. Face-to-face 
interviews with local emergency managers and law enforcement officials in selected rural 
communities explained that despite limited resources, they were able to meet all of the 
threats that nature and extremist groups imposed on them. When incidents overwhelmed 
local capabilities, mutual-aid and volunteers supplemented local first responders. 
Participant demographics relevant to this study reflected primarily white Middle 
Americans of all age groups in a pastoral environment that was either their place of birth, 
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or to which they later gravitated. Other than the variances in generational representation, 
no other evidence of ethnic diversity was noted. 
 The data collection process involved face-to-face interviews with participants in 
ten rural communities within a four-state area in order to a gain a richer narrative 
concerning operational policies and emergency management practices at each of the sites. 
There were no variations or unusual circumstances present in the data collection process. 
As the sole data collection tool, I was obligated to make unannounced visits to meet with 
participants after previously contacted gatekeepers proved ineffective. This solicitation 
technique proved useful as one participant offered to provide an introduction to a 
counterpart in another region or state. The data collected was recorded on a digital 
recorder and also written in response to a previously prepared questionnaire. My presence 
at all interviews, coupled with a good subject knowledge base, facilitated my ability to 
analyze and interpret the data collected. The discrepancies or variances in this study’s 
findings were the result of contrasts with findings in previous studies that addressed the 
same problem, which initially shaped this study’s problem and purpose statements, as 
well as the research questions. The face-to-face interviews of participants, coupled with 
my developed knowledge of the subject, formed to provide sufficient evidence of the 
study’s trustworthiness.   
 This study’s results confirmed one of the previous studies’ findings (Bryant, 
2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), 
as they related to funding and resources, and disconfirmed the others. I remind the reader 
that each of the above cited studies provided the basis for this study’s primary research 
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questions. The four that were disconfirmed related to questions of local leaders justifying 
noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines, how noncompliance affected 
rural leaders’ ability to govern in relation to public safety and national security, and 
whether rural leaders understood their roles and responsibilities in the post 9/11 era. What 
this study’s results also presented was the likelihood that the previous studies’ findings 
were exclusive to the other Midwestern states and therefore not transferable to this 
study’s research sites. Based on the results of this study’s findings, it may be appropriate 
to expand on them for potential adoption by other US regions and its possessions having 
similar demographic profiles of urban centers and multiple rural areas. In Chapter 5, I 
make recommendations on how rural communities in those regions can implement 
effective emergency preparedness measures despite limited resources. The final chapter 
presents an interpretation of the study’s findings, lists the study’s particular limitations, 
and explains recommendations applicable to rural areas. Chapter 5 also discusses the 
study’s implications for social change, and presents conclusions drawn from the field 










Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusions 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and to describe the 
various rationales that rural civic leaders in Upper Midwest states offered as their 
justification for not complying with the National Preparedness Guidelines that were 
issued in 2008 (DHS, 2009). The guidelines were issued after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, with the intent of providing assistance to all of the nation’s 
communities in the development of their own security plans to prepare them for and 
allow them to respond to, recover from, and mitigate against natural or manmade 
disasters. The only available works in the literature on the subject of compliance with the 
national guidelines in rural communities are five studies conducted by Bryant (2009), 
Chenoweth and Clarke (2010), Marion and Cronin (2009), Oliver (2007, 2009), and 
Stigler (2010). Those studies presented findings that indicated that the primary reasons 
for rural noncompliance with the national guidelines were lack of funding, concerns 
related to cost effectiveness, rural leaders misunderstanding their roles in the post-9/11 
era, and regional remoteness. The intent of this study was to confirm or disconfirm the 
validity of those previous studies’ findings with the purpose of developing a common 
rationale for the findings of compliance or noncompliance. By extension, if these 
rationales were proven valid throughout rural America, which is estimated to represent as 
much as 97.5% of the nation’s land area and is home to 18% of the nation’s population 
(NLC, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), the previous studies’ conclusions implied that 
national security and rural public safety were being compromised. This implied condition 
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justified further research on the question of homeland security in rural America and thus 
influenced the purpose and title of this study.  
 The nature of this study derived from a qualitative multisite single-case approach 
that aligned with the inquiry’s stated purpose and objectives. The selection of this 
approach followed the rationale that the concept drives the research and the study 
purpose drives the analysis (Patton, 2002). Each of the previous studies’ findings 
influenced the formulation of open-ended research questions for this study that were 
designed to elicit the necessary information to achieve the study’s objectives. For 
example, participant responses to the interview questions provided the necessary 
information that ultimately led to a clear understanding of the reasons for compliance. 
Indeed, this study’s findings were instrumental in disconfirming a greater number of the 
previous studies’ findings and confirming only a smaller number (Bryant, 2009; 
Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010), 
suggesting that the nation’s security and rural public safety are intact and that programs 
in those areas are operating more effectively than earlier studies suggested. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
 As stated in the previous paragraph, this study’s key findings can be summarized 
as objective results that answer the stated research questions. For example, the central 
question, which was shaped by previous studies and addressed how rural civic leaders 
justified their noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines, was 
disconfirmed (Bryant, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). 
All participant responses to the interview questions reflected a pattern of compliance by 
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rural leaders, who described how they had used the national guidelines to prepare for and 
respond to disasters since the 9/11 attacks. Their descriptions included the types of 
incidents experienced, the vulnerability of their infrastructure, their response plans, and 
local mutual-aid agreements, all of which are components of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines. Research Question 1, which was also influenced by the previous studies 
(Bryant, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010), concerned 
how the issue of noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines affected 
participants’ ability to fulfill their governing roles as they related to national security and 
public safety. This study’s findings disconfirmed this question following purposeful 
interviews with participants, who responded from 10 different sites indicating that their 
ability to govern had never been compromised because they had been in compliance 
since the issuance of the federal guidelines. Those responses suggested that the studied 
communities had been compliant with the National Preparedness Guidelines since they 
were first issued in 2009 by their state emergency management directors in Iowa, 
Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas.   
 This study’s findings did confirm the assumption of Research Question 2, which 
presumed that lack of funding and lack of resources hindered rural leaders’ ability to 
implement emergency measures in their communities. In all of the previous studies, 
participants had indicated that one of their rationales for noncompliance was related to 
the lack of funding (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; 
Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). In this study, all participants responded that although 
more funding would allow the hiring of additional personnel and purchase of new 
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equipment, what was allotted by the state adequately served their needs. They presented 
the view that resource limitations were challenging, but that collective aid by first 
responders, area volunteers, mutual-aid units, and federal grants to fund training and 
special equipment made up for resource or funding deficiencies.  
 This study’s findings disconfirmed Research Question 3, which was also 
influenced by three of the five previous studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010; Stigler, 2010). This research question asked what role remoteness and separation 
played in local leaders’ decisions not to implement emergency preparedness measures 
within their rural communities. Statements by interviewees K2-EM/LE and K3-EM 
offered that theirs was a style of living based on personal choice and a desire to assist 
neighbors and community members in times of need (Putnam, 2000).  In their responses 
to Interview Questions 9 and 12, these same participants did not consider their rural 
communities separated or remotely situated from a major urban center. As a whole, they 
expressed strong feelings that responses to rural incidents are handled more effectively 
locally. Participant K4-LE/EM explained that the policy of a county sheriff assuming 
responsibility for responding to all emergency incidents within a county applied only to 
those jurisdictions where rural towns had no police departments and that the sheriff had 
also established substations in those communities.   
 This study’s findings also disconfirmed Research Question 4, which concerned 
what understanding participants had about their duties and responsibilities in the post-
9/11 era regarding the implementation of preparedness guidelines in their communities. 
One of the previous studies influenced this question (Oliver, 2007, 2009). This research 
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question was summarily discounted by the findings derived from participants’ responses 
to the interview questions. Contrary to the previous studies’ conclusions, this study’s 
findings clearly indicated that rural leaders in this Midwestern four state region had a 
complete understanding of their roles and responsibilities regarding national security and 
public in the post-9/11 era.  
 The findings also determined that most of the conclusions reported in the previous 
studies were not only inconsistent and therefore inconclusive, but also nongeneralizable. 
In this regard, the current study’s findings have extended knowledge in this particular 
discipline when they are compared to those in the peer-reviewed literature as described in 
Chapter 2. Unlike the previous studies’ conclusions (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010), this study’s findings 
produced consistent and conclusive rationales for the studied communities’ relative levels 
of generalizable and transferable preparedness.  
 For this study, I chose Putman’s (2000) theory of social capital to help understand 
the phenomenon. Experts in the field of homeland security and emergency management 
(Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004; Reese, 2013) examined a score of theories during the 
past decade in attempts to find a relationship between those theories and these disciplines 
without success. The problem appears to be that both homeland security and emergency 
management encompass too many multifaceted responsibilities and functions to be 
defined by any single theory. I did find Putnam’s theory of social capital and its civic 
benefits useful as an analytical lens, particularly when its principles appear to have been 
adopted by and adapted to the studied rural communities. Putnam promoted the concept 
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of social capital theory by presenting the argument that minimal adaptation of social 
capital in a given community will lead to a rigid and unresponsive political system. 
Writing from a political perspective, Putnam argued that social capital in effect is a 
precondition of effective government and economic growth in a particular community. 
Claridge (2004), a supporter of Putnam’s theory, explained that social capital represents 
the value of social networks that tend to bond people with similar interests and to bridge 
otherwise diverse members of the community with norms of reciprocity and trust. These, 
then, are the values that facilitate collaboration, cooperation, coordination, and 
communication in all communities during emergencies, particularly in rural areas 
(Bryant, 2009). 
 When viewed in this context, the theory of social capital aligned well with this 
study. Because a theory’s primary purpose is to explain a particular phenomenon, this 
study’s initial focus was providing an explanation for the variance of rural rationales 
concerning local levels of compliance or noncompliance with the National Preparedness 
Guidelines. This focus addressed not only about why either process was occurring, but 
also why it was occurring in such an affirmative way. Social capital theory, as described 
by Putnam (2000), is based on the concept that cohesion and stability within a 
community rest on a firmer foundation when local residents establish social networks that 
promote trust through cooperation and reciprocity during times of need. Putnam argued 
that the more widespread these networks are the healthier a community becomes, both 
socially and politically. An assumption underlying this theory, then, is that a community 
that cultivates and nurtures the “civic virtues” of social capital will be healthier socially, 
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politically, and economically, as opposed to one that does not (Putnam, 2000, p. 7). 
Putnam explained that social capital represents the various aspects of social relations, 
which include local norms, values, networks, and the roles they play in community 
cohesion. This community cohesion is what Putnam relates to civic virtue, which is 
characterized by civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance, and the 
associational life those virtues represent. The principles of social capital theory were thus 
recognized as essential to the social cohesion and political health of the studied rural 
communities when it was necessary to meet the challenges of emergency management 
posed by seasonal incidents. In summary, what this study’s research determined was that 
compliance with national and state preparedness guidelines in the studied rural 
communities was due, in great part, to their general adaptation of social capital principles 
(Bryant, 2009; Claridge, 2004; Putnam, 2000).  
 As the field research developed, this adaptation was reflected in the responses all 
10 participants made to the interview questions. For example, the make-up of Interview 
Questions 1, 2, 7, and 15 and their responses supported the central question. Following 
the study’s intended structure, Interview Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 were aimed to support 
Research Question 1. In keeping with this research sequence, Interview Questions 9 and 
11 were used to support Research Question 2. To confirm compliance in the studied 
communities, the analyzed responses to Interview Questions 10 and 12 expressed support 
for Research Question 3. And finally, Interview Questions 13 and 14 related support for 
Research Question 4. Essentially, the study’s findings indicate that all of the studied 
communities were in compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines.  
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Table 3, which is depicted below, encapsulates this study’s results following analysis and 
interpretation of the findings. 
Table 3 
Status of State and Site Compliance With the National Preparedness Guidelines 
Following Interpretation of the Study’s Findings 
  
         States and sites                              Compliance status according to findings 
________________________________________________________________________
State of Kansas                                           Full compliance 
 Sites K1, K2, K3, K4, K5     Full compliance 
State of Missouri                                     Full compliance 
 Sites M1, M2, M3, M4          Full compliance 
State of Iowa                                           Full compliance 
 Site I1       Full compliance 
State of Nebraska                                    Full compliance 
 Site N1                                  *Unconfirmed 
*The State of Nebraska was found to be compliant, but the regional director for 
emergency management in Lincoln, Nebraska did not respond to requests to participate in 
this study. Because he is a graduate of the Emergency Management Institute at Central 
Missouri University, it seems likely that Nebraska Site 1 is also compliant. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 Study limitations are those variables or restrictions that are always out of a 
researcher’s control (Patton, 2002; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Fieldwork involves 
multiple sources of information because no single source should be trusted to provide a 
comprehensive perspective on an issue (Patton, 2002). Interview data can be distorted by 
participants’ personal biases, politics, or simple anxiety. Public records and documents 
may also bear limitations if they are incomplete or inaccurate. From its initial stages, this  
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study was bounded and framed by a number of limitations. They included an 
investigation of a single facet of the National Preparedness Guidelines as they applied to 
rural communities, which meant that the findings would not be applicable to the nation’s 
urban centers. This study’s unique and purposeful geographical site was also a limitation 
if it is accepted that there is only one Tornado Alley in the U.S. This is the corridor nature 
has shaped across Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Iowa that perennially produces 
extreme weather patterns throughout the region (see map on p. 93). The study was also 
limited by the purposeful interviews of participants who chose to live in that part of the 
Midwest and work as law enforcers, first responders, or emergency managers.  
 All of the participants indicated that they had earned college degrees along with 
years of experience in their particular fields. At no time during the field research process 
was any evidence revealed that raised any question about the interviewees’ honesty or 
trustworthiness. Indeed, the candor and competence exhibited by the study participants 
convinced me that their responses reflected pride in their roles and responsibilities. Their 
responses to the interview questions contributed much to the study’s trustworthiness 
because their accuracy helped to validate the overall findings. The credibility or 
believability of their responses provided assurance that the study results were 
trustworthy, from both the participants’ and my perspective. In turn, the study’s 
dependability and repeatability were supported by the triangulation of participant 
interviews, use of official documents, and my personal interpretation of data being 
investigated. This explanation is offered with the understanding that a limitation in the 
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dissertation process is that a study usually reflects only a review of the stated problem 
during the period of its examination (Simon, 2011; Yin, 2014). 
Recommendations  
 As stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this case study was to explore and describe 
the reasons why a number of rural communities in the Midwest were previously reported 
as noncompliant with implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines reissued 
in 2009 (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009; DHS, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; 
Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). Previous studies found that general noncompliance in 
other Midwestern study sites was due to lack of funding and resources, to local leaders 
not understanding their roles and responsibilities in the post-9/11 era, and to remoteness 
and separation from urban areas. The major themes presented by those previous studies 
were that the rationales for noncompliance varied with participants and geographical 
regions, resulting in inconclusive and inconsistent findings. Those studies also failed to 
explain how other states, such as Florida (FDEM, 2008-2013), have been able to 
implement the national guidelines with the same formulaic allotments of homeland 
security funds and include the state’s urban and rural communities in their emergency 
incident plans. Florida, like all other compliant states, has implemented the national 
guidelines using allocated funds based on the national formula of assessed threat, risk, 
vulnerability, and state population (Kopp, 2012; Moteff, 2014). That initial contradiction 
shaped the premise that drove this study with an objective of confirming or disconfirming 
those initial findings. The study’s objective proved valid by disconfirming most of the 
previous studies’ findings and confirming only a small number of them. This outcome 
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could create opportunities for their transferability and future research. Examples include 
similar geographical regions of the U.S. Southwest and Northwest, as well as other rural 
areas in U.S. territories and possessions.     
 This study’s strengths and limitations have proven valid and transferable to those 
four-state regions having a number of urban centers and multiple rural areas. Among this 
study’s strengths are revelations of compliance by all the participants in the four-state 
region that was studied. For example, Oliver (2007, 2009) contended in a previous book 
and article that in spite of the publicized roles that rural leaders were to play in the post-
9/11 era, they remained unclear regarding their understanding of the responsibilities and 
roles they had assumed following issuance of the National Preparedness Guides in 2009 
(DHS, 2009). This study’s findings appear to contradict Oliver’s conclusions with 
statements from participants that indicated they knew exactly what their duties and 
responsibilities were prior to, during, and after an incident. In addition, the same findings 
confirmed that all of this study’s participants had been compliant with the national 
guidelines since they were issued (DHS, 2009). The studies by Chenoweth and Clarke 
(2009) and Marion and Cronin (2009) reported that the lack of funding and equipment 
prevented rural communities from developing and implementing effective emergency 
preparedness measures. Those findings were also discounted by the current study, which 
found that although participants conceded a need for additional funding to hire more 
trained personnel, they were able to respond to all hazards with their current staff. When 
certain tools or equipment were needed, acquisition was usually realized following a  
grant from FEMA.  
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 The two other studies that influenced this research were published by Bryant 
(2009) and Stigler (2010). Those studies reported on the challenges that local leaders 
faced when confronted with efforts to implement emergency preparedness measures in 
their rural communities. Among the challenges those studies reported were resource 
limitations, ineffective or aged communications systems, separation, remoteness, and low 
population density. All of which, they reported, made it difficult for rural communities to 
develop all-hazards capabilities at the local level. To some extent, those findings have 
been found to be valid. For example, low population density and remoteness tend to limit 
response and recovery times. Resource limitations may not allow a local response unit to 
have a hazardous materials (Hazmat) expert on its payroll, or to invest in more efficient 
communications technology and rural broadband initiatives.  
 This study’s findings, however, made those challenges surmountable because all 
participants reported that low population density also made it easier for them to identify, 
locate, and respond to area residents during incidents with the current communications 
systems. These systems include National Oceanic Atmospheric Administrative (NOAA) 
battery operated radios capable of receiving alerts from regional emergency managers. 
Remote dwellings can also rely on conventional telephones, television and radio, as well 
as satellite-capable radios operated by emergency managers which provide information 
regarding ongoing weather or incident conditions. Participants K1-LE/EM and K3-EM 
explained that area residents within a local response unit’s jurisdiction were often within 
minutes of assistance. In those instances when the incident was beyond local capabilities, 
contacted regional mutual-aid units were only hours away. This included local requests 
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for special equipment and expertise, such as a Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) specialist. 
 The ability of the rural emergency managers to meet reported challenges despite 
the limited resources available to them reflected strength of organization and effective 
response to all hazards that may have befallen their communities. Those two studies 
touched on the concept of social capital as an effective alternative to response and 
recovery involving incidents in their rural communities, although Stigler (2010) did not 
recognize it as such (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000; Stigler, 2010). The strength of 
organization and response effectiveness underscored above raised the question that 
addressed: Why social capital principles revealed in this study were not considered as 
recommendations for change by authors of the previous studies?  
 An added strength of the study’s findings was the applicability of its findings to 
other rural regions. The findings could also be applicable to the states that were subjects 
of the previous studies. They can be employed regionally, or state-by-state as a measure 
of comparison depending on the researcher’s qualitative study purpose. The research 
method, time, purpose, and geography were added strengths to this study’s outcome. The 
rural referred to above are regions with similar patterns of densely populated urban 
centers and dispersed populations in rural areas, which may also experience compliance 
issues with the National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2009; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014).  
Although the transferability of this study’s findings may be problematic to other regions 
due to geographical, political, or economic reasons, the adaptability of social capital 
principles to local emergency management practices in rural communities remains a  
subject worthy of further study.  Figure 4 below illustrates the nation’s regions as they  
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are configured by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Figure 4. U.S. Census map showing separation of regions with inclusive states. Retrieved 
from the Census Bureau website; http://www.uscensus.gov. 
 
 Among the social capital principles commonly found in the studied rural 
communities were cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and communication which 
all of the participants stated were key components of effective emergency management. 
An important finding of this study is that all participants interviewed held the common 
belief that responses to emergency incidents are a local matter, to be supplemented only 
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when rural capabilities and resources are overwhelmed. To summarize then, the findings 
that revealed this study’s strengths also served to discount the conclusions reported by the 
studies examined during the literature review. In light of these findings it would appear 
appropriate to expand on this study’s findings with the objective of applying them in 
other states or regions with similar demographics (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 
2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010).   
Implications for Social Change 
 This study’s findings have provided the potential to impact social change at the 
societal-policy level in a contributing way. Policymakers who adopt new ideas based on 
this study’s findings are likely to issue policies that direct organizational behavior, which 
in turn affects the general welfare of local families and individuals. For example, this 
study’s findings, which related to operational effectiveness despite resource limitations, 
rural separation and remoteness, low population density, and inefficient communications 
systems, would have a beneficial effect in other regions with similar demographics. The 
findings that local civic leaders were able to conduct emergency management operations 
effectively, despite limited resources, reflects the process of creating ideas to promote the 
safety and security of rural residents.  
 If presented as reported, this study’s findings could foster new policies in those 
previous study sites, as well as in the similar regions of the Southwest and Northwest. 
Awareness and training that takes the findings into consideration would make emergency 
management planning and operations more cost-effective by applying allotted homeland 
security funding more efficiently, thus making each adoptive state’s rural communities 
140 
 
safer. In addition to providing operational guidance to an individual state’s homeland 
security officials and emergency managers, this study’s findings also offer instructional 
value to rural civic leaders who want to compare the study’s findings with their current 
programs to determine if revision is needed. Yet another potential impact for positive 
social change at the societal-policy level would be an enhanced understanding of the 
underlying forces that resisted the concept of compliance in previous studies, particularly 
if any future studies show similar conclusions (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; 
Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010).   
 To effectively address the study’s purpose, the method chosen for this research 
was a case study that allowed a concentrated examination of multisites in four states 
which may have been in noncompliance with implementation of National Preparedness 
Guidelines issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009). The characteristics of this chosen method 
allowed me to investigate in-depth a current phenomenon in its real-world context. This 
method set my investigative boundaries, which included the research time period, the 
geographic locations where the phenomenon was occurring, and identified professional 
individuals who became subjects of the study. The implication of selecting this research 
method was that upon completion of the study it allowed me to present an in-depth story 
of my findings in a narrative form (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014).  
 The theoretical foundation that aligned with this multisite case study is social 
capital theory as advanced by Putnam (2000). This theory is based on the concept that 
communities, particularly those in rural areas, experience greater degrees of cohesion and 
stability when local residents establish networks that promote mutual trust through 
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cooperation, collaboration, communication, and reciprocity. Putnam argued that the more 
common these networks and exchanges are present, the healthier communities become, 
politically and socially. Social capital theory focuses on the various aspects of social 
relations, which include local norms, values, networks, and the roles they play in 
community cohesion. The rationale for selecting this theory was based on its alignment to 
the study’s purpose and its relation to the study of investigating compliance with the 
National Preparedness Guidelines in rural communities. The alignment of this theory to 
the study becomes evident when the reviewer considers the challenges of implementing 
emergency measures in remote areas with limited resources and where rural community 
cohesion is sometimes an existential requirement. In many cases, rural communities must 
rely on cooperation, trust, and reciprocity as essential elements to their social welfare and 
development (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000). Although some sources have speculated that 
these local networks and social ties may be the reason why some rural communities resist 
outside directives, this study’s findings revealed that this speculation was not valid 
(Bryant, 2009; Caruson & MacManus, 2004; Stigler, 2010). 
 When presenting a general description of recommendations for best practices, as 
they relate to this study’s findings, requires an understanding of the evolutionary process 
of the concepts that American public understands as homeland security and emergency 
management. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the process of civil defense was reactive, not well 
organized and inefficient. After the 9/11 attacks, the concept of homeland security and 
emergency management became a proactive effort carried out by experts in many fields. 
During the post-9/11 era, however, it is accurate to point out that homeland security and 
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emergency management as administered by the DHS and FEMA have been a work in 
progress, too often prone to administrative and operational mistakes. A prime example 
was the mishandling of the response to the Katrina Hurricane disaster in August of 2005. 
After-action reports of that response led Congress to enact the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006 (Haddow et al., 2011).  
 That law was critical to the effort of regaining public trust in the government’s 
ability to protect its citizens. One of the most notable changes this law made was to 
delegate more autonomy to FEMA. The law further ensured a separate budget for FEMA 
and required certification that all newly appointed administrators were college trained, 
with at least five years experience in emergency management. An important requirement 
directed that all regional FEMA offices develop close working relationships with their 
state counterparts. In addition, the Office of Grants and Training was moved to FEMA 
with a Citizen’s Corps coordinating office placed under its supervision. To coordinate 
national operations, the law also established a State and Rural Advocate, a law enforce-
ment advisor, and National Advisory Council to advise the Administrator on all aspects 
of emergency management (Haddow et al., 2011). When considering the extent and 
nature of extreme conditions that threaten the studied rural communities, it should be 
done with the knowledge that there is no way to prevent those conditions, but they can be 
mitigated through effective emergency management practices. Rural localities can protect 
themselves against militant groups through more effective partnerships with state and 
federal law enforcement agencies. They can also protect themselves and property by 
establishing clearly marked evacuation routes during impending storms and sealing their 
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homes against wind and water whether residents choose to shelter in place or evacuate. 
Emergency managers should identify secure shelters for the elderly, infirm, and the poor 
who must shelter in place. When an incident overwhelms local resources, local, state, and 
federal assistance should be requested to provide the necessary foodstuffs, equipment and 
the resources needed to make effective recovery possible. If available, state response 
teams should make efforts to establish statewide communications interoperability that 
allows responding agencies to communicate with one another during the response and 
recovery phases following an incident (see Appendix D).       
 These are noted recommendations for best practices that should be revisited as 
natural and manmade threats evolve, as the nation witnessed during the Boston Marathon 
bombing in 2013 (Piddock, 2014).  A 2012 survey showed that 57% of Americans in 
urban areas believed that occasional acts of terrorism are the new norm. Michael Hayden, 
the former director of the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA), has stated this 
“new normal” means that all types of people, not just Muslims, could fit the profile of the 
Tsarnaev brothers (Harmon, 2013). In a recent article, the New York Times reported that 
since September 11, 2001, almost twice as many Americans have been killed by White 
supremacists, antigovernment fanatics, and other nonMuslims, than by radicalized 
Muslims. These lethal attacks have been carried out by people espousing racial hatred, 
hostility toward the government, and theories such as those of the Sovereign Citizen 
movement, which denies the legitimacy of most statutory law. The assaults have taken 
the lives of police officers, members of religious minorities, as well as random civilians 
(Shane, 2015). The U.S. Constitution states that a primary responsibility of the central 
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government is to protect the lives and property of its citizens (Kozak, 2011). From a more 
practical standpoint it is important for citizens to understand that the government cannot 
protect everyone and everything from all threats all of the time. For that reason, it has 
become essential that all Americans learn to function with heightened vigilance, and to 
make homeland security every citizen’s responsibility. Nature will likely continue to 
challenge the nation’s emergency managers with extreme weather patterns that will result 
in various types of incidents. In line with the need for Americans to practice vigilance, 
the 9/11 Commission stated in their report of the September 11, 2001 threats will be 
defined more within societies than by the territorial boundaries drawn between them. The 
commission’s report added that from terrorism to global disease or environmental 
disaster, the challenges have become not only national and transnational, but also 
international in scope. This seems to be the defining nature of the threats that will 
challenge homeland security specialists and emergency managers in the 21st century 
(9/11 Commission, 2004). Over 14 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the 9/11 Commission’s conclusions remain as valid today as they were then. As stated in 
the previous chapter, it would be appropriate to expand on this study’s findings with the 
objective of applying them in other states or regions with similar demographics. 
Conclusion 
 This study’s results answered the research questions that disconfirmed most of the 
findings reported in the previous studies that influenced this study’s purpose and research 
method (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 
2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). This study’s results provided evidence that refuted most of the 
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findings from the previous studies that were based on those rural leaders’ rationales for 
noncompliance with nationally issued preparedness guidelines. This study’s findings 
added understanding to the subject’s knowledge base because they answered the broader 
question of whether homeland security is present in these Midwestern rural areas. That 
answer affirmed that homeland security measures and emergency management principles 
have been in place and in compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines since 
their issuance (DHS, 2009; State of Iowa, 2015; State of Kansas, 2014; State of Missouri, 
2015; State of Nebraska, 2014-2016). This study’s findings confirmed that the national 
security safety net had not been weakened by leaders of rural communities studied in the 
four-state regions of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska. The current findings also 
provided information, which served to establish that the value of public safety is as much 
a concern to civic leaders in rural communities as it is to civic leaders of urban centers. In 
spite of the findings and recommendations reported in previous studies conducted in 
Upper Midwestern states, this study found that the studied rural communities in Kansas, 
Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska have been in compliance with the National Preparedness 
Guidelines since issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009). This study’s findings concluded that the 
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Appendix A: Participant Consent Form Letter 
Date 
 
Addressee (Mayor, City Attorney, Chief of Police, Fire Chief, Emergency Manager) 
 
Dear (Participant)  
           We have not met before; I am a former U.S. Marine and a retired federal agent. 
Currently I am a Doctoral Student with Walden University conducting research on the 
regional question of homeland security and emergency preparedness in some of the 
heartland’s rural communities. The research question driving my study centers on the 
implementation level of the National Preparedness Guidelines that were designed and 
issued in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and revised 
following the Hurricane Katrina disaster in August of 2005, to protect all communities 
from manmade and natural disasters. The purpose of the study will be to explore the 
levels of preparedness in selected rural communities to better understand the reasons that 
affect their implementation. Data collection will result from the review of public 
documents and audio recorded interviews with civic leaders who are responsible for the 
implementation of emergency preparedness strategies in their state’s rural communities. 
You are being contacted because you hold such a position. Interview questions would 
focus specifically on matters related to emergency preparedness measures implemented 
in your community since the 9/11 attacks. The interview would be held at a time and 
place of your choosing, and the duration of your participation would involve no more 
than a 30 to 45 minute meeting. Your participation in this study would be voluntary, and 
your refusal to participate would involve no penalty or criticism for you or your 
community. As a participant, you would have the right to decline or discontinue 
participation at any time. Your participation in the study would involve minimal personal 
risks, but none that would extend beyond those ordinarily encountered in daily life. There 
would be no benefit or compensation for your participation in the study, other than the 
greater benefit to your community that results from the study’s findings.  
           
           All data collected during the course of this study will be held in strict confidence, 
and at no time would information concerning your participation be released to any 
individuals or other institutions. Although the analysis and interpretation of the collected 
information is likely to be published in the future, neither your name, location, nor any 
other identifying information will be used in that publication. If you have further 
questions about the study, I can be contacted by email at manuel.gonzalez@waldenu.edu. 
To verify my study’s purpose and to clarify your rights as a participant, I invite you to 
contact the university’s Research Participant’s Advocate at 001-612-312-1210, or at the 
following email address: irb@waldenu.edu.  If you choose to participate, please enter the 
words “I Consent” on the blank line below, then print a copy for your records, and send 
one to me at my email address. I thank you in advance for considering my request.  
 
Manny Gonzalez, Doctoral Candidate, Walden University: _______________________ 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions With Follow-Up Probes 
1. What manmade or natural disasters have occurred in your community since the 9/11 
 attacks? How did you respond to those incidents? 
2. What local facilities or infrastructure do you believe are vulnerable to either type of 
 attack? When you say that your utilities are the most vulnerable, how often are 
 they disabled? 
3. What groups, if any, reside within your community which may pose a threat to public 
 safety? Why do those particular groups stand out in your mind?  
4. What agency conducts threat assessments in your community to ensure its safety and 
 security? How applicable are the national preparedness guidelines to your 
 community? 
5. What federal, state, or county agencies has your community contacted to help with 
 threat assessments? Can you say more about the results of those contacts? 
6. What federal, state, or county agencies have offered assistance during threats or actual 
 disasters? Were those offers of assistance helpful to your community? 
7. What protocols does your community have in place for contacting federal, state, or 
 county  agencies? Have you always felt that your community does not need such 
 protocols? 
8. What federal, state, or county agencies has your community worked with in the past 
 five years? Can you tell me if that was due to a specific need for outside help? 
9. How has funding, training, personnel, equipment and remoteness affected your 
 community’s implementation of disaster or emergency preparedness measures? 
 What emergency measures would you implement with direct federal funding? 
10. What interagency disaster preparedness committees or task forces exist in your 
 region? Why is it important that responses to emergency incidents remain local? 
11. What mutual-aid agreements does your community have with other regional 
 agencies? How do these agreements affect preparation, response, and recovery 
 after an incident? 
12. What limitations does your community experience as a result of geographical 
 remoteness? How does this limitation relate to the earlier topic of downed utilities 
 during storms? 
13. What role do you personally play in case of a disaster? How is that important to you?  
14. What is the size of the population your office serves? Would mutual-aid help with 
 recovery?    
15. What is your feeling toward the acceptance of federal aid and directives to implement 
 emergency preparedness programs that would be tailored to your community? 








 Preparedness in the discipline of emergency management is the state of readiness 
that an entity can measure to respond to a hazard, disaster, major crisis, or other type of 
emergency. This state of readiness is measured by a philosophical theme that expresses 
the capacity to respond to all-hazards under any conditions. The preparation cycle 
involves hazard risk assessment, vulnerability, evaluation, and planning for a potential 
incident. Decisions affecting equipment and possible evacuation are part of the planning 
process (FEMA, 2009a).   
Response 
 When disasters such as earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, or hurricanes occur, 
police, fire, and emergency medical personnel are usually the first responders to such 
events. Their mission is to control and secure the scene, attend to those in need of 
medical attention, suppress fires, and neutralize unsafe conditions. In the majority of 
instances, first responders are usually adequate to restore order, but in others they must 
stay on site until the emergency management teams can respond. Response is the 
discipline in which the NRF requires the use of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), 
which are designed to provide operational organization to all involved support agencies.  
Emergency Support Functions Applicable in the Response Discipline 
 Emergency support functions serve as coordinating mechanisms that provide 
assistance to other federal, state, and local responders involved in missions of primary  
162 
 
Federal interest and FEMA is the coordinator and primary agency. In the following 
pages, each ESF is described by its purpose statement, which includes its capabilities, 
operational concepts, and the designation of its member agencies.  
(ESF#1--Transportation: Coordinator Department of Transportation (DOT). The DOT 
coordinates all transportation safety and movement of personnel. 
ESF#2- Communications: Coordinator DHS-National Communications Center. 
Maintains oversight of all federal communications systems and is responsible for their 
protection. 
ESF#3--Public Works and Engineering: Coordinator Department of Defense-Army Corps 
of Engineers. The Corps is responsible for infrastructure protection and emergency 
repair. 
ESF#4--Firefighting: Coordinator Department of Agriculture-U.S. Forest Service. 
Coordinates and supports federal wild land, rural, and urban firefighting activities.  
ESF#5--Emergency Management: Coordinator DHS-FEMA. FEMA assigns all mission 
duties and manages resources, planning, and finances. FEMA also coordinates all 
incident activities.   
ESF#6--Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Service: Coordinator 
DHS-FEMA. FEMA is responsible for providing mass medical care, emergency 
assistance related to housing and related human services. 
ESF#7-- Logistics Management and Resource Support: Coordinator DHS-FEMA and 
General Services Administration provide comprehensive national incident logistics 
planning, space, services, supplies, equipment, and contracting services.  
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ESF#8--Public Health and Medical Services: Coordinator Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). Oversees public health issues related to major incident and 
ensures that public health system is capable of handling mass fatalities, as well as 
physical and mental health cases.  
ESF#9--Search and Rescue: Coordinator DHS-FEMA. Initiates life-saving assistance and 
directs search and rescue operations.  
ESF#10--Oil and Hazardous Materials Response: Coordinator Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). The EPA responds to oil and hazardous materials incidents, including 
chemical, biological, and radiological spills for short- and long-term environmental 
clean-up. 
ESF#11--Agriculture and Natural Resources: Coordinator Department of Agriculture 
(DOA). The DOA is responsible for food safety and security, provides nutrition 
assistance, and responds to animal and plant disease threats.   
ESF#12--Energy: Coordinator Department of Energy (DOE). Coordinates energy 
industry and provides energy forecasts. Also conducts energy infrastructure assessment 
and restoration.  
ESF#13--Public Safety and Security: Coordinator Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Coordinates security planning and provides technical assistance. Conducts facility and 
resource security, and supports local agencies in safety and security, site access, traffic, 
and crowd control. 
ESF#14--Long-Term Community Recovery: Coordinator: DHS-FEMA. FEMA conducts 
economic and social impact assessments to determine recovery from incident. FEMA 
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provides assistance to affected communities and works with local leaders to develop 
mitigation strategies.  
ESF#15—External Affairs: Coordinator: DHS. The DHS coordinates distribution of 
emergency information to the executive and legislative branches of government, as well 
as to the media, the general public, and international partners; and strives to maintain 
good community relations.   
Support Annex Summaries 
 The NRF also includes support annexes that describe how departments and 
agencies not listed as coordinators in the ESFs interface with those coordinators to 
facilitate and execute the common functions to ensure efficient and effective incident 
management. These eight annexes are listed as Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, 
Financial Management, Public Affairs, International Coordination, Private Sector 
Coordination, Tribal Relations, Worker Safety and Health, and Volunteer and Donations 
Management. The NRF specifies and defines the roles that each participant plays in a 
given incident, from a local citizen to the president.  
Recovery 
 The recovery process presents a more complex set of issues that must be decided 
by local community leaders. Those decisions depend on what comes first; rebuilding 
homes, restoring businesses, resuming employment, replacing city, personal property, or  
rebuilding damaged infrastructure permanently. Choices must strike a balance between 
an immediate need to return to normalcy and the long-term goal of mitigating future 
vulnerability. The goal of recovery is to bring all stakeholders together to plan, finance, 
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and implement strategies that will bring the community back to a safer and more secure 
state than it was before disaster struck, as quickly as possible. 
Mitigation 
 Mitigation is the sustained effort taken by affected communities to reduce or 
eliminate risk to a population or particular property from all hazards and their effects. 
Costs of hazards to American taxpayers continue to exceed $45 billion annually with no 
likely relief in the years that follow due to climate change and rising sea levels. The 
function of mitigation differs from the other disciplines of preparedness, response, and 
recovery, in that mitigation looks at long-term plans and solutions to the effects of risk 
and vulnerability. The intent of mitigation is to ensure that fewer communities fall victim 
to disasters by creating economically secure, socially stable, better built, and more 
environmentally sound sites.res the involvement of local leaders, financial companies, 
building officials, land-use planners, business owners, insurance companies, concerned 





Appendix D: An Emergency Management Plan for the State of Florida 
 Florida is one of the fastest growing states in the nation with a population of 
19,600,000, and is projected to surpass New York as the third most populous state in the 
union. In the past decade, Florida has become a haven for various retired professionals 
attracted to its pleasant year-round climate, its beautiful beaches, fine dining 
establishments, abundant medical facilities, museums, and world-class performance arts. 
For these amenities, residents tolerate a seasonal hurricane, a wild fire, or infrequent oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Florida generates much of its revenue from tourism, which 
hurricanes, oil spills, and wild fires can impact in a negative way. Prevention and 
protection from oil spills usually fall within the purview of the industry and the federal 
government. The best measures against this type of threat are prevention first, followed 
by preparedness, along with the readiness to respond quickly and effectively. Costs for 
the response, recovery, and cleanup following these types of man-made disasters is 
usually borne by the industry responsible for monitoring them, as well as by affected 
states and the federal government.  
 The geophysical location of the Florida peninsula is subject to hurricanes from the 
first of June through the end of November when cold air from the Arctic region flows 
down to the Midwest and Southeast parts of the country where it meets warm trade-winds 
from the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. These same trade-winds often bring 
heavy rains along with severe thunder storms laden with lightning, which tend to spark 
grass and forest fires in the Everglades and forested areas of the state. These are natural 
disasters common to Southwest Florida, but oil spills, on the other hand, are usually 
technical or manmade disasters caused by negligence, accident, or lack of oversight by 
companies in their quest for oil. Even small spills tend to affect the state’s source of 
revenue until they are cleaned up because their effect has a negative impact on the state’s 
fishing industry, as well as on other water activities which have an adverse affect on 
tourism. Fires initiated by lightning strikes in the Everglades or forest areas damage the 
sea of grass, burn trees, kill wild life, and Easterly winds carry the smoke westward 
toward the more populated areas of the state, which affects people with respiratory  
conditions. Response to such fires is usually led by the county’s various fire districts and 
depending on the depth and breadth of the fire, other districts may be called to assist. The 
state’s Environmental Protection Agency, Homeland Security Department, State Fire 
Marshal, as well as the Florida Department of Agriculture and Forest Service would also 
be involved. All funding for these fires is borne by the individual fire districts involved 
and state supplements, as well as fire fighting grants from FEMA.  
 Although there is no known way to prevent these natural disasters, localities can 
plan to protect themselves from their most serious effects. In the case of serious 
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hurricanes, preparation for, and protection from, these storms often involves the evasion 
process by residents taking clearly marked routes away from the hurricane’s path. Sealing 
homes and stocking them with water, battery operated devices and foodstuffs, are normal 
procedures for residents who choose to ride out the storm and shelter in place. In those 
instances when the storms are projected to become especially destructive, the federal 
government will become involved and supplement the state’s response with FEMA-
provided personnel and funding assistance to provide temporary housing, equipment, as 
well as necessary food stuffs. In each of these scenarios, the state of Florida would 
deploy an appropriately trained regional State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to 
assist, or to lead first responders at the site of a particular disaster. Florida is also one of 
the first states to develop and implement a statewide communications interoperability 
capability to coordinate all state agencies involved in a particular response to a major 
disaster.  
 The findings of an immediate response by a regional SERT team would determine 
the nature and extent of the damage and recommend the required expertise to deal with 
the threat or hazard. Each responder would have overlapping jurisdiction, with one 
agency relying on the expertise and response capability of another as defined by, and in 
accordance with provisions of the NRF and NIMS. The Incident Command Center (ICS) 
would also be organized in the same fashion, but in those instances involving natural 
disasters, the emergency management team would assume leadership roles in the  
recovery and mitigation processes, with law enforcement providing a support role to 
maintain order. In either scenario, the Governor would retain the option of mobilizing the 
state’s National Guard to provide site security or to help maintain order and release law 
enforcement to continue their regular duties. 
 The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) operates as an 
independent office within the executive branch of state government. The division’s 
mission is to ensure that the state is prepared to respond to all emergencies, recover from 
them, and to militate against their impact. With that assigned responsibility, the division 
plans for and responds to all natural and manmade disasters, which often range from 
floods and hurricanes to hazardous material spills, nuclear power alerts, and seasonal 
wildfires. In that capacity, the FDEM administers a statewide emergency management 
all-hazards preparedness program that focuses on the four disciplines of preparedness, 
response, recovery, and mitigation. In addition, the FDEM is responsible for the constant 
state of readiness of its seven State Emergency Response Teams (SERTs) which are 
comprised of members from various intergovernmental groups, volunteers, and from the 
private sector, who have differing levels of expertise in a number of areas. To ensure a 
ready response to a disaster site, the FDEM has divided the state’s 67 counties into seven 
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regional offices, each led by a Regional Coordinator. Each region coordinates activity 
with a 24/7 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at the state capital in Tallahassee. 
 Florida’s domestic security program has been implemented following 
collaboration with state and local government agencies, as well as private sector partners 
to ensure that statewide response plans integrate multi-agency needs yet remain focused 
on one state mission. The state’s plan is based on a structure that provides multi-
jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary participation at all levels of government; consistency 
in response protocols, response equipment and training, including interoperable 
communications, and a process that promotes consensus to ensure local, state, and federal 
initiatives work toward a common goal. The effective response capability at all levels of 
state government requires preparedness for all-hazards and contingencies at personnel 
and organizational levels. This level of preparedness was prompted by the nation’s  
exhibited vulnerability as surfaced by the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the general 
lack of federal and state preparation to respond, mitigate, and recover from the effects of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. With those incidents in mind, the state’s emergency 
management planners and specialists produced the nation’s first state-level 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and all-hazards preparedness program that 
fulfills and implements the National Incident Management System requirements outlined 
in the National Response Framework. The plan’s key elements of strategy, structure, and 
partnerships are designed to focus on acts of terrorism and natural disaster response 
missions. These include the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of terrorist acts, 
along with the protection of Florida’s citizens, visitors, and critical infrastructure during 
the application of the four primary disciplines of emergency management.  
 Operationally, the Florida Division of Emergency Management is designated the 
lead agency for responses. On-site FDEM manages all emergency events in accordance 
with Incident Command (ICS) structures, doctrine, and procedures as they are defined by 
NIMS. Florida’s plan includes the unique feature that calls for the regional placement of 
State Emergency Response Teams or (SERTs) which are comprised of highly trained 
specialists equipped to respond to all threats or disasters, whether natural or manmade. 
During a disaster within the state, a regional SERT will respond and be assisted by the 
Florida Division of Emergency Management. The team will also be supported by the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the Florida Highway Patrol, county and local 
law enforcement agencies, as well as all pertinent state agencies trained to respond to 
disasters of a particular type. 
 Since 2001, the state of Florida has distributed over a billion dollars of federal 
funds to state and local agencies for the building of all hazards scalable readiness systems 
which through mutual aid will ensure that all state levels of government have the 
necessary resources to protect their citizens, regardless of the type or nature of disaster. 
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These actions have resulted in Florida’s ability to develop and establish an effective 
disaster response system based on the National Response Framework (NRF), and the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). The state’s proven disaster response 
capabilities have instilled a high degree of operational confidence within the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and the Division of Emergency Management 
(FDEM). That confidence is especially noted in the state’s preparedness report, which 
was submitted by the FDEM in 2008. Florida State’s emergency preparedness and 
response plan underscores and stresses the operational philosophy of keeping the state’s 
urban and rural areas safe and secure through the practical and practiced efficacy of 
collaboration, cooperation, communication, and coordination by all first response 
participants. This philosophy is emphasized and articulated throughout the plan’s 
operating directives; most particularly in relation to the approach, structure, and 
execution of the plan’s preparation, response, mitigation, and recovery phases. In cases 
involving terrorist acts, federal and state law enforcement agencies would respond, but it 
is likely the FBI would be the lead investigative agency. The Florida plan’s remarkable 





Appendix E: Acronyms Used in Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
  
After-Action Report: A report that summarizes identified problems and deficiencies that 
 arose during a response to a disaster, recommending solutions to those issues.  
Agro-Terrorism: This is the description of terrorism against farming industries and 
 products.  
Al-Qaeda: The militant fundamentalist terrorist organization that attacked the U.S. on 
 September 11, 2001, whose name means the “base” in Arabic and which has since 
 morphed into various autonomous groups of jihadists throughout the Middle East, 
 the Arabian Peninsula, and Africa.  
Asymmetrical Warfare: Terrorist attacks by a militarily weak group against a militarily 
 strong group or nation. 
Border Protection: These terms refer to the security of America’s borders and other 
 ports of entry.    
Business Continuity Plan: A plan to assist critical business enterprises recover 
 following a disaster. Businesses provide food, medicine, building supplies, and 
 salaries to communities.  
Capacity Building: This is a strategy that attempts to enhance the ability of nations, 
 states, or communities to effectively deal with potential or actual terrorist attacks. 
CBRNE Weapons: The broad family of weapons that include chemical, biological, 
 radiological, nuclear, and explosive agents capable of causing mass death,  injury 
 and destruction. 
CERT:  A Cert is a community or citizens emergency response team that has received 
 formal  training in response, recovery, and mitigation operations.   
Civil Defense: The reactive term used to describe domestic security prior to the terrorist 
 attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Consequence Management: This is an emergency management function that stresses 
 planning, emergency medical response and public health, disaster relief, and 
 restoration of a community.  
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CSI:  Container security initiative was one of the first measures taken by the government 
 to protect maritime trade and ports against terrorism. 
COOP:  This is the plan that ensures a continuity of operations following a national 
 disaster which includes the list of leadership succession and agency 
 responsibilities.  
Crisis Management: This is a law enforcement function that concentrates on identifying, 
 anticipating, preventing, and prosecuting those involved in terrorism.  
Critical Infrastructure: Identified infrastructure determined to be critical for the normal 
 functioning of society, comprised of industrial, utility, transportation, and other 
 distribution systems.  
Cyber-Terrorism: The use of computers to attack agricultural, commercial, defense, 
 electric, financial, government, law enforcement, military, security, utility, and all 
 other grids the nations uses to function.  
Cyber-Security: Involves the protection and defense of computer networks and related 
 computer infrastructure.  
Dirty Bombs: These are explosive devices laden with dangerous amounts of chemicals 
 or radioactive materials designed to contaminate large population areas when 
 detonated. 
Disaster: An event that exceeds the resources of local first responders to deal effectively 
 with the response and recovery of that event. 
EMAC: The Emergency Management Assistance Compact of 1996 is an agreement 
 among all states, territories, and possessions to render assistance to one another in 
 time of need.  
Emergency Management & Response Personnel: Includes federal, state, territorial, 
 tribal, and local government representatives as well as NGOs, private sector 
 organizations, and owners of critical infrastructure.  




Failed State: A failed state is one that is weak or ungoverned and susceptible to a 
 terrorist takeover such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria. 
Fatwa: A fatwa is a religious edict issued by a Muslim cleric.  
FEMA: The federal emergency management agency responsible for federal policies, 
 programs, and actions to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all 
 hazards. 
First Responders: These are the police, fire, and emergency medical technicians who are 
 first to arrive at the scene of a disaster to preserve life, protect property, and 
 secure the site. 
Force Multiplier: This is the strategy of increasing striking power without increasing 
 manpower. Terrorists use the media, transnational support, computer and cell 
 phone technology, as well as religion as force multipliers.  
Hawala: This is an ancient financial system used by Muslims to move large amounts of 
 money  without actually exchanging funds over banking systems and international 
 borders, partly in efforts to avoid seizure by the Foreign Assets Control function 
 of the U.S. Treasury Department.   
Hazard: A potential source of danger to a community that may or may not become a 
 disaster. 
Hazmat: Hazardous materials that can pose a threat to the environment or a community’s 
 health if accidentally or intentionally released.  
Homeland Security: This is the proactive term that displaced civil defense as the 
 concept practiced to protect the homeland. As opposed to civil defense, 
 homeland security is a concerted effort to prevent terrorist attacks within  the 
 U.S., reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, recover from, and minimize the 
 damage of attacks that may occur.  
HSPD: A homeland security presidential directive bearing the legal authority of an 
 executive order issued by the President of the United States. They vary in name, 
 and President George W. Bush preferred this moniker. 
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Ideology: A core set of beliefs related to values, attitudes, ways of thinking, and goals, 
 whether based on political, religious, or other influences.    
Intelligence: This is the function of collecting, assessing, and disseminating information 
 about an enemy, a criminal, or a terrorist.  
Islamic Fundamentalists: This term describes militant individuals or groups of Muslims 
 that violently oppose the existence of the United States and Israel.  
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Forces are FBI-led groups comprised of federal, state, and 
 local law enforcement officers focused on the investigation of terrorist activities.  
Land-Use Planning: A process that is applied to determine how a community will 
 recover and grow following a disaster to mitigate a recurring disaster, and 
 includes, flood plain management, ordinances, easements, environmental 
 reviews, building codes and controls.  
Madrasah: A Madrasah is a school in Pakistan and other Middle East countries that 
 indoctrinate young students in extreme Islamic thought, and groom the most 
 tractable to become suicide bombers. 
Mitigation: A sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk to people and property from 
 the effects of hazards and disasters.  
Mujahedeen: In mainstream and radical Islam, the term is used to describe Holy 
 warriors and radicals use the term to describe jihadists.  
Mutual Aid: A formal collaborative agreement between jurisdictions to provide 
 assistance when aid is needed.  
NIMS: The national incident management system is a set of principles that guides the 
 systematic, proactive, approach by all government and nongovernment 
 organizations in their joint efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover 
 from, and mitigate the effects of life or property damage, and harm to the 
 environment.  
NRF: The national response framework is the established federal guide on how the 
 nation is to conduct all-hazards responses. 
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NRF: The national response framework is the established federal guide on how the 
 nation is to conduct all-hazards responses. 
NGO: This is the short term that describes organizations comprised of private citizens, 
 with no government affiliations, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army. 
9/11: A shortened reference to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
9/11 Commission: This is a shortened reference to the National Commission on Terrorist 
 Attacks upon the United States appointed by President George W. Bush to 
 investigate the attacks of 9/11. In 2004, the commission made over 40 
 recommendations for changing government, in particular the intelligence 
 services, to prevent future attacks.   
Ordinance: This is an authoritative order or law issued by a local, county, or state 
 government, intended to establish or modify certain public procedures.  
PKEMR: The post-Katrina emergency management reform act is a law which specifies 
 ways to avert the slow and disjointed federal response to the Katrina Hurricane 
 disaster in New Orleans, and establishes educational and experience 
 standards for emergency managers.      
Preparedness:  This term describes the state of readiness to respond to a crisis, disaster, 
 or any other type of emergency incident. 
Prevention: Encompasses counterterrorism operations such as intelligence gathering and 
 preventive strike activities.  
Protection: Encompasses antiterrorism operations to deny attacks and defend against 
 acts of  terrorism, which include improved building design, enhanced security, and 
 infrastructure protection.   
Recovery: This is the phase in emergency management that describes the development, 
 coordination and execution of disaster-site restoration plans. These plans are all-
 inclusive in that they involve government, nongovernment, private citizens, as 
  well as all other social, political, and economic restoration stakeholders with the 
 goal of rebuilding a better community. 
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Risk: This is the measure of likelihood that a hazard will manifest into an actual disaster 
 or emergency incident and the consequences that event will bring.  
SAR: Search and rescue operations during the response function to find and save lives. 
Secondary Devices: Follow-up bombs or destructive devices intended to create fear, 
 harm and disrupt responses to the initial attack.  
Sheltering: During a disaster, survivors indicate to emergency managers, local officials, 
 and off-site relatives or friends whether they will evacuate or shelter in place. 
Situation Report: A report submitted during an incident that assesses the nature and 
 scope of the disaster that estimates loss of life and property damage, and 
 describes the recovery measures underway as required by NIMS.  
Soft Targets: These are potential sites of terrorist attacks due to their openness and 
 accessibility to the general public. 
Suitcase Bomb: This is a portable nuclear or radiological device that can fit in a suitcase, 
 back pack, or large briefcase. 
Taliban: The name of the Afghan Islamic Fundamentalist group in Afghanistan that 
 provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks, which means 
 “student” in Arabic and “students” in Pashto.  
Theocracy: A government that is run by clerics in the name of God, such as that in Iran. 
Threat and Threat Assessment: A careful study of targets that may appeal to terrorists 
 and the appropriate recommendations on how to harden them.  
USA Patriot Act: An effective counterterrorism law which stands for Uniting and 
 Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct 
 Terrorism. The intent of this law is to prevent terrorist attacks and enhance law 
 enforcement’s capabilities. 
Vulnerability: Reflects a high degree of proneness to disaster and/or limited emergency 
 management capabilities.  
WMDs: These are weapons of mass destruction that will create major carnage, injuries, 




Appendix F-Request and Permission to Use Photos from KC Star 
February 16, 2016 
Sabrina Porter, PARS International, Agent for the Kansas City Star Newspaper 
212-221-9595 X 126; email sabrina.porter@parsintl.com 
Kansas City, Missouri 64119 
Dear Ms. Porter: 
Please accept this message as a formal request to use three photographs I borrowed from 
the KC Star newspaper and its website dated November 5, 2015. As I explained to you in 
yesterday’s text message, the sole purpose for their use in my dissertation is to illustrate 
the type and nature of storms that are common to the Kansas City vicinity during the 
rainy season. The photographs bore neither titles, nor names of the staff members who 
took them. I have attached them for your review and identification. My dissertation has 
since been completed and approved with the condition that permission from your office 
be acquired prior to their use. Please let me know if there is a fee for reproducing the 
photographs in this manner. Your assistance is appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
Manny Gonzalez, Doctoral Candidate, Walden University 
PERMISSION TO USE FORM 
_X_Granted: If used only for grading, not for general publication, or resold for profit.                 
__Not Granted 
Signature:  Sabrina Porter                                                           Title: Agent for the  
Date:  February 17, 2016                                                              Kansas City Star 
